Analyzing the Peculiarities of Higher Education in Korea:
A Historical Sociology of Education Exploration

Ki Seok “korbil” Kim

Korea Institute for Research in the Behavioral Sciences
Ki Seok “Korbil” Kim is currently Distinguished International Research Associate at the Paulo Freire Institute, UCLA and also at the Institute FREE Afrik, Burkina Faso. He is representing NGO, Educators without Borders (EWB)-Global, as Founder, Chairman & Chief Field-working Officer since 2007. He is Burkina Faso Honorary Consul to Korea with the decoration of the Knight of National Order in 2012.

He served as Endowed Chair Professor of Seoul Women’s University specialized in global education development cooperation after having retired from education professor of Seoul National University(SNU) in 2013. He was a member of the Fulbright New Century Scholars of Higher Education in 2008, and in Excellent Scholars Program, the National Research Foundation for 2009-2013. He holds a bachelor’s and master’s degree from SNU and PhD from University of Wisconsin-Madison. He won Alumni Achievement Award, School of Education, University of Wisconsin in 2003. His latest Korean book on Studies on Higher Education in Korea (Seoul: Education Sciences Press, 2009) was cited as the Best Books of the year by the National Academy of Sciences, Korea. He has been Invited Professor, Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University, Japan, and a visiting scholar at Ministry of Education and Sports, Laos (ADB Grant No. 0166-Lao on Strengthening Higher Education Phase 1), Board of Higher Education, Ministry of Education, Indonesia, and Center for Education Research at Stanford University, and Korea Institute, Harvard University.
Contents

Foreword / 1

Chapter 1. Why a Historical Sociology of Education? / 5

Chapter 2. Intellectual Renaissance and Origins of Training for Classical Literati in the East and the West: An Historical Comparison / 17

Chapter 3. Is Korean Education a Replica of the American Model? The Twisted Results of an Encounter between Indigenous Forces and Global Models / 35

Chapter 4. Divided Higher Education in a Divided Korea: A Comparative Analysis on the Rise of Seoul National University and Kim Il Sung University, 1945-1948 / 49

Chapter 5. Transition from High Schools to Universities / 77

Chapter 6. A Great Leap forward to Excellence in Research at Seoul National University, 1994-2006 / 101

Chapter 7. A Pyrrhic Victory? The Korean Passage to Tertiary Education for All / 119


References / 162

Source of the Papers / 168
Foreword

This book is to describe and explain analytically the peculiarities of Korean higher education. They have been made, unmade and remade to cope with domestic and international changes of the time. This book is a collection of the journal articles and book chapters that I published during the last two decades. In each of these articles I intended to explain how South Korean higher education system has developed and transformed in a peculiar geopolitical and historical context and what role it played for South Korean society to become the world’s economic power over the destruction and devastation after the June 25 War in 1950. South Korea was ranked as the 6th largest exports country in 2015. According to World Bank data, South Korea’s GDP is the 12th in the world. In 2019 the World Economic Forum(WEF) showed Korea becomes 13th in it’s Global Competitiveness Index.

In this rapid and impressive economic growth, Korean higher education system has played a critical role. The notable characteristics of this system include universal access to tertiary education, the degree of privatization is incredible, and is characterized by wide variation in quality. The Korean case is indeed an inspirational story for other developing countries to draw valuable lessons from. At the level of tertiary education, there have been extraordinary achievements in making several world-class research universities in a very short period of the time. At the same time, however, significant dilemma such as universal access with high rates of unemployment, over-privatization and social equity issues that South Korea has experienced have to be underscored I aimed to write these research articles to fill the gap and share valuable insights and important policy implications for tertiary education experts and scholars. I believe Korean educational case is a Pyrrhic victory: win some the battles but lose the war. Thus, learning from the problems of South Korean experiences is as valuable as learning from the success. This is the central point of this book. I intend to analyze how and why questions, despite its remarkable expansion and impressive accomplishments, so that Korean educational system failed to accomplish its social goals and other countries can avoid these pitfalls.
My journey of knowledge sharing started in 2001 when I presented a paper entitled “Can Korea Build a World-class University? On the Practicality of Korea’s Ambitious Aspirations” a. Years later I made a research visit to the World Bank Tertiary Education Coordinating Unit chaired by Dr. J. Salmi to present Korean higher education reforms in response to a new wave of globalization world-wide. Those papers that ended up in this book are listed in the records of sources of the papers.

Any academic paper is hardly a work of a single author. In one way or another it is an outcome of cooperative and collective labor. This book exemplifies such collective labor. I’d like to take this opportunity to acknowledge my special thanks to scholars and colleagues who participated in this collective work. First, my deepest thanks should go to my American mentor, Michael Olneck, Emeritus Professor of Sociology and Education Policy Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison since 1980. He hired me as a graduate assistant for the quantitative research on the relationship between education and incomes. Serving him as a “number crunching” assistant (for statistical analyses) has paved a way for my becoming an independent and rigorous researcher. Our 1987 paper published in Sociology of Education might be one of the EPS’ academic legends. I started using punched cards of the mainframe computer in 1985 and advance to Super Minicomputers without card reader but data-disk and tape mounts. Technology changed swiftly but not statistical analyses, graphic plotting and draft writings. Two years later when I got a job at Seoul National University in 1985, Mike sent a short email note saying our paper is now published. It took more than six years of hard-working of data handling and painstaking drafting tables and graphics from number crunching work to publishing peer-reviewed empirical paper. Without elbow-to-elbow work with Mike, I could not have reinvented myself as an education scientist. After a long day of working, leaving tables and graphics behind at his office, we drove back to his home together at about midnight to celebrate with a shot of Jack Daniel whisky. We couldn’t be happier when we chatted on our new research findings. He told to me that his “Sandy” did the same ritual of cheering

a The theme of the meeting was First International Forum on Education Reform: Experiences of Selected Countries, Office of the National Education Commission, Bangkok, Thailand, 2001.
at Harvard and he followed it at UW-Madison. Sandy is the middle name, using only by his intimate colleagues and students, the Greater American Sociologist, Christopher Sandy Jencks who published Inequality in 1973. Mike was a graduate student doing number crunch job. In the following work of *Who Gets Ahead*, Mike became a chapter writer on education. At SNU, I repeated the tradition of one shot of Jack after having sleepless nights of empirical data analyses at my office, 11-434 Education Building.

As a non-native English speaker, writing my ideas and thoughts in English is incredibly frustrating. I am grateful to Sociology Professor S. H. Nam in CSUCI, a Korean Badger (UW-M alumnae) who did more than proofreading of my rough draft that I presented at a Boston University meeting organized by P. Altbach and Jorge Balan of the Ford Foundation. After much tedious work of restructuring, it became Chapter 7. In my struggles, I am very fortunate to have met Professor A. Banks, TESL professor of the SNU Brain Korea 21, who did proofread every paper in the book and, for the last two years, the whole draft twice.

The colleagues whom I am deeply indebted to are the co-authors of the papers. Among them are my former doctoral students and now colleagues, professors S.S. Kim (Seoul National University of Education) and H. B. Park (Chungnam National University.) They helped me with utilizing rigorous and robust methodologies. Our archival work on the Captured North Korean Documents in Pyongyang during the 6. 25 War (referred as to Record Group 242) best demonstrates the collective nature of my study. After the war, the RG 242 was shipped to America and well-kept in National Archives II in College Park until I started to dig into deep with my doctoral students for more than 10 years since 1996. I wrote Chapter 4 of this book, analyzing the original hand-written records on North Korea education. These records clearly convinced me that, quite contrary to the claims that often made by Korean historical revisionists, the burning issue in the establishing of Seoul National University in 1946 is not political confrontation between right and left. The most controversy was whether or not to keep internal governance (or faculty republic) inherited from the Japanese Imperial Universities. The sharp difference of the idea of the university and governance was a moving force of the conflict. In short, de-colonization was failed and compromise prevailed. Thanks to the originality of evidences, several doctoral students completed their dissertations with distinction.
The brand new Ph.D. in 2019 and a former undergraduate and master’s student of mine, Ms. Y. K. Min of SNU, did all the small and big jobs in finalizing this book. Mr. C. G. Lee, the former Administrative Manager of SNU Library kindly arranged me a workspace at Faculty Lounge. Special appreciation goes to the President of Korea Institute on Research in the Behavioral Sciences (KIRBS) Dr. J. S. Lee, who makes this book available to researchers abroad.

Last, but not the least, my whole-hearted personal appreciation must go to my life-long companion Dr. Chanran Kim, a retired Professor of Seoul Women’s University. It is not a secret that Korbil has been some sort of a self-professed maverick, ranging from being a non-conformist to an outright rebel. For a very long time, especially since my faculty careers from 1985, South Korea has been in seriously troubled water, bouncing from one form of oppression to another until now. She is the bridge over the troubled world, and never forgot to watch my back. This book comes out of her enormously generous support and loving patience.

February 8, 2020
Ki Seok “Kobil” Kim
Chapter 1

Why a Historical Sociology of Education?

After all, what is history if it is not an analysis of the present, since the constituent components of the present are only to be found in the past?

Emil Durkheim (1936)

1. Doing historical sociology of education

This book is about to study and explain how current Korean tertiary has emerged and developed. The most intriguing question is why current higher education from the 1945 been undergoing a severe crisis which has by no means reached its conclusion. At the turn of the 20 century when Durkheim has seen a series of a profound crisis of European classical education, the backbone of the French secondary education that has been molding and remolding over the ten centuries. Inspired by him and his method, I will faithfully follow his footsteps to explain the roots of the crisis of Korean tertiary education for the last seven decades or so.

It is a collection of academic journal papers published from 2001 to 2018. It is primarily aimed at explaining the historical formation of higher education in Korea. The research method used here is what we would refer to as historical sociology. This method may lead us to a deeper understanding of the complex and intriguing processes in the shaping of Korean higher education. At the level of abstract theorizing, there is indeed no need to defend the use of this method, since this approach has been used by a number of sociologists before and after Abrams’ brilliant and seminal work, Historical Sociology (1982). Adams seconded S. Jones’ note that “sociology as a theoretical disciple and history as an empirical discipline have been happily drifting toward one another for several years; a fruitful and contented marriage may now be envisaged.” (x). He also underlined a general call for “recognition of the importance of historical time in social analysis.” Further encouragement followed from diverse sociologists. C. W. Mill, for example, insisted in “the inseparability of history and sociology.” E. A. Shils often argued that time
is also a constitutive property of society. Giddens (1979) also emphasized the necessity of appropriating the notion of time in sociological theory. According to Giddens, “the exclusion of time” has its counterpart in the repression of the temporality of social institutions in social theory—a repression effected largely by means of the division of synchronic from diachronic. But this kind of separation has no rational justification; with the recovery of temporality as integral to social theory, history and sociology become methodologically indistinguishable.”

The answer that almost every historical sociologist has tried to answer is actually very simple: “to what extent does the world have to be the way it is?” (Abrams, p. 5) The answers they have variously found differ in accordance with theoretical perspectives provided by Marx, Weber and Durkheim. The objects of their investigations were the major social changes which developed and evolved over long periods such as the transition to industrialism, building the bourgeois nation states, class formation and associated struggles, and bureaucratization. Areas rarely studied are those of social theory and empirical studies on the making of Western/modern education among sociologists mainly inspired by Marx and Weber.

Among the three great creators of social theories, it is only E. Durkheim who has demonstrated a very keen interest in education, not only as a theorist but as a teacher. He demonstrated the unequivocally outstanding example of historical sociology of education. At the time of the 1902 French educational reforms, the University of Paris opened a new course on the History of Education in France for all the elite cadets seeking the aggregation. It is still compulsory for those aspiring to become lyese professors in letters and in sciences. The University asked Durkheim to teach on that course and he began lecturing on the program in 1904-05 and continued every year until 1923.

His intention was to explain the formation of secondary education (after the Revolution, lyese) in France. The French title of his 27 lectures was L’evolution pedagogique en France. It was not until 1977 that the book was translated into English. In this work, he traced the development or evolution of lyese over the ten thousand years since the 11th and 12th Centuries, from the very earliest origins of the University of Paris. Due to delays in translation, the book “has been almost completely ignored by writers on Durkheim and on the history and sociology of education (Lukes, 1975, p. 379, Footnote 2). A noticeable ignorance is Abrams’
treatment of Durkheim’s works. Since there was no way of reading this book when he originally wrote Historical Sociology, he sticks to the notion of anomie from The Division of Labor in Society (1933). In his 1982 book, he is both correct and mistaken. He is right in that Durkheim explained the transition to industrialism in terms of anomie, in the same manner as other historical sociologists. He is wrong in that he criticized the book on the Division as being “unhistorical.” Was this so? Durkheim is “not interested in anchoring his argument in any sort of demonstration of what actually happened.” (Abrams, p. 27) A careful reading of Durkheim’s two works published in 1933 and 1938 suggested that Abram’s harsh criticism of being “unhistorical” only applied to analyses of the book of the Division. He is not a simple historical sociologist, but by extending the scientific method to cover all education issues, it appears to be is the Mater of a historical sociologist of education.

In my previous book of Historical Sociology of Education for Korean readers (Kim, 1999), I introduced the necessity of using the method to explain the shaping of modern (western, in fact) education in Korea; starting from the opening of the ports to the (1894-1895) Gabo Education Reform (Kim & Ryu, 1994). When I and my doctoral students collectively traced the origins of modern education in Korea, we came across another historian of education who succinctly demonstrated the importance of the historical relationship between civilization and education. In his analyses of the formation of Western Education in Antiquity (Marrou, 1965), he identified that “there is a certain time lag” between the two. “A civilization must achieve its true form before it can create the education in which it is reflected.” (xiii)” The development of schools or an education system always accordingly followed the maturation of civilization. To use his words: “education is a secondary activity, subordinate to the life of the civilization of which it forms a part, and normally appearing as its epitome.” Once the Western ancient civilization achieved its true form, sometime during the period from BC 1,000 to AD 500, education in antiquity started to reflect the civilization from whence it sprung. It is only in the generation following Aristoteles and Alexander the Great that education assumed its classical and definitive form: thereafter it underwent no substantial change (Marrou, 1965). To search for the beginning of education, we had better trace the development of a civilization that the education system reflected. We
better analyze in depth of the historical relationship of what Marrou termed “the time lag” between a civilization and education. This is precisely what Durkheim did when he traced the evolution and development of Lyses over the ten centuries since the 11th and 12th Centuries in Europe.

He started his first lecture by drawing the boundaries of what education studies is. “To use reflection methodically is to do education theory.” (Durkheim, p. 7) According to the translator, the term “education theory” was in French “pedagogie” which is the key concept running through all of his lectures and remains part of the title. Before going further, we have to keep in mind the threefold distinctions of the concept : 1) the scientific theory of education, 2) the art of teaching, consisting of the ways of acting, practices, systemized skills; 3) pedagogy, or seeking to “combine, assimilatingly as possible, all the data science puts at its disposal, at a given time, as a guide to action.” (p. 5) Next, we need to research the deeper meaning of reflection. This means “the scourge and enemy of routine” and “it prevents habits from becoming immutable, rigid and sacrosanct.” (p. 6) If reflection has been stimulated; it cannot help but apply itself to those education problems over time. It is only by carefully studying the past that we come to anticipate the future, and to understand the present; consequently a history of education provides the soundest basis for the study of educational theory (p. 9). On the point of where true research begins, Durkheim makes this point, as below:

And that is precisely why a study of history is so important and worthwhile. Instead of starting out by what the contemporary idea ought to be, we must transport ourselves to the other end of the historical time-scale; we must strive to understand the educational ideology most remote in time from our own, the one which was the first elaborated in European culture. We will study it, describe it and, as far as we are able to, explain it. Then, step by step we will follow the series of changes in society itself, until finally arrive at the contemporary situation. That is where we must end, not where we must begin (p. 12).

After clarifying the term “reflection” and “methodically,” he advanced to elucidate the research method of historical sociology, and in so doing revealed both its value and necessity. He showed that “we shall be seeking the causes of this peculiarity in the history of our education.” At this point he sounded like an
evolutionary biologist who seeks to trace the origins of the species in his claim that “we must go back until we have reached the first nucleus of educational ideas and the first embryo of educational institutions. He also uses the terms such as “egg”, “nucleus”, “worm” and “the original germinative cell.” In his search for these things, he pays special attention to his search for the social mores of the time to which they are closely linked.

He believed in the idea that education has its own spirit and its own life in its evolution, which is relatively autonomous. (xii) This idea is the key concept which has made such an enormous impact on the rise of the British new sociology of education led by Basil Bernstein. Combined with the works of Bourdieu, they succinctly presented the concept of relative autonomy of both education and culture. Their studies laid the cornerstone upon which cultural reproduction theory and sociology school curriculum would later evolve.

From his empirical studies of the first germ of an academic institution which is still to be seen in the history of modern French societies, he discovered a convict that St. Augustine founded at Hippo where the pupils live together (p. 24). Gradually, this was to evolve into the Cathedral and Monastic schools. These schools are seen by him as being “very much humble and modest” and views them as being the forebears from whence the entire “French system of education emerged.” (p. 24) Later, during the 11th and 12th Centuries, when the University of Paris emerged, it did so not as a more sophisticated version of the schools, but as “an entirely novel system of schooling” whose distinctive features have remained unchanged until recently (pp. 77-80). When the University started to become the center of excellence in research, into changed itself into something which was later identified as Scholasticism, there were four faculties within it: art, theology, law, and the medical faculty. The arts faculty functioned as a preparatory school for the other three vocational schools. It is the former that transformed to secondary schools called lyses during the Revolution.

The evolution of the arts faculty or lyses has not been harmonious but rather full of contradictions, conflicts and struggles. Durkheim summarized the process as follows:

Here as elsewhere the struggle for survival has led to results which are only crude and approximate. In general it is the best adoptive and the most gifted which
survive, but against that, this whole history is littered with a multitude of lamentable and unjustified triumphs, deaths and defeats. How many healthy ideas which ought to have survived to maturity has been cut down in their prime!” (p. 13)

The struggles continued on and on before and after the 1902 reform. French “secondary education has for more than a half century has been undergoing a serious crisis, which by no means has reached its conclusion. And this crisis not restricted only to the French.” (p. 24). This very serious sense of crisis and urgency is well reflected in the question as to why the University opened compulsory courses in the first instance and the reason why Durkheim took this work “more importantly, because circumstance seem to demand it of me.” (p. 1)

2. The Outline of the book

In Chapter 2 comprises, a comparative history of the intellectual renaissances which occurred in both the West and the East; is made between the West and the East this to reveals the origins of Korean higher education which served as a for the training ground for society’s elites. of elite of the society. It’s not yet well known that there has been a selective bias in the writing of the “world” history of higher education is still not a widely known or acknowledged reality. Western hegemony prevails in this academic endeavor. To recover one of the many lost traditions of higher education, I make a historical comparison of the two distinctive academic traditions representing the West and East: Scholasticism, which was revived in the 12 Century, and Korean Confucianism which was recapitulated in the 16th Century. If the organization of the University of Paris was where scholasticism blossomed in the medieval period in the Wests, then it was the is a material relationship between a mentor and his disciples, through which a distinctive academic lineage was formed, where the renaissance of Korean Confucianism has taken place since the early 16 century. I detected some of the undisputable differences in the Western and the Eastern ways of achieving to reach academic excellence. The goals, subjects, methods, and organizational bases of education do drastically differ. Instead of the centrality of the institution in the west, the centrality of scholarly relationships was the key factor in the East. These
differences, however, do not support for any value judgment of one tradition being superior to the other, as seen so in many books of the world history of higher education. A single-minded analysis zing of a foreign model from the western perspective does not lead to a global history, but a historical comparison will do.

Chapter 3 shows the process of the rise of the two representative universities in the south and north immediately righter after the collapse of the Japanese imperial occupation in 1945. From the examples presence of Seoul National University in Seoul and Kim Il-Seong University in Pyongyang, we clearly see a case of a divided higher educational system in Korea. This paper addresses a series of questions concerning the educational origins of the divided education system at the university level. This chapter R recounts both the traditional and revisionist views on the nature of the socio-political movements which opposed against the Seoul National University (hereafter, SNU) Plan. On this point, this , this paper makes the a claim that what occurred was, not the imposition of American imperialist intervention, but a division within the variety of scholarly organizations among Korean academics and professors, who failed to keep their promise of to strive together for a Grand Unity, and it internal conflicts which proved to be so was conducive to the division which took place. The two universities were created in October 1946 within just two weeks of each other. Hardly different were the rationale and procedures behind the making of these two “Supreme Universities were virtually identical”. Moreover, seen from the composition of the leading faculty members of each university, they were born as identical twins.

A built-in contradiction concerning university autonomy was the moving force behind the keen disputes about the SNU Plan which did not permit any form of self-government on the part of faculty members. A legendary tradition of self-government among professors first became the de facto legitimate practice during the struggle for the freedom of the academy in the history of the Japanese Imperial Universities. It was, however, maintained to protect the vested interests of professoriate privilege and prestige which was ere never shared with other professors in private universities or colleges. Newly appointed professors, who were mostly graduates of imperial universities and were members of the progressive political parties and leaders of various scholarly organizations wanted to inherit a progressive element of university autonomy, while reform-minded bureaucrats who
were graduates of American universities and members of the rightist political parties wanted to remove any reactive element of faculty autonomy which in fact led to the vicious Japanese tradition of school sectionalism. Contrary to the claims made by the revisionists, it was not the movement against the SNU Plan but the Plan itself that failed. The rise of SNU was a compromise between the two competing groups. This group competition facilitated the division. Key members of the former group who were opposed to the SNU Plan went to Pyongyang to actively participate in the founding making of Kim Il-Seong University and became the backbone of it. Some of the legacies of imperial universities remain at SNU.

Chapter 4 focuses on one of the unintended consequences of an educational reform aimed at transplanting a foreign model onto a local one, or more specifically, the results of imposing the American educational model upon Korea. To scrutinize the widely spoken claim that Korean education is but a replica of the American model, two instances are examined: university governance and American style admission officers. In Korea, when it comes to the establishment of a university system, local forces have exerted tremendous efforts at resisting the outright imposition of a foreign model. SNU is clearly not a mere carbon copy of an American public university regarding governance. Recent attempts to impose an American admissions officer system is also lacking in one essential feature. The key issue is not whether admissions officers are highly trained experts. However, But it is something to do with the notion of the essential freedom of a university including extensive use of subjective materials in selecting students. In short, both American styles external governance at SNU and the so-called American style admissions officer program have clearly resulted in superficial similarities, while the core structural realities have remained unchanged.

The chapter 5 addresses the issue that has been most seriously debated time after time in Korea for the last three decades or so. Is there any propensity for the scholastic achievement of high school students to decline because they attend a high school without an entrance exam? To answer this question, we compared the growth rates of students who enrolled in a prohibited school and a non-prohibited school. We analyzed a national sample data of National Assessment of Education Achievement administrated by the Korea Institute of Curriculum and Education (KICE) in 2001 and a trial Scholastic Aptitude Test administered by KICE. The
method we used was is a kind of 3-level latent variable regression hierarchical linear model; a model often termed the KC-model.

Using the KC-model, we found that the claim of “Equal Dull-Brained Policy” does not coincide with our data. There were no sector effects and no sign of declining growth rates over time among the ablest students. Moreover, an increase in test scores depends a lot more on other factors than on the admission policy. Cognitive development does not occur according to the sector but does occur according to IS levels at 10th grade or earlier achievement. There is something that is not clear. One of the claims that gets a good deal of attention in the controversy is the claim that a selective school is more advantageous to high-ranking students. This does not mean, however, that schools in the no-test sector are superior to those in the reference group. We are merely just suggesting that we could not find any the decisive or definitive actor conducive to the impressively higher achievement of the students in FL&S schools. On the internal reforms implemented at SNU over the last ten years and the effectiveness of these policies. The main strategy undertaken to bring SNU up to the world-class level was to emphatically pursue excellence in research. Long before governmental funds were allocated for this purpose from 1999 onwards, SNU had already vigorously pursued excellence in research and teaching. The experiences of SNU in these endeavors represents an important case study that bears vital theoretical and practical implications for other Korean universities, as well as for universities in other middle-income countries.

The Chapter 6 addresses the question of how to empower research competence of a kind which would lead a peripheral university like SNU to becoming a world-class university. There have been noticeable achievements in building competitive, first-class universities in many developing nations, particularly in Asian countries. This paper will examine the process by which SNU can be transformed SNU into a world-class university in Korea. The analysis will focus on the internal reforms implemented at SNU over the last ten years and the effectiveness of these policies. The main strategy undertaken to bring SNU up to the world-class level was to emphatically pursue excellence in research. Long before governmental funds were allocated for this purpose from 1999 onwards, SNU had already vigorously pursued excellence in research and teaching. The experiences of SNU in these
endeavors represent an important case study that bears vital theoretical and practical implications for other Korean universities, as well as for universities in other middle-income countries.

Chapter 7 analyzes the Korean passage towards tertiary education for all. With a specific focus on the traditional form of higher education, it tries to answer the questions of how and why this extra-ordinary phenomenon took place happens in such a short period. Applying a historical sociology method, it attempts to explain the mechanism and consequences of the simultaneous transition to universal access to both the secondary and tertiary education. Over-privatization has been the primary mechanism behind this e simultaneous transition since the late 1960’s. Such a heavy degree overflow of privatization in achieving universal access places a significant financial burden on families, particularly those of disadvantaged socioeconomic status. The more financial resources that come from the private sector, the more difficult it becomes to attain equitable access. There is no sign of a narrowing in the gap which exists between regions, socioeconomic status, gender, and family background, all of which have led to the inequality of access to universities and colleges. My final reflections revolve around are put on a simple question: “is this a story of outright victory or is this victory a largely pyrrhic one?”

Tertiary education in Korea is, as a whole, has been undergoing a severe crisis for the last seven decades since 1945. There seems, at present, no feasible solution. In Chapter Eight I presented some reflection on the past, the present, and the future of higher education. The reasons behind and the processes at work in why and how the current crisis is the principle concerns are the object of this book. The reasons behind and the processes at work in why and how the current crises are the principle concern is the object of this book. I shall sum up the three components that have been conducive to creating and prolonging the crisis: unstable governance, the lack of the division of labor in higher education system, and over-privatization in access and finance.

There have been conflicting conceptions of the idea of a university. Since the failure of replacing internal governance (Japanese form of faculty control) with to external governance (lay board) as embedded in the 1946 SNU Plan, the issue of governance was been unresolved and accordingly has long been at the stage of the
The worst case of the most confusing and most tension-ridden issue. Neither internal, nor external governance, but prevails the legal shackles of tight control of every aspect of the schools by the Ministry. There has always existed a cadre corps of incompetent and politically inclined bureaucrats in the Ministry. The absence of stable university governance was the critical factor leading to the total failure of the higher education system.

Most universities in Korea aspire to be like SNU, whilst Japanese universities aspire to be a Tokyo university. What has occurred is what Riesman termed a “meandering procession” on the road toward excellence as observed in the U.S. Compared to the Californian case of a division of labor, one of the most significant drawbacks of the universities in Korea was a fatal failure to create a variety of tertiary institution as a system with a clear-cut diversification and functional differentiation among schools. The maintenance of a rigid division of labor between research universities, the teaching universities and colleges, and two-year vocational training colleges might be the route to the overall expansion of social access. This system embodied the idea of higher education as more than a collection of individual institutions; rather, these were interdependent institutions operating within the framework of common public structures and with a commitment to a single set of ideas within structured limits. The system was a major departure from the idea of the university as a stand-alone firm. The absence of a well-coordinated higher education system has also critically affected the Korean economy and impacted upon the labor market. The higher educational institutions were not able to adequately meet the specific and strategic human resources needs of Korea’s rapidly growing knowledge-intensive industries.

The current “modern” higher education system of Korea started from the “Gap-o” 1894/95 Education Reform. However, the Confucian (551-479 B.C.) cultural tradition and practice of teaching around 500 BC was the historical and cultural origins of private higher learning in Korea. An archetype form of privatization emerged, following Confucius Analeptics (VII. 7); by bringing “bundles of dried fish” as nominal tuition to the teacher. The Confucian model also formed the basis for the very old form of non-formal and less-institutionalized (NFLI) private learning for intellectuals. This academic tradition and lineage composed of the very Asian form of private lessons, none of which can be found in the West.
While all higher education institutions in Korea rely on private funds, the vocational colleges have the highest degree of reliance on the private sector. This pattern differs sharply from the Californian Master Plan. In America, community colleges are mostly state-funded public institutions with virtually free education. Whilst both Japan and Korea were the two countries that have spent the least amount of public funds on higher education; Korea’s dependence has been much more severe than Japan’s. The loss of the meaning of education as a public good has fueled private expenditure on education. The ever-growing increase in the amount and proportion of private funds that were invested in the education market by parents has in turn further broken down the meaning of a common good. This vicious cycle of over-privatization was the mechanism of the simultaneous transition to universal access to secondary and tertiary education. The dominance of private vocational training meant that the financial burden from lower SES parents would continue to increase to the point so that the idea of higher education as a form of public good seemed to be severely eroded. Moreover, tertiary education has often served to reproduce the level of social and economic inequality outside the education system itself.
Chapter 2

Intellectual Renaissance and Origins of Training for Classical Literati in the East and the West:
An Historical Comparison

1. Introduction

These papers address one fundamental question: is it feasible to write a genuine global history of higher education? Approximately a century ago, Durkheim raised an interesting question in his lecture on the history of the University of Paris: “Can we really believe, for example, that to study the marvelous complexity of Indian civilization would be of less educational value than studying that of Rome, and that the humanity which it enshrines is somehow of an inferior quality?” (1938, p. 324) This question took hold and has travelled over time. It has been reiterated by others; (de Bary and Chafee, 1982, x) “Past studies of traditional education have too much often been based on the twin assumption of Asia backwardness and West superiority”. More recently Lucas (1998, p.5) spoke of the selection bias in writing histories of so-called world higher education which has been “unabashedly Eurocentric.” He listed the following lost traditions: “the great libraries associated with China’s successive dynasties… oral tradition and devotional centers nurture by the Vedandist.. Nestorian, Muslim scriptoria, centers of higher learning that once flourished in the principal West African cites of Jenne, Gao and Timbuktu under the Songghay imperia from the thirteen to the late sixteenth century.” The rich tradition of Korean Confucianism which blossomed from the 16th century in Korea is omitted from even this list. It was therefore not surprising that a Japanese scholar (Umakoci, 1997), who could not find any model of a western university in the 19th century Korea, concluded imperiously that Korea was too backward to possess a western university, unlike the recently modernized Japan.

It was true that the Korean authorities had no intention of implanting a western university in the same way as Japan had done with the University of Tokyo, it was
untrue to say that Korea had not possessed great centers of excellence in advanced learning before and after the 19th century. As will be seen more clearly later, the notion of scholasticism had been thoroughly digested amongst leading Korean intellectuals. Without direct contact with Catholic missionaries, these early modern scholars created their own church in the 18th century. The intellectual bridge between Korean Confucianism and Scholastic philosophy did not exist in the form of an institution such as a university but rather in the relationship between a brilliant scholar and his students. This relationship developed into a variety of non-formalized and less-institutionalized (NFLI) academic networks that later formed a distinctive academic lineage over generations.

Asian audiences have seen and experienced enough distortions from the discourses on the form of “modern” education which in reality means western education. By equalizing modern with western, authors implicitly treat non-western education as not worthy of the title of civilized education. This practice of a number of very important traditions is a form of selective traditionalism. Williams made a clear link between the practice of omission to “the most evident expression of the dominant and hegemonic pressures (1968, p.115).” The selective tradition is “an intentionally selective version of a shaping past and a pre-shaped present which is then powerfully operative in the process of social and cultural definition and identification.” In writing histories of universities, western institutes have been intentionally selected—in for emphasis, whilst East Asian practices have been excluded. In a western hegemonic dominance, “this selection is presented and usually successfully passed off as ‘the selective tradition’.“ (p.116) The seemingly powerful selective traditions are however weak at the same time, since “the real record is effectively recoverable, and many of the alternative or opposing practical continuities are still alive. (p.116)”. I will do two things in this paper: recover the lost tradition of the Korean higher education and compare it with the hegemonic one. In this comparison, I will focus on the material base of the intellectual renaissance in the East and in the West.
2. The Relationship between a Mentor and his Disciples in the Making of Korean Confucianism

Confucius is without doubt the source of the East Asian tradition of academic lineage. He never pretended to be an original thinker but claimed to be a humble scholar who wanted to transmit the ancient traditions of the Saga-Kings’ thoughts to later generations. He never took a higher position of power. His ultimate goal was only “recognizing the imperatives of Heaven” and “leading (others) to follow them.” (Analects 2:4) He never preached to an assembled congregation, nor spoke before a crowd. He always spoke in a scholarly and collegial manner. What de Bary (p.13) found in the Analects anecdotes was “a continuing intimate dialogue or discussion among friends and disciples.” In his life time, only a handful of his disciples and his grandson Zisi (481–402 BC) understood the true meanings of his teaching. Three hundred years after his death, thanks to Master Zi’s teachings, Mencius (372 – 289 BC) was able to interpret the text of Means reputedly written by his mentor and this formed the start of the tradition of the early Saga-hood. It took another gap of 1,4000 years after Mencius, before the Master Ch’eng brothers picked up the thread of what had not been successfully transmitted. Following them, Chu Hsi (1130–1200) took upon himself the task of restoring the academic lineage that had been lost after Mencius.

The legacy of Confucius has survived two renaissances over the last 2,500 years, since antique Confucianism in the Han Dynasty came into its own. The first was Confucianism reinvented by the Cheng Brothers and Chu Hsi in the Southern Song Dynasty and later coined as “Neo-Confucianism” by Jesuit monks (Fairbank, 1982, p. 82). The second is the rise of Korean Confucianism transplanted and recreated mostly by Master Taegye (Yi Whang, 1501–1570) in the Chosun Dynasty and later known as Shirhak (Sil means to seek truth through facts and hak means learning). During this one and half millennial cross-border succession, educational institutes funded by the central government existed in some form in Korea. It was true that Confucian teachings were taught in a state school called a Taixue (literally meant Greater Learning) or what Fairbank called a “National University” (1994, pp. 70–71) in China; and this had its counterpart of Sungkyunkwan in Korea. He compared Chinese institutes and western universities in the following way:
“Perhaps it is an over translation to call the imperial academy inaugurated in 124 BC as the National University.” He did indeed over translate the term Taixue since he could not deeply understand the real vehicle of intellectual renaissance in East Asia. Min (1980) also made the same error of over translation in his writings on the history of Chinese higher education. The institutional base of Taixue or Sungkyunkwan was very week, not because of the lack of power and privilege as existed in the University of Paris, but because of the nature of Confucian teachings.

In his brilliant historical sociology of western education, Durkheim (1938) demonstrated how the successive evolution from Cathedral schools, to the University of Paris and the Jesuit colleges were the driving forces behind three great renaissances: the Carolingian, that of the 12th Century, and the 16th Century Renaissances, respectively. Unlike the Western tradition, Taixue and Sungkyunkwan did not contribute anything fruitful in the making of an academic renaissance. Chu his put his greatest efforts into not the state school, Taixue, but private academic networks and academies. These were the very places of learning and inquiry “in a way not possible at state schools, which were organized on competitive lines and associated closely with the exams.” (de Bary & Chafee, 1982, p.8) However, the functions of academies were “tools of for working out the completion of Neo Confucianism.” (p. 10) Chu rebuilt and expanded an old academy known as “White Deer Grotto Academy” that became the most preeminent repository of Confucianism for the Southern Song Dynasty. At the core of such academies is the relationship between mentor and disciples in their mutual pursuit of the Heavenly Way.

In line with de Bary(1991, 49), Fairbank reiterated a number of reasons behind of a lack of organized institutional support for the Confucians as follows (1994, p. 63):

… they faced the state, as individual scholars unsupported by an organized party or active constituency. … It is this institutional weakness, highly dependent condition, and extreme insecurity marked the Confucians as ju “(softies”) in the politics of imperial China.

During the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910), intellectuals participated in academic activities through informal channels of communication between mentors and their disciples. Indigenous scholastic traditions were cultivated and maintained through academic discussions and the extended exchange of manuscripts, correspondence and
letters. These academic interactions, however, had been the center of excellence in research in keeping with the Confucian way and training of the power elites of the Kingdom. It was also at a variety of NFLI academic networks that most of the training of the Korean literati was carried out, ranging from family schools, to the Letter Halls, private academies, and to reading-study societies. Despite lacking a strong organizational base, a great number of academic relationships between prominent scholars of Confucianism as a central figure and their disciples was forged and renewed. It is common practice amongst Korean scholars to refer to such networks as “the Gate,” signifying a door leading to the Heavenly Way. (Kim, 1997) It was through such relationships that intellectual excellence and cultivation of the personality in its highest form was possible. If the University of Paris was the place where Scholasticism blossomed in the medieval periods, then it is the relationship between mentor and disciple, through which a distinctive academic lineage was formed, which is the source for the the Shirhak renaissance.

The Korean literati found Neo-Confucianism very appealing to their intellectual tastes, for it sought to build an ethical basis for an enlightened political order and it also represented a metaphysical system of thought that sought to find the roots of the natural order of the cosmos (Lee, p.217). Zhu’s teachings were liberal and humanistic as well. It is liberal, for it sought the reforming of existing unjust governments. It is also humanistic, since it regards “man as playing a central, creative role in the transformation of the world.” (de Bary, p. 7) In his commentary on the Great Learning, Chu Hi made it clear that the notion of self-renewal as the basis for a larger human renewal would indeed lead to political and economic reforms. Man can indeed be the measure of man, it was so “only because the high moral sense and cosmic dimension of the human mind-and-heart give it the capacity for self-transcendence.” (p. 10) He held the conviction that sage-hood could be learned by anyone, not by a selected few. These ideas were attractive to some scholars living in the Southern area, who were mostly political minorities (Lee, p. 233).

Chu Hsi’s cosmology asserted a dualism, where the great immutable principle of form (li) gives shape to material things (qi) that, when shaped by li, creates our existent reality. Behind this duality is Dao, the Way, the vast energizing force that pervades the universe and all things in it. “Only through disciplined self-cultivation
could a man acquire understanding of the Way and in pursuit of it forms his character.” (Fairbank, p. 98) Character cultivation therefore always started with “learning for the sake of oneself… to find the Way in oneself.” (de Bary, p. 9; Fairbank p. 99) Korean intellectuals embraced his idea of “genuine learning” which was in fact the dominant ideal of the Northern Sung reformers. When the same issue arose regarding the need for civic examinations for governmental jobs, reform-minded scholars attacked exam-minded scholarship as “learning for the sake of others” which contradicted the notion of “genuine learning.” On this, the Analects (1:3) spoke thus: “To be unsoured even if one is unrecognized, is this not to be a noble man.” “False learning” was studying “for the sake of impressing others or gaining their approval” or studying to pass a state exam. Chu Hsi was a traditionalist and a reformist as well. Like his mentors, he insisted on a return to the antique Saga-Kings’ tradition of thoughts and practices that had lost its’ succession for longer than one and a half millenniums. The only means of achieving this goal is “repossess the Way.” (Fairbank, p. 98) What Korean Shirhak scholars had done was also one way or another an attempt to “repossess the Way”, which that failed in its transmission after the Southern Song Dynasty.

It was T’ oegye’s disciples over a number of generations who stayed away from Neo-Confucianism and reinvented it anew into Korean Confucianism. From him and his disciples, we can find a prototype of a distinctive academic lineage which provided the material base for creating Shirak.

A disciple of Shunho (1681-1763), who placed a cornerstone for the renewal of Sirhak, wrote the following memorial words on his mentor’s tombstone.

Our scholarship had always grown from an academic lineage. The Korean Confucius, T’ oegye, taught his Way to Hangang who taught it in turn to Misu. As a disciple of Misu, Sungho inherited the legitimate academic lineage of T’ oegye.

Both Hangang(Chung Gu, 1543-1620) and Misu(Huh Mok, 1595-1682) were also prominent scholars of the time and formed an intellectual link to the rise of Shirhak. Sungho did not meet with his mentor Misu in person even once, but became his disciple only through reading his mentor’s writings. This academic lineage had nothing to do with the educational functions of Sungkyunkwan. Scholars in this line age were particularly aimed to counter the uncritical following of Confucius’s teachings and the strict adherence to formalism by followers of
Neo-Confucianism. They tried to understand the increasingly metaphysical nature of
thoughts and teachings that paid less attention to the social, political & economical
conditions of Korean Society. They wanted to recover the essence of “genuine
learning” in a place where scholars seek for “learning for others recognition.”
They paved the way so that scholar-officials could lead reforms to both the
government and people’s daily realities.

From a faction of Sungho’s lineage, a group of early converts started to emerge,
ot through the works of Catholic missions abroad, but rather on their own through
readings on scholastic books followed by discussions and critiques of books brought
back from Churches in Beijing. Among such books, one in particular had enormous
influence: True Accord of Catholicism written by a Jesuit monk, Mateo Ricci
(1552-1610) (Lee, p. 239). He was a very unique monk who had sought compatibility
between Neo-Confucianism and Scholasticism. He made it clear that the former
paved the way for the latter. He never rejected the long cherished practices of the
Rites which had been banned in 1788 by the papal bull. It was this very bull which
led to the Persecution of 1801. This was only revoked in 1938, long after the tragic
sacrifices made by thousands of innocents.

The second faction of Sungho’s disciples went on to firmly preserve the values
of Confucian orthodox doctrine. The historical records indicate that this group read
a vast amount of books on Scholasticism. A leading literati of this group wrote to
Sungho, in a series of letters severely criticizing the drawbacks of the European
University system, especially the ordering of school subjects. For him, feeding
technical and professional knowledge to young pupils without a sound base of
character-building was not education at all. After this group proposed a political
position rejecting heterodoxy – which in fact meant a rejection of the values and
thoughts of the West, including that of later westernized Japan – this faction
advanced their position to vehemently oppose the opening of the doors to the
West, by raging righteous wars against the Japanese invaders.

The Sirak led by Dasan (Chong Yag-yong, 1762-1836) placed a specific focus, not
on metaphysical discourse, but on natural and social sciences with a pragmatic
method of inquiry into the real conditions of society. His disciples all sought a
government free of corruption, national wealth, and utilitarian land reforms. There
were no records showing that Dasan’s scholarship was enriched at Sungkyunkwan.
He was remembered to be the best of the best literati, who built a springboard for the modern political and social reforms of later days. Led by him and succeeded by his academic linage, the Sirak scholars “impelled Yi Dynasty scholarship rapidly ahead in new directions.” (Lee, pp. 232-243) This higher learning has been credited with helping to create a modern Korea.

In short, some major characteristics of higher education in Korea can be specified as follows. Unlike the European model, it did not consist of organized, and very formal higher educational institutes. A Letter Hall was a space of learning and intellectual exchange which could be “enacted” at any time and in any place, if there was a scholarly teacher and a group of students with the desire and capacity to learn. This place was open to virtually all men, with a few exceptions. Co-existing with a network of public education institutes, private academies and academic linage functioned as the centers of excellence in research and higher learning. The current structures and operational environment of Korean universities reflect various conflicting models. They included a traditional mentor-disciple relationship, the German research university model adopted and transplanted by Japan, and that of the American research university progressively modeled since the 2000’s. (Kim & Woo, 2008) The case of Korea has indicated clearly that a history of higher education cannot be reduced to that of a study of those educational institutes called universities.

3. The University of Paris and the Making of Scholasticism

The queen of school subjects of the Western Europe changed its importance from grammar, dialectic and rhetoric among the seven liberal arts and this sequential transition of weight was in accordance with the evolution of what Durkheim (1938) had termed the three renaissances. Scholars of the three arts, or trivium, were intellectual pioneers of western learning. Alcuin (730-804), the first school master of its kind, appealed to the Emperor Charlemagne so as for him to legally establish schools in every abbey and monastery. The name scholasticism was derived from these church schools taught by arts scholars. These schools further evolved to Cathedral and Monastic Schools that became progressively centers of early medieval higher learning. Among the trivium, Aristotle’s dialectics played a
critical role in raising new forms of institutes outside the boundary of the Church. This innovated form of higher learning led to extraordinary intellectual activities which climaxed in the creation of the University of Paris around 1234.

Due to a revival of Aristotle’s works such as Categories, On the interpretation & Oreganion, school masters placed a more specific focus on dialectical reasoning and, by doing so, they gave a new direction to the Christian tradition in philosophy. This dialectical movement was led by prominent scholars such as Roscelin (1050–1125), Champeaux (1070–1121), and Abelard (1079–1142). Since the introduction and translation of Aristotle’s philosophy was done through Arabian scholars and accompanied by their commentaries, it was tinged with pantheism and idolatry. Scholars wanted to study Aristotle’s logic, but not his other works on the Greek classics, and they especially did not favor Arabic interpretations and commentaries on them. As done by grammatical scholars during the Carolingian renaissance, dialecticians kept the form but left out the content of the classic works, which were full of humanity and paganism.

The rise of Scholasticism was heavily influenced by foreign intellectual traditions such as Islam’s Ilm-al-kalam and Jewish philosophy, both of which used reason to defend their faiths and doctrines (Bowen, p. 90, 143) Theological scholars applied dialectics as an art of discussion and disputation to defend their faith, as Islamic thinkers pursued a rational theology. Collective efforts were made to set a rational theology that went far over St. Augustine’s conviction that faith aided reason as reason did so faith. Metaphysical controversies were moving forces of the advancement of the arts of the dialectic. In this historic momentum of scholarly evolution, overcoming ones mentor’s philosophical stance was a common practice in scholastic warfare.

In a debate known as the Great Controversy between nominalism vs. realism, scholars of two prominent philosophies of the time were Rosaline and Champeaux, to list a few. The question of this controversy is whether genera are constructions of the human mind or some kind of objective reality over a particular thing in which the genus participates. Their defense of realism was severely ruptured by their own disciple, Abelard. He criticized his mentors’ view, for they “had made a fundamental error in confusing the object with its name.” (Bowen, p. 53) His success stemmed from his superiority in disputing points with his own masters.
After breaching from his mentors, he became a “founding figure of Medieval Scholasticism (McGrade, 2003, p. 353.) In him, historians found “personified everything which the Middle Ages loved: brilliant dialectic, faith grounded in reason and that curious mixture of religious fervor and passion for knowledge which was the distinguishing mark of this great era.” (Bowen, p. 76) Its culmination was Aquinas’ s (1224/5-74) master work, the Summa the logiae (A Summary of Theology). It was regarded as the highest fruit of Scholasticism. He was a disciple of Albert the Great (1200-1280) who was a commanding genius in presenting Aristotle’s thoughts and was the first interpreter of Aristotle’s works in its entirety. From Alcuin to Abelard to Aquinas, there was, however, a clear absence of academic linage in Korea. Scholasticism has been a school of thought or a school of brilliant and outstanding scholars. Unlike the evolution of Confucian thought, a notable academic linage from Master to his disciples over one and a half millennia has little to do with this western intellectual movement. The material base of the western intellectual movement is, not that of a relationship between master and disciple as in Korea, but through highly formalized and strongly organized institutes called universities.

It remarkable that, of all the medieval institutions, the university resembles so closely its old form. It was the University of Paris that effectively taught Aristotle’s dialectics, and from this it became the center of scholastic controversies largely led by the Dominican or the Franciscans attempts to proveit’s the supremacy oof one over the other. The aggressiveness of this scholarly movement came from the Christian conception of education and its’ methods. The goals of Christian education sound similar to the Confucian one, for both seemed disinterested in imparting particular knowledge and ideas into the human mind, but cultivating “general disposition of the mind and the will.” (Durkheim, pp. 29-31) However, any apparent similarity stopped here. The ultimate goals of each were direct opposites. Confucius’ s teachings would lead a devoted scholar in its ultimate form to a sage. In principle everyone could become a sage. Christian teachings demanded that people to convert to its’ own system of values and doctrines. However, conversion is something which “is suddenly touched by grace.” In a continuous process of self-cultivation, reaching the Heavenly Way, grace or any sort of other worldly entity did nothing of good to scholars.
Conversion was “a profound movement, a result of which the soul in its entirety, by turning in a quite different direction, changes its position, its stance, and modifies its whole outlook on the world.”

Scholasticism could only be made by the mutual penetration of reason and faith within a single system of ideas. To make the two inseparable, school masters emphasized the teaching of the dialectic. Durkheim (p. 141) identified two methods of scholastic teaching: exposito and quaeestiones. The former is to elucidate the authors’ arguments made on the commentaries, and the latter is to debate or dispute. Scholars never attempted to debate the whole body of human knowledge. The disputation began where knowledge in its strict sense impossible. Or the subject of debate was matters in which strict proof was absent. Making strong arguments, one against another was inevitable, for it was regarded as the only way whereby scholars could separate truth from falsehood. In the classroom and in writing, it often takes the form of explicit disputation: a topic drawn from the tradition is broached in the form of a question, opponents’ responses are given, a counterproposal is argued and the opponent’s arguments are rebutted. Since the ultimate goal of debate is to defend faith from attacks of idolatry and paganism, disputes often “degenerated into slanging matches, vulgarities, insult and threats: ‘people even reach the point where they kicked, punched and bit one another.’ Wounded and dead were left lying on the floor.” (p. 142).

The mediaeval university as a guild, sprang from the term universitas which existed throughout Europe during the Middle Ages. It comprised a group of individuals with common goals. To convince members to cooperate and advance their common interests, guilds formed stable, self-enforcing associations that possessed structures for making and implementing collective decisions. The multiplicity of arts teachers was the base material that gave birth to the University of Paris which best expressed the medieval mind. Putting it differently, it was the University which was more representative than the Church of that time. “For it was only by uniting, by forming enduring associations, sufficiently powerful to command respect, that they managed to guarantee for themselves the legal right to exist.” (Durkheim, p. 79) To sustain these monopolized privileges, a body corporate demanded of its members a strict form of discipline and procedures.

The solidarity among teachers was solidified by the common practice of not
allowing anyone to be a teacher against their collective will. A teacher could not run any course without his teacher’s permission, at least at first teaching to the public. This practice was consolidated as a ceremony known as inception. When Abelard failed to follow this, he was accused of a major misdemeanor, sent to trial and was expelled from the school. This ceremony was used to restrict competition and to maintain respect for tradition. An arts teacher needed one other authorization. The chancellor at the Cathedral exerted a power to grant a license to teach. The sources of these two were quite opposite: the former being secular, the latter being religious. From these dual identities of arts masters, the character of the University was that of a half-secular and half- ecclesiastical institute or, at its deepest roots, an institute born of internal contradiction of these two opposing characteristics. The history of the western university has been that of the acrimonious struggles of secular forces and religious ones, some of which lasted long after the French Revolution, when the University of Paris legally became a non-religious state institution.

The medieval universities began by being nothing more than a corporation of different arts masters or law students. The University is a grouping of individual arts teachers, and not a grouping of different subjects. By making their organization a body corporate, liberal arts teachers made a notable success in exploiting the vested interests in monopolies and eliminating all competition. This University functioned as a defining institute, to the point that other schools strove to imitate. It took several hundred years to overcome the western idea of education as being for the selected and privileged few. This idea was not common among countries honoring the Confucian conception of education as being open to all men. His ideas on who were eligible to be a student of higher learning can best be summarized thus: “From the men bringing his bundles of dried flesh for my teaching, I have never refused instruction to anyone.” (Analects, 7: 7) Dr. Legge, the highest authority on Chinese Classics in the English speaking world, interpreted this phrase as follows: “However small the fee his pupils were able to afford, he never refused instruction. All that he required was an ardent desire for improvement, and some degree of capacity.” (1892, p. 61)

At the beginning of the 16th Century Renaissance, a scholastic scholar was regarded as a barbarian for his use of ruthless dialectic. The newly important
subject was changed to that of rhetoric along with the quest for the antique classical teachings of Greece and Rome. In this transition, the key players of the universities were replaced to a new religious order. This new religious order, the Society of Jesus, emerged to check the increasingly threatening spread of the Protestant Movement in Europe. This order was organized by Loyola together with a number of students of the University of Pairs in 1534. It was well known as an order of passive obedience and unity of action and religion. The Jesuits made it clear that the best tool for combating heresy was the education of the young generation. They started to build colleges as preparatory schools for the European universities. These schools were extraordinary successful all over the bourbon region, so much so that, as Durkheim has noted (p. 239), “all the great names of the 17th and 18th Centuries were pupils of the Jesuits.”

The Jesuits travelled to other continents such as Asia and South America. After stepping into India and Japan, they endeavored to create a China mission. This mission was to function as a window through which the West and the East shared and exchanged their intellectual and cultural traditions. As mentioned before, Ricci was the most towering Jesuit in this academic exchange. He was one of the first Western scholars to master the Confucian classics and became the first to translate them into Latin. He was one of the founding figures of the China Jesuit Mission. Referring to the Nestorian Monument discovered in 1623, the Jesuits used it to refer to decisive evidence that a thousand years earlier, the gospel had been proclaimed in China. Pointing to the western church as being an old religion to Chinese Kingdoms, they argued for a spiritual affinity between Neo-Confucianism (as coined by them) and Scholasticism.

Ricci’s intellectual brilliancy was evidenced in his argument that Confucius’s Lord of Heaven was identical to that of the Catholic work, God. His translation of Ruggieri’s (1543–1607) book into Chinese, known as True Account of God, was one of the most widely read and discussed, pored over and over again and having a major influence on the thoughts of Chinese and Korean scholars as well. He accordingly supported traditional Rites as the ancestor veneration of the dead. Based on his deep study and understandings of Confucian cultural traditions, he presented a convincing but somewhat disputable treaty that Confucianism and Christianity were not opposed, and in fact the former was a precursor to the latter.
It was this treaty which led to the Rite Controversy after his death for over a hundred years. As with other similar controversies, the controversy emerged within the Church and around the University of Paris. In this dispute, the bitter issue was whether or not Ricci’s defense of the Rites constituted paganism, heresy or idolatry. As late comers to China, the Dominican and the Franciscans carried this to the Church, but no decision could be made since no one in the Church or the University had sufficient knowledge of Chinese cultural traditions to provide the pope with a ruling. Even though the Dominicans had no intellectual capacity to clear the disputation, they helped the pope issue a bull against Ricci in 1715. However, in 1939, the pope rebuked that bull, and much belatedly recognized in his new decree the merely civil characteristics of the Rites, a claim repeatedly made by Ricci. However, it was not until 1958 that his approach was recognized as being the model of missionaries.

While he was active, Ricci also met a good number of Korean emissaries who seasonally made diplomatic visits to Beijing. Thanks to his prior reading of western books and through direct correspondence, Jyebong (Yi Su-gwang, 1563-1628) understood western knowledge of both sciences and scholasticism, and brought back books on these subjects with him to Korea. As is always done by a Korean scholar, he compiled a collection of books on new knowledge which became the first known encyclopedia ever written in Korean. Due to successive encounters with other emissaries, the Jesuits significantly helped to shape the making of the Sirhak movement. While the intellectual influences of China began to wane after the society was dissolved in 1773, this was not the case in Korea where reformed-minded scholars, seen in the likes of Sungho and his disciples. Such men digested the basics of western sciences and scholastic philosophy, made changes to fit them into the prevailing social and political conditions, and continued to develop them into their own system of ideas.

4. Discussion

Following the work of Durkheim and Lucas, I have made an attempt to recover a lost tradition that had not been recognized and thereafter rarely written in a history of its own. To do so, I compared two quite different renaissances in the
East and West: that of Scholasticism and Silrhak. In doing so, I came across a series of very interesting pairs representing the two respective intellectual traditions. The ultimate goal of the former is conversion, whereas the latter was a gradual process of becoming a this-worldly sage by self-cultivation of character. To defend its religion, scholastic scholars counted heavily on the rigorous use an intellectual fencing, while Confucian scholars pursued a collegial dialogue without any attempt to impose their own values and virtues. In the former, a man is merely a servant of God, while Confucian thinkers regard an individual as a measure of the universe. The opportunity of learning was very limited to but a privileged few in the west, but East Asian education was in principle open to all men who were determined to learn. In one tradition, to earn one’s reputation you must intellectually overpower your opponents, particularly your own mentors. This kind of breaching was hardly imaginable in the east. Among other things, western education was carried out in a strong corporate body, dedicated to protecting its’ own vest interests and privileges, but without highly formalized and forcefully organized institutes, a rather soft intellectual relationship between a mentor and his disciples prevails. This relationship evolved into a distinctive academic lineage over the passage of generations.

So far I have identified some of the undisputable differences in the Western and the Eastern way of achieving excellence in higher education. The goals, methods and intuitional bases of both education systems do indeed differ drastically. These identified differences do not support any value judgment of one tradition being superior to the other, as has been done so often before in many writings of the so-called “world” history of higher education. If we do believe Roman civilization is superior to Indian, we have little difficulty in reproducing western hegemony in writing the history of higher education. To make a judgment of an East Asian tradition from the point of view of the western model, some would argue that the absence of any institution comparable to the western one reveals the intellectual and cultural inferiority of other civilizations. However, overcoming the enormous pressure of western hegemony, anyone could find a simple fact that Korea, for example, has kept for long its own tradition, even as China’s collapse and Japan’s version was being forcefully superimposed.

It is true that the Confucian scholar is in fact weak in terms of their power
base. However, he never endorsed any war against anyone in a secular or a sacred sense. In seeking self-cultivation, there is no place to launch Crusades or engage in intellectual fencing against one’s opponents. It is scarcely possible to find any clause in the Analects or other classics that praises the conquest of nature and taking advantage of it to attain national wealth. On the contrary, it rather suggests a sustainable form of development by harmonizing nature with human beings. Some western intellectuals would make a decision to develop and later use, if necessary, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to protect their own civilization. Confucius advised kings that the first thing to be rid were weapons. Such advice makes him appear very naive and soft as a political advisor of the modern age, but his conviction that warfare was not an appropriate tool to keep peace the world has increasingly become more convincing now than in his own time.

Is there any way of making some reasonable composite of the two traditions into a single institute of higher education? The strong point of the East Asian tradition is the relationship between a teacher and his/her students. The strong point of the western tradition is the endurance of the University. Could we take the former as the contents, while the later as the form of intellectual evolution? Could we further try to fill the contents into the form? To put it another way, could we fill the East Asian model of a mentor-disciple relationship into a model lately known as the American research university? Many years ago, I conducted a study of Seoul National University (SNU) with a specific focus on excellence in research using two indexes: international school rankings and the adjusted productivity of schools. (Kim, 2007) In that case study, I reported that self-strengthening forces coming from the very relationship between a teacher and doctoral students has been utterly pivotal in its rapid but sustaining ascendance in the school rankings over the years. According to QS World University Ranking (http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings), the ranking of SNU has risen year on year since 2005, from 63rd to 37th in 2011.

My fundamental question was: “is a western model the only prototypic model of something such as intellectual renaissance, state formation, and industrial revolution?” Putting it differently, was the British industrialization depicted by Thomson’s powerful ethnography, the only model of Industrial Revolution to occur globally? Or wasn’t it in fact a very peculiar and idiosyncratic British journey,
from which followed many differently passages such as the French, German, Japanese and Korean patterns of industrialization. If the answer is no, we can map out a global history of higher education by making historical comparisons of a variety of ways in achieving excellence in research and education particular times and the particular places. This paper was an attempt at recovering one of the many lost traditions: the relationship between a mentor and his disciples as a material basis of the making of Shirhak which was by no means inferior to Scholasticism. This residual culture of an academic tradition has survived among modern time Korean universities, and acts even now as a pivotal force in the making of SNU into a world-class research university from her former position on the periphery.
Chapter 3
Is Korean Education a Replica of the American Model?
The Twisted Results of an Encounter between Indigenous Forces and Global Models

1. Introduction

This paper focuses on one of the unintended consequences of an education reform aimed at transplanting a foreign model onto an indigenous one, or more specifically, the results of imposing the American educational model upon Korea. If there exists any widely spread claim in the extant studies in the history of modern education, it is the one that modern Korean education is a replica of the American model. This rather bold but groundless claim is usually supported by two supporting arguments. These claims can, broadly speaking, be summarized as follows. Firstly, the foundation of the current Korean education system was shaped during the three years of reforms implemented by the American officers of the US Military Government in Korea (USMGIK). The 6-3-3-4 school ladder, for example, which was so conducive to school expansion, was copied directly from the American model.

Whilst it is true that de-colonization reforms were carried out during the three years from 1945 to 1948, the substance and contents of education, other than the form of its institutional and administrative arrangements, remained unchanged. Educational fever, that powerful force which had long shaped the fundamentals of Korean education, was carried over from the colonial period (1910-45) to the postwar independence era (1948 until the present). It also could be detected in the traditional forms of education which had existed long before the Japanese invasion in the early 1900’s. It is very difficult to find a single high school with three years of attendance in America. Furthermore, the high school itself is not separated by the probable destinations of students but is in fact tightly integrated into a comprehensive education system, including both college and vocation tracks which were available within the same school. In contrast to Korea, no American students
need to sit any form of entrance exam to progress a high school. Moreover, unlike America, high school education in Korea was not free. Korean parents had to pay the tuition fees of their children for the three years of upper secondary schooling.

In this paper, I plan to examine two instances that were apparently transplanted directly from American models, which on closer examination, turn out to be clearly Korean models with an outwardly American form. These are, firstly, the system of university governance itself, and secondly, the new system of “admissions officers.” The former instance emerged when historical revisionists made the claim that the establishment of Seoul National University (hereafter SNU) in 1946 was representative of an American cultural imperialistic intervention at work. In my earlier paper (Kim, 2001) I made it clear that what historians termed the “Kukdaean Dispute (literally translated as a plan for a national university)” had far less to do with political and ideological conflict but could be more accurately defined as a conflict over the very idea of the university itself; more specifically, the issue of university governance. This latter instance is one of the most hotly debated issues in higher education policy. There follow a push with many carrots from Minister of Education and Science Technology (MEST) with too much exaggeration of the appropriate function and the results expected of admission officers.

2. The second attempt to incorporate external governance

The Korean government has recently decided to try to incorporate an external governance system into SNU, after having failed to do so in 1946. Last November, a bold reform plan of incorporating SNU with an aim to extend this process later to other national universities was adopted at a cabinet meeting. MEST sent this plan to the National Assembly to legalize the policy in law. According to this new scheme, if enacted, SNU will be run by a governing board consisting of seven to 15 Directors including two higher officers from SNU and two deputy cabinet members. Since among the members only the Deputy President is an SNU employed faculty member, this board is a good example of external governance. Running a college with an external board first appeared in Scottish universities and this was subsequently transplanted into American colleges in the Colonial Era, where college
founders detested “the sloth and autonomy of Oxford scholars”, that is, faculty autonomy. (Thelin, 2004, pp. 11-12).

It is this Borders of Directors, in it’s role as a supreme decision making body, that is a core element of school management and operations. This model will culminate in the autonomous selection of a President who, under the present system, is selected by a popular vote combining one full vote from faculty members and, strangely enough, 0.1 vote from all members of regular, full-time academic staff. With In his follow-up briefing, the Minister made it clear that this policy could provide the opportunity for a long awaited measure which would allow SNU to transform itself into a leading world-class university. Furthermore, this reform could trigger a policy of incorporation for all the other national universities, as had been the case in Japan.

All Japanese national universities were incorporated on April 1, 2001. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Science and Technology made it clear that this reform was carried out with the objective of enabling national universities to improve the quality of their education and research, build appealing national universities rich in individuality and play a greater role in meeting the expectations of the public and society in a more competitive environment. This law transformed all the national universities into autonomous and independent institutes, this also included independence in the area of finance. The rhetorical pronouncements of both Korean and Japanese governments sound very similar but the attainment of these lofty expectations and outcomes has not yet been confirmed. Here is an excellent example and indications that the Korean model is following the Japanese model, which was in turn, originally adopted from the American model. This particular reform attempted to dramatically transform an internally governed institute into externally governed one. It is unavoidable that each school is involved in keen competition for survival and is forced to push for excellence in all areas. From the initial six years of the Japanese experiment on university governance, some observers have started to notice signs of widening gaps between the haves and the have-nots among corporate universities. The Japanese case helps contextualize the strong protests from within SNU; they not only from a considerable number of faculty members but also from a coalition of SNU unions, such as faculty, government official and workers unions. The government will
guarantee the provision of public funds to SNU as it has done so up until now as a national university. At this point, the final codification of this policy into law at Assembly in 2010 is not absolutely guaranteed, nor is it an absolute certainty that it will be extended to all the national universities.

The first attempt to incorporate external governance at SNU was made during the USMGIK administration in 1946. Dr. Paul Auh, also known as Cheon-Won (hereafter CW), who worked as a Deputy-Director at the Bureau of Education under the USMGIK, introduced the American idea of the public university (Oh, 1964, 416; 1975, 99-105). This was the American model of the university with departments as a unit of the school and a Carnegie unit system for academic grading. Quite contrary to many revisionists’ works which have focused on the ideological struggle between right and left, the real issue was indeed whether to implement internal (faculty-autonomy) or external (Board of Directors) governance. The debates and power struggles among professors finally ended up in a no-win situation when the Education Act was passed in 1950. This Act resulted in neither internal nor external governance, but tight central bureaucratic control by the Ministry over both the public and private universities. The Ministry has exerted enormous power in imposing limits on students and faculty quotas, tuition and salaries ever since. The idea of incorporating national universities has emerged to ease the tight and rigid control of higher education affairs by MEST, and to introduce competition among schools to promote long term survivability. The core of the reform is re-introducing external governance into the universities.

It was CW who first planned to establish an externally governed public university in Korea, even though this fact is not officially mentioned nor recognized in the series of school history books formally complied by the SNU authorities almost every ten years since 1946. His plan was to create a grand university to represent all the academic fields available for study in Korea. Twenty years after his planning (Oh, 1964), and thirty years after implementing the plan (Oh, 1975), he belatedly disclosed his pioneering role in the making of SNU. The establishment of this grand university was a long-cherished desire of the entire academic world since the defeat of Japanese imperialism. A similar plan was carried out in North Korea, which led to the establishment of Kimilsung University (KU). Both SNU and KU emerged through the merging of extant professional colleges into a national
university (Kim, 2001). The only difference between the two was the idea of the university: SNU’s founding ideal was that of an American public university, while KU sought to be an exemplary example of a socialist university best shown in the example of Moscow University in Russia.

For many years, professors and their students have believed that internal governance or faculty autonomy was the only appropriate model which was in line with the university ethos. The ideal type of this model was shown in Germany, in her efforts to establish the research-oriented Humboldt University, where education and research became one single core of university activity (Fallon. 1980, 28–31). It was also a legacy of Japanese colonial education, the self-administration of universities referred to exercising personnel management and financial rights, essential elements of management in the Imperial Universities in Japan. The Dean and Chairs of each department of the university were elected directly by the professors, and appointment, promotion, retirement and upgrading or reduction of remuneration was carried out through the Professors’ Council. This legacy, which actually personified the autonomy of professors, was publicly announced in the history of Japanese higher education. Some historians of Western education termed such practices as a form of “Faculty Republic.”(Musslen, 2001, pp. 23–29)

CW consistently claimed that the greatest advantage of his new plan was the complete removal of “factionalism” among colleges, a traditional practice of Japanese colonial education (Oh, 1975). He expressly stated that the public university could not accept the “self-administration of professors.” He knew very well that this practice of allowing professors to exercise the right to recruit personnel had originated from Tokyo or other Imperial Universities. To him, the legacies of Japanese imperial universities were regarded as an administrative mal-practice, akin to colonial slavery in education, whereby the ruling classes were to be cultivated with privilege. He was not willing to permit the colonial practice that allowed special groups of professors to govern the colleges they had graduated from, with the “exclusive tendency of rivalry of local barons”; all done in the name of self-administration. It was against the principles of democratic education he had experienced firsthand in America, having earned a master and doctoral degree from Cornell College in Iowa and Teachers College, Columbia University in NY, respectively.

To resolve conflicts among competing interest groups, the Military Governor
suggested a revision in the form of Act 102, the legal basis of SNU, on Feb. 27, 1947, and handed it over to the Interim-legislative Assembly. A more interesting point was that the U.S., drawing back from political turmoil, instead entrusted Koreans to handle the whole process of mapping out the compromise. A mere amalgamation of vocational colleges with a university is not the best way to create a university with a single identity. Even after the amalgamation was carried out, each college still strove to maintain a position of superiority and leadership. In 1968, 22 years after SNU first opened, the university authority decided to try and establish itself as a truly first rate and integrated university. Since the 1980’s, which constitutes the beginning of the era of political democracy in Korea, the issue was brought again to public notice in relation to the election of the college’s president by popular vote. Direct voting for the president is a common practice but not a legal device. The actualization of this however, according to public opinion within SNU and elsewhere, was regarded as a great achievement. This indicates how the system of appointing a president by government as a device of control over universities was cute. This system is a replica of the colonial universities, and we should not overlook that professors’ nostalgia or affection for the “good old days” affected their selection of popular voting. In particular, most professors, who based their idea of the university on the Japanese imperial university model, thought that voting was the method all universities should follow when they elected a president.

Along with the failure to implement a system of external governance, government is now pursuing the goal of an incorporated university where a group of external directors will function as a governing board of the university without a popular vote from professors in the selection of the head of the school. It was CW who first envisioned the future of the SNU governance model in 1946 and it has taken more than 60 years or so to make it a reality. The conflicting conceptions of the idea of the university have shaped the development of SNU, which needed to establish itself as a unified university, free from the “Monroe system” or factionalism among colleges, to use CW’s own terms. In some respects, de-colonization has not yet been fully realized at SNU. This will be even more so the case after this policy of incorporation is implemented in the years to come. Local forces exerted tremendous counter efforts when an attempt to impose upon them a foreign model of a university. In no sense can it be said that SNU is a
mere replica of an American public university. SNU has been, is and will be a Korean university, which nevertheless utilizes many American influences from time to time. The rapid rise of SNU in the world rankings may explain SNU’s capacity and determination to utilize the idea of the world-class research university in America. (Kim, 2007)

3. Introduction of so-called “the admissions officer” system

As a second instance of transferring an American education model into the Korean higher educational reality, the American model of what has been known as the “admissions officer system” will be subject to examination. A policy to expand this system has become one of the major issues in higher education, since it was recently (and abruptly) put forward by a school head of a small local college and later vigorously backed by MEST. Without knowing the essence of the model and its substantial implications, policy makers and university officers started to view this new idea as a panacea to drastically reduce the huge proportion of household income spent on private tuition for children in Korea. Some have argued that the widespread use of this system could resolve the chronic problems in college admissions. The sudden announcement from a publicity hungry president to adopt this new system drew the keen attention of policy makers and concerned citizens as well. MEST, regardless of the absence of any empirical verification of such a model’s usefulness and nor any analysis of the preparations necessary for adopting this totally new approach, announced a new administrative position to extend this model among universities together with substantial financial incentives. Some people suggested that this new system could be used not only in tertiary education but in the secondary school system as well to decide such matters as entrance to special schools such as Science High Schools or for admission to a new breed of International Middle School soon to be established.

In any society, the college admissions system is considered to be a very difficult issue as it is directly related to the cultivation of future leaders who will, through tertiary level education, later seek opportunities for honor, wealth and power. Colleges understandably act in their best interests to select the best candidates for admission as they provide the most fertile ground for the best education. However,
most countries, except for America, do not suffer from dysfunctional college admissions systems. They pay little attention to objective criteria such as school records and national test scores, and but rely mostly on their own discretion without any outside intervention. As shown in the area of college sports in America, even in cases where students are high school graduates but almost illiterate, prestigious colleges even offer scholarship for promising athletes. Such cases also apply to the children of faculty members, donors, or national leaders. The so-called “admissions officer system” made all this possible after the Office of Admissions was established in American private colleges in the 1920s. Renowned public universities soon followed the same path, which we now recognize as beings the beginning of the current admissions officer system. From the perspective of Western European or Japanese elitist universities, this model neglects objective criteria, and must therefore appear quite bizarre. It was this system which served as the new model that Korea introduced following earlier Japanese experiments.

In many cases, misunderstandings cause policy confusion and the “High School Equalization Policy” is a typical example of such confusion in Korea. Although the introduction of a lottery system is the essence of such a policy, it was criticized by people who misinterpreted it as being the “fruit of an egalitarian ideology”. This is also the case with the admissions officer system. The term “Admissions Officer” is translated as “Sa-jung-gwan” in Korean. Who, then are these officials? In the case of the previously quoted college that first initiated the debate, they admitted the reality of the situation and decided to make provisional arrangements to substitute well-trained professionals like admissions officers with social leaders outside school. Since there are not enough admissions officers with sufficient expertise and experience, they argue that social leaders such as formal ministers, emeritus professors and ambassadors could complement such an as yet immature system. This makeshift modification would be unimaginable in the American model as it was originally conceived. In the American model, the admissions officer refers to the President and Dean of the college while regular staff are also called officers. Although people refer to such staff as “Sa-jung-gwan (officer)” in Korea, the President is a key figure in the system, and he/she is able to set admissions criteria at his/her own discretion, independent of government control or the governing board. This criterion does not have to be limited to objective references.
such as academic excellence in the form of school grades and national test records, but it always includes the children of faculty, major donors and student-athletes. In the eyes of the traditional universities of Europe, this American model looks odd and sometimes, frankly, bizarre.

Why are subjective evaluations given priority over objective criteria in America? The following brief history of the admissions system explains this well. Since the 1920s, intellectually able young Jewish students from Eastern Europe descended on American colleges, increasing their proportion of the student body from 20% to 40%. Colombia established an office of admissions, and other private colleges soon followed suit. The Big Three (Harvard, Yale and Princeton) were not no exception. In order to regulate their admission rate, American colleges needed to include subjective references as a complementary measure, such as signed recommendations, interviews, and photos in some cases. The very first research on admissions data by the sociologist of education Karabel revealed several shocking realities (Karabel, 2005). His research shows that three prestigious colleges established offices of admissions and utilized subjective references in order to increase the numbers of male students from advantaged backgrounds, and simultaneously decreased the numbers students from minority backgrounds.

According to Krarabel, “the cornerstones of the new system were discretion and opacity-discretion so that the gatekeepers would be free to do what they wished and opacity so that how they used their discretion would not be subject of public scrutiny.” (p. 2) It was not surprising to see “the latitude to admit the dull sons of major donors and to exclude the brilliant but unpolished children of immigrants” in American private colleges. It’s a well known fact that President George W. Bush Jr. was able to enter Yale University not by reference to any objective standards of excellence but by his father’s reputation. Female students had long been excluded from these prestigious colleges, and even where they were finally given the same opportunities, this only happened because the co-ed colleges had started to attract intellectually able male students.

The college authorities could tell precisely whether an applicant was a minority student or not based on recommendation letters and interview. Undoubtedly, they appreciated letters from the privileged such as Senators, Governors, Generals, or high ranked executives who spoke standard English without minority accents. There
has been another notable case where the linguistic competence of high school graduates really matters in their transition to universities. In the case of France, for instance, despite its early lead in opening education opportunity, oral interviews account for a major part in admissions criteria, in addition to national test scores. Children of privilege, from traditional elite backgrounds were in a very advantageous position. Among students who are admitted without examination, about half of them fail to proceed to the next grade. Most of these failed students are from immigrant and low-income families, lacking in cultural capital. It is well known in the history of higher education that the French sociologist of education Bourdieu once theorized that this French paradox was a form of cultural reproduction with the new notion of cultural capital. Compared with students taken care of by the so-called “Soccer Moms” it is hard to expect students from low-income families to have the same level of community service experience, not to mention involvement in other activities such as group music (symphony) or sports (football), because they might have to help support their family economically. The core element of subjective evaluation is an ambiguous notion of “personality”, which has found its equivalence in the “characteristics”, “leadership abilities”, or potential for being a future “global leader” jargon of recent years. The problem is that only the college authorities possess the essential freedoms to define these obscure notions. In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the “four essential freedoms” of a university: “the freedom to determine who may teach, what may be taught, how it should be taught and who may be admitted to study.” (Thelin, 2004, p. 43) These four aspects of university operations and management are student admissions, faculty appointment, curriculum selection and teaching methods. Reiterating the importance of freedom, Bok, the president of Harvard, underscored several measures that government should not exercise; namely, were rigid rules, procedural requirement, and coercion. Instead, he suggested indirect intervention via incentives and subsidies. (Bok, 1980, pp. 80-101)

Subjective evaluation consists of this “discretion and opacity.” The criteria developed by the president could only be evaluated by the college concerned and was then faithfully adopted by the dean of admissions and the admissions officers. Although the admissions data is not subject to public scrutiny and absolutely classified in any college, Karabel’s research revealed that the American college
admissions system was at best a concealed mechanism to entrench academic and social privilege. Many education policies were intended to promote equal opportunities for women and minorities, but they failed to reform the fundamental function of the reproduction of inequality.

The foundation of “personality” lies in the definition of capability. In the early years, it was defined as “Christian Gentlemanly behavior” found amongst White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. According to this definition, minorities like Jews are “unrefined”, as are Asians. After the admissions officer system was introduced, the term “nerd” was used to disparage high scorers and overestimate the children of the privileged who had lower academic scores. This term has been widely used after entrance to college. The British imperialist Rhodes created the most prestigious scholarship for American college graduates, to provide an opportunity to study in the United Kingdom and grace the country with their presence. From the beginning, he made it clear that the qualified students should not merely be “bookworms”, but rather scholarships should take into account applicants’ “exhibition of moral force of character” and “fondness of and success in manly outdoor sports such as cricket, football and the like”. The criteria for admissions and scholarships that neglect objective standards create for themselves a new meaning of capability and legitimacy. There is an ongoing debate regarding subjective evaluation that was initially introduced to counteract discrimination against Jews in that it is now apparently aimed at Asian students.

Without either a policy discussion nor a feasibility study on the admissions officer system that was adopted in order to retain and conceal the existing social order in the U.S., MEST in Korea went ahead and set out substantial financial support to universities applying this new system, especially private universities suffering from chronic budget deficits. It would appear that in this instance, we are witnessing Faust selling his soul to the Devil. The core principle of discretion and opacity in the admissions officer system is a precondition that is hard to be granted or indeed even valued in Korea. It is entirely possible that both politicians and government could directly involve themselves in the establishment and application of a college admissions system. Donation-based admissions, prohibited by the "three-no" policy, is in fact the basis of the American admissions system, however, it is simply unfeasible. As long as politicians and government designate the scope of discretion,
the US admissions officer system cannot be deemed to be a verified system. Moreover, the national sentiment in Korea, which leans very far in favor of objectivity and impartiality, will accelerate the debate on subject criteria and the evaluation of universities. The public’s demands and expectations of objectivity are largely due to the critical importance of Korea’s high stakes exam system. The sole source of impartiality is the requirement that grades are calculated out to three decimal places and scored against more than 10 standards. Therefore, there is a contradiction between discretion and impartiality in applying subject criteria and reference points. The guideline for the admissions officer system from the Korean Council for University Education indicates impartiality as the first priority. However, this guideline is in direct contradiction with the principle of discretion which is not able to be practically enforced. Besides this, problems remain with the question as to what happens when students rejected under this system and their parents challenge the results (through possible legal action), which will inevitably lead to the disclosure of admissions data. Given the number of universities in Korea, there is a high possibility that a few extreme cases could devastate the whole system.

The key issue is not whether it is trained experts or “social leaders” who constitute the ranks of these admissions officers, but whether the admission process being left at the discretion of the colleges themselves is in itself an essential freedom. MEST in Korea apparently has its priorities wrong and implements the education budget on marginal issues. The repetition of minor mistakes means that they grow into a crisis. The analysis of how MEST has shattered the fundraising policy that now threatens the existence of education will follow. Due to MEST’s negligence in the area of higher education finance, the Korean higher education system relies heavily on the private sector. Some have argued that we should export this experience as an example of a successful case of a low costs policy. The notion that cheapening and “economizing” in education in such ways can be under serious discussion and consideration at all clearly demonstrates the erosion of the very idea of the university.

5. Concluding Remarks

In this paper only two instances of efforts aimed at educational reform designed
to transplant an American model onto the corresponding Korean model were analyzed: the latest attempted reform was from as recently as 2008 and the oldest was from 1946. Many more examples of unique American programs which have taken root in Korea as twisted hybrids exist. If we consider secondary education, for example, there we found a Korean high school at the upper level of secondary education described as a 'comprehensive high school'. This type of school first appeared in America in the 1920's to dispense with the system of separate high schools based on the probable destinations of high school graduates: a cohort of college bound students, with other students moving on to factories or other vocational fields. This unique American model was transplanted to Nordic countries in the 1940's, whilst quite remarkably maintaining the intended founding ideal of having one comprehensive school for all pupils, regardless of their future destinations or plans. This ideal, symbolized a system of education aimed at being truly democratic and the backbone of this ideal still exists. An almost identical attempt at the rhetorical level was made in the transplantation of the globalized high school model into Korea in the 1960's. Both American and Nordic high schools have followed the model of being true comprehensive schools without having the separation between vocational schools at the upper secondary level. However, Korean comprehensive schools have been categorically classified as but one of many vocational type schools, in line with commercial, agricultural & technical schools. They have not been true copies of the American high school. It would be possible to add yet more examples that appear superficially similar but in reality are quite different or do not share any or all of the underlying principles or ideas behind the reforms.

The issue of the desirability or feasibility of transplanting an allegedly “successful model” into a very different historical and cultural education context is not merely a matter of the past, but of the future in regards to Korean education. Recently, many experts in the field of education working in multi-lateral organization like the World Bank, the OECD, and UNESCO have boldly argued that Korean education could be bench-marked for the development of less developed countries. The best example of the above has been the telling contrast of tertiary education strategies employed in Ghana and the Republic of Korea with respect to the economic development over the preceding four decades or so since the early 1960’s. In
1958, the two were at the same level of GDP but over four decades later, this gap has increased remarkably. This is attributable to not only education in general but to tertiary education in particular. The manifested message of the WB book is clear; if there were any country that wished to became an economic power like Korea, it should attempt to emulate Korea’s path of development. This ambitious plan was echoed for years and manifested in MEST’s policy of “exporting the Korean model of education.” At best, one could argue that Korean education has some points of value to share with other countries, including lessons on its “successes” and “failures”. However, without any theoretical and critical examination of the issue of transplanting education models across borders, cultures and time scales, any attempt to do so could easily descend into an act of neo-cultural imperialism; the twisted results of which are very well documented in the rich literature of colonial education.

As has been seen from the above, the attempts at importing foreign models into the Korean context of higher education has been one of the most commonly cited examples for those seeking to critically examine the issue of transferring models across borders. Both American style external governance at SNU and the American style “admissions officer” program have both clearly resulted in superficially similar models being introduced into Korea. However, in both instances, the deep structural reality has remained unchanged. These two transplanted models cannot produce any of the anticipated or expected outcomes, if both the government and universities themselves are strongly committed to the values and ideas of the freedom and autonomy of the university as an institution. To use Bok’s convincing argument, well-functioning shared governance and a flexible admissions officer program are possible only after four essential freedoms are guaranteed. These are; the freedom of the university from government (whether that freedom has been more or less restricted over time) has been at the structural core of Korean educational reality. As best shown in attempts to introduce an American style admission program, cosmetic changes with highly politically charged reforms are unable to lead to a radical change in the status quo. In contrast, they serve as a vehicle to reinforce the central government’s tight controlling mechanisms over university operations. I would like to conclude with a simple question: Is this allegedly “good practice” model in our own higher education system really worth exporting to poorer, developing countries?
Chapter 4
Divided Higher Education in a Divided Korea: A Comparative Analysis on the Rise of Seoul National University and Kim Il Sung University, 1945–1948

1. Introduction

South and North Korea have their own “top-tier” universities—Seoul National University (hereinafter referred to as SNU) and Kim Il Sung University (hereinafter referred to as Kimdae) respectively. These two universities in Korea clearly demonstrate the “divided higher education of a divided country”, and in this article I have analyzed the rise of both universities after Japan’s defeat. “A Study on the Establishment of Kim Il Sung University“, Educational Theory, Research Committee of Pedagogy of Seoul University, 10th Volume, No. 1, 1996; “Study of the Rise of Seoul National University“, Nasan Park Yonghun Kyoso Chungnuyn Toim Ginyum Nonmongip, Collection of Papers in memory of Retirement under the Age Limit, recently published.

These universities had the same purposes, procedures and methods of establishment, as well as the same dates of establishment. As far as organization of the professorate, the two universities also had a common origin. I call them “identical twins“, in the light of such features shared at their inception. In another study, I have presented an analysis of the process of the creation of each university. In this study, I will analyze the formation of the education systems in a divided country by focusing on the origin of the division of the universities. First, the origins of both universities are compared and analyzed.

In this article, I have placed Koreans at the center of their own history. This is natural, but it has not always been done in much of the research on the history of modern Korean education. Existing studies have focused on revealing the manifestation of the educational and occupation policies of the foreign countries who occupied Korea, and the opposition of Koreans to them. Most likely, this was
unavoidable because for some time foreign military forces exercised the dominant authority and power in Korea. Such a view of history has been customary. Earlier traditional research and also much of the so-called “revisionists’ studies“ appeared as a series of master’s degree theses, addressing Kookdaean in the 1980s. A representative work of this trend includes “Progressive Democratic Educational Movement under the US Military Government“, by Lee Kil-sang, the 9th Korea-Japan United Academic Seminar, 1996, Tokyo.

The above mentioned paper primarily addressed the policies of the United States toward Korea and the propulsion of educational reform by the U.S. military government, and analyzed the response of the Korean people to such reforms. However, in this study, the main theme is what Korean people did to rebuild the system of national education after the defeat of Japanese imperialism. The protest against the dominance of foreign occupation forces is also analyzed, but in this case, the efforts of the Koreans as primary agents are placed at the center of the study, in active opposition against the intrusion of foreign power.

The method was guided by a view of endogenous development, as an outgrowth of critical mindedness and reflection based on a series of research tasks spanning the history of modern Korean education. The method has been practically applied to various periods. The result of this method will be evaluated by the following studies. Kim Ki-seok & Ryu Bang-ran, "Origins of Modern Education in Korea", Educational Theory, DOE, Volume 7,8, No. 1, 1994: Ryu Bang-ran, Appearance and development of Modern Education in Korea, Doctoral thesis of Seoul National University, 1995; Oh Seong-chul, A Study on elementary education in 1930s, doctoral thesis of Seoul National University, 1996; Kim Ki-seok, Lee Hyangkyu, “Origin of Socialism education of North, 1945-1950”, Hallym Science Institute, Hallym Collection on Thesis (recently published).

As a result, we have confidence in the possibility of its consistent application and use in future studies. In this study, I have made extensive use of some original material unused for some years, which came from the records of the U.S. Militray Government in Korea (USMGIK), and so-called “enemy documents”; materials from U.S. National Archives that are classified as Record Groups (hereinafter referred to as RG) 332 and 242, respectively. Materials published by the USMGIK include Data collected before and after Liberation II; Educational Policy of the US Military
Government, Seoul; Lee Kil-sang, Wonju-Munhwa Publishing Company, 1993; other data that is not include in this data collection is referred to as RG332. For information on the circumstances or contents of the collection of captured Korean documents, see Bang Sun-joo, “Bibliographical Introduction(1) of Plundered North Korean Transcribed Documents”, Asian Culture(Asian Culture Research Center at Hallym University), 1986. Curriculum vitae of faculty of Kimdae among captured documents, 1946, concerning appointment of faculty, Appointment at Kim Il Sung University, 1947, Captured Korean Documents, RG242, National Archives were used. Classification and analysis of captured documents were made by Dr. Paul Auh and Dr. Jang Ri-wook. During the war, they were dispatched to Far East Army Headquarters as agents of psychological warfare, and assigned to translate and analyze the captured documents. (Paul Auh, Lonely lord of a castle, Seoul Kwangmyung Publishing company, 1975, p. 122)

2. Literature Review

This study seeks to address the following three questions. “Who suggested the idea of the Kookdaean?” “What were the main causes and outcomes of the anti-Kookdaean movement and its outcome?” and “What relationship exists between the anti-Kookdaean movement and the establishment of Kimdae?” The former two questions are usually dealt with through an analysis of the Proposal for a National Seoul University (hereinafter the ‘Kookdaean’) that created Seoul National University in 1946. Korean education reformers were characterized as being active in suggesting and implementing the Kookdaean, based on the “New History of Education in Korea”, whereas Americans were characterized as being passive. Dr. Chun-Seok Auh (Cheonwon) did not indicate that he was the person who suggested the Kookdaean in writing a history of education in Korea, but he merely indicated that the “Kookdaean was devised by a Korean officer in the Academic Affairs Department, and the US took a largely passive attitude.” Paul Auh, A History of New Education in Korea, Seoul; Hyundai Kyochong Publishing Company, 1964, p416. However, he clearly disclosed in his memoirs that he was the person who devised and sponsored the Kookdaean. For memoirs, Paul Auh, op. cit., 1975

The outcome of various revisionists’ studies can be summarized as follows. He
idea of the Kookdaean was conceived of by an American officer in the Bureau of Educational of USMGIK. That is, the “Kookdaean was first made by an American officer, and it was Koreans who played the part of the villains in the process.” Lee Kil-sang, op. cit., 1996; the following are cited from the above thesis.

With the proposal of “the integrated university plan” made by the U.S. military forces, the Kookdaean was suggested in an attempt to reorganize the educational system of higher education in line with an American model. A group of reform-minded Korean bureaucrats who cooperated with the U.S. military carried forward the Kookdaean “with a view to resisting the progressive educational power that was growing through educational activities centering [on] committees of university autonomy.” In short, the Kookdaean was “the result of a joint, (but) selfish compromise between [the] military government office that [had] experienced [a] failure of bureaucratic governance over higher education for (the) past ten months, and those figures in educational circles who cooperated with the military government in order to (their) maintain power over the educational world.” Progressive intellectuals in charge of college councils and executives of academic groups started a nationwide movement against the Kookdaean as they viewed it as a policy instrument of American officers of the Department of Educational (hereafter DOE) of the USMGIK and Korean bureaucrats. They resisted for more than one year and “several hundreds of students and some 380 professors” were punished or penalized to varying degrees. As a result, “progressive educators were completely removed from the mainstream of the education circle.” The anti-Kookdaean movement ended in failure, and Seoul National University was created. The above claim is consistent with the key issues surrounding the questions raised by cultural imperialism. As for theories which argue that education can be part of cultural imperialism, see Martin Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism, N.Y.: David McKay Co., Inc, 1974.

In much of the previous scholarship on the subject, the anti-Kookdaean movement was thought to have been brought about on the orders of the North Korean communist movement. It was said that the Chosun Education Association was deeply involved in the movement, and that even the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had issued a clandestine order to Namrodang (Labor Party of Southern Korea) to initiate a nationwide strike, with critical evidence supportive of this
The interpretation, of phenomena was therefore, somewhat oversimplified. Complicated matters were only considered in terms of confrontations over the questions of social status, emphasizing one choice of interpretation, that choice being limited to either a right or left wing interpretation. The key issue of the Kookdae an project was the realization of the self-administration of universities “Self-rule of universities”, referring as it does to exercising personnel management and financial rights, an essential part of management in the Imperial University of Japan. This critical importance of this key point has traditionally been underestimated the president and deans of each department of the imperial university were elected directly by professors, and appointment, promotion, retirement and upgrading or reduction of remuneration was carried out through the Professors’ Council. The practice, which actually actualized the true autonomy of professors, was publicly announced in 1913, taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the “Kyoto University, Sawayanagi case.” Sawayanagi, the dean of Kyoto University, dismissed 7 professors on the grounds of necessary reforms. The Professors’ Council protested against his actions by resolving to resign and skipping lectures with a claim that all matters of personnel management should be decided by the Professors’ Council. The minister of the


Revisionists believed that progressive intellectuals had resisted the Kookdaean because it was suggested by a “compromise out of joint egoism” among leading figures in both countries. However, whichever is the more accurate interpretation, both conventional and revisionist claims seek to find a cause for this series of events with regard to the proposition and execution of the Kookdaean that will provide a single answer, no matter whether they are from either the right or left of the political spectrum. Thus, these two viewpoints cannot be differentiated as they originated from the divisions and polarizations inherent in the Cold War.

Claims in the past were definite and clear, whether they were revisionist or not. Therefore, the issue was regarded as being extremely simple, primarily because it was analyzed in a one-dimensional manner. That is, a series of complicated phenomena were oversimplified. Complicated matters were only considered in terms of confrontations over the questions of social status, emphasizing one choice of interpretation, that choice being limited to either a right or left wing interpretation.
Ministry of Educational Affairs, who was afraid of the effects of this incident spreading, tried to patch things up by delivering a memorandum to the Professors’ Council stating, “It is proper and reasonable that the President of the university discuss with the Professors’ Council matters concerning the appointment and dismissal of professors.” Later, the right to appoint and dismiss professors was granted to the Professors’ Council. For the processes involved and the roots of such privilege, see Japanese Education written by Dairoku Kikuchi, London: John Murray, 1909, pp. 365-370 or Study on National Education, A Brief History of Japanese Education, Tokyo: Choto Munhwa Publishing company, 1989, pp. 146-147.

In the manner of an imperial university.

The leadership struggle to establish the university that took place between professors from the imperial universities, who strove to maintain vested rights, and the revisionists did not attract much public attention. The self-administration of universities, which was the basis of “educational democracy”, was excluded from analysis, with no consideration as to whether it was an object of reform or not. If we do not accept the value implied by the slogan, another issue can be raised. Should the self-autonomy of universities by professors be eliminated as a remaining vestige of colonial education or maintained as part of the essence of a university? These issues have never been deeply examined or addressed adequately until now.

In order to answer these questions, a multi-level analysis method can be applied. National conflict along with conflicts over social status can be considered together. In addition, the conflict between the power to maintain vested rights in the university and the power of revisionists is also reflected. As a way to focus on the force of the reformists, the practices in regard to academic or regional relations, in addition to political beliefs, can be also considered. Let us review unanswered questions by making use of the methodology of stratified decision making.

3. The Idea of the Faculty Republic and the Kookdaean Project

The following questions to be reviewed are those for which there are remarkable differences between traditional viewpoints and revisionists’ viewpoints. That is, “Who suggested the idea of the Kookdaean?” “What were the main causes and outcomes of the anti-Kookdaean movement and its outcome?” and “Why was
there anti- Kookdae movement and why did it end in failure?” The North’s Jongdaean (literally the comprehensive university plan), which created Kimdae, was used as a comparative standard. That is, “Is Jongdaean consistent with the ideal of an educational democracy movement?” “Is it possible for those professors who opposed the Kookdae and took part in the Jongdaean, or who transferred to Kimdae from SNU, did so to realize their own intentions at Kimdae?” As revealed in my thesis, SNU and Kimdae began preparations at the same time to open their doors, and did so, one after the other, at an interval of only two weeks in October 1946. <Table IV-1> shows the main events, from preparation to opening, and from opening and to production of the first graduates.

SNU and Kimdae were established as national “top-tier” universities, and existing higher education institutions merged into integrated universities. If any difference exists, it is that Kimdae was operating normally from the time of its opening, whereas SNU’s normal operations began one year after its opening due to severe resistance on the part of professors and students. As for the structuring of faculties, professors at these two universities were scholars of the “do-or-die corps”, which was voluntarily organized shortly after the defeat of Japanese Imperialism. They included the Academy of Chosun. According to records of the Academic Institute, “Do Bong-seob, Ahn Dong-hyeok, Kim Ryang-ha, Lee Koo, and Huh Dal-jae got together at Junghwa Company Hall at the 2nd floor of Chongno Christian Youth Society, Seoul” on Aug. 16, and organized a preparatory committee of the Chosun Academic Institute. The Academic Institute had 10 departments in addition to a Secretariat, and a representative person in each sector became the manager of each department. The Dept. of Science (manager: Do Sang-rok), Dept. of Pharmacy (Do Bong-seob), Dept. of Engineering (Choi Kyung-ryul), Technical headquarters (Yoon Il-jung), Dept. of Agriculture (Cho Baek-hyun), Dept. of Economy (Baek Nam-woon), Dept. of Fishery (Jung Moon-ki), Dept. of Historical Philosophy (Lee Byung-do), Dept. of Medical Science (Yoon Il-sun) and Dept. of Literature & Linguistics (Lee Yang-ha). Academic Institute, Hwibo, 1946, which was organized for “the grand union of academic fields”, a self-autonomous council that voluntarily took over universities and junior colleges, and Jindan Hakhoi. On Aug. 16, An Dong-suk, Lee Byung-soo called for a reconstruction meeting, changed executives, and settled future policies. The Standing committee included Lee

**<Table IV-1> Chronology of the establishment of SNU and KU in 1946 and after**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Main Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 16, 45</td>
<td>SNU Changed the name from Imperial University to Seoul University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid Oct. 45</td>
<td>KU Announced a plan to set up a comprehensive university in North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 23, 46</td>
<td>SNU Appointed Deans of University and seven colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 8, 46</td>
<td>KU Decided to launch a public university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13, 46</td>
<td>SNU Announced a plan to open a national university in Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 22, 46</td>
<td>SNU Promulgated the Act to establish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid Sept. 46</td>
<td>SNU Protests started to erupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1, 46</td>
<td>KU opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 15, 26</td>
<td>Students refused to register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 47</td>
<td>SNU Eruption of nationwide strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 6, 47</td>
<td>SNU Revision of SNU law as Public Law of Interim Legislative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13, 47</td>
<td>SNU New Board resolved to reinstate expelled students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13, 47</td>
<td>SNU The first commencement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 50</td>
<td>SNU The first graduation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most of the executives of those groups were intellectuals who were employed at SNU as professors. Due to the aggravation of political conditions, however, the autonomy group and the universities appeared to be divided to such a degree that they were unable to be unified voluntarily. Thus, professors were separated by their own beliefs, on the right or the left. The question at this point was how such internal disunion led to the division of the universities themselves.

The Kookdaeans was proposed as the result of internal necessity in the academic field. This was strongly expressed by Cheonwon. His testimony that the Kookdaeans was proposed in order to establish “a grand university” to represent all the academic fields in Korea is consistently shown in relevant documents dating from 1946. Twenty years Paul Auh, op. cit., 1964, p. 416 note 1. after the first organizer of the Kookdaeans was revealed, and thirty years since the start of the Kookdaeans project, Paul Auh, “Kookdaeans case”, op. cit., 1975, pp. 99-105

Cheonwon the Dr. Auh clearly disclosed his role in the proposals for and implementation of the Kookdaeans. From his recollections, it is known that he had a discussion with the bureau director, Mr. Eok-Kyum Yoo about the Kookdaeans after several weeks of consideration, and received his consent, and then received a promise of active support from military governor Ruch via Head Director Lockhard. He then began to carry the plan forward. This is consistent with other data from the DOE. In particular, it also corresponds with other detailed records on the establishment of SNU. When comparing sources on the Establishment of Seoul National University; its writer and date were unidentified. RG332, and History of Bureau of Education, From 11 Sept. 1945 to 28 February, 1946 by Lockhard, RG332, the descriptions available on the Kookdaeans were consistent. Both the organization and structure of a university to be newly established were consistent. However, in Lockhard’s records, it was very vague about names, dates, and the responsibilities undertaken by relevant players. The above records are more detailed than those available in “One year of the Ministry of Educational Affairs”, regarding dates and responsibilities. The former is the fundamental material that contains testimonies and evidence of relevant people, and the latter is a historical depiction using basic material and information available. Here, the basic material is more reliable.
According to those documents, an American officer, Mr. Croft, was newly appointed as a successor to the Dean of Kyungsung University, who was then to be in charge of college affairs at the DOE. A concrete plan for the Kookdaean was mapped out, according to the “instructions” of the American officer. Op. cit. The role of the U.S. officer in organizing the Kookdaean is as follows. Under his guidance, plans were drawn up for a professional staff of 465 members to care for a future prospective enrollment of 8,000 students. Soon after, it was disclosed that the university would have 3 departments of Kyungsung University, and 7 other junior colleges. The university in this case refers to SNU. This evidence indicates that he simply assisted in the process of organizing SNU, and did not exercise a leadership role. According to “One year of the Ministry of Educational Affairs”, one of the duties of a U.S. officer who was newly appointed to the university as of Dec. 12, 1946, was to think about devising a plan for the establishment of a university based on American universities. He may have led the project. It would appear to be and was later depicted that the officer worked at Kyungsung University in the capacity of a dean, which caused us to surmise that he was Croft. Seemingly, this issue surrounding Croft has been misunderstood, in that he had returned to the Academic Affairs Dept. after resigning from Kyungsung University, and had then suggested the Kookdaean project. See p. 28 of One year of the Ministry of Educational Affairs. However, Croft worked at the Academic Affairs Dept. until Dec. 7, and he was not in the department when the Kookdaean was first proposed. When an officer in command of 24 troops in charge of military history listened to witnesses about regarding the stationing of men without approval at the Engineering dept. of Kyungsung University, Croft’s was at the Foreign Affairs Department. He was eligible to work in that department when we consider his former posting which was as an Intelligence Officer. See “One year of the Ministry of Educational Affairs” for details about the transfer of Croft, and for interview records, see Interview with Lt. CMDR, A Crofts, USNR, Foreign Affairs Section, MG, 21 January 1946.

His role was at most one of providing “instruction” as, unlike Croft, he did not succeed to an administrative post, even though he took charge of some affairs at Kyungsung University.

American military officers took great pains to appoint a Korean President of the
newly established SNU. They recommended one Korean, who also had the recommendation of the Chosun Education Committee, at the end of January 1946 and with the approval of the Koreans. However, the military governor did not accept him on the grounds that he was not eligible for that post. Finally, this candidate and another American officer were recommended to the War Ministry of the U.S. Unexpectedly, Harry B. Anstead was appointed as the new President in February. See appendix of One year of the Ministry of Educational Affairs for appointment date of Anstead.

He was a pastor working with the army and had no experience in college administration. The U.S. military, which exercised dominant authority over South Korea, had appointed an absurd person to an absurd post at an absurd place. That is, there was no American officer capable of “devising a grand university to represent [the] entire academic world.” Besides lacking manpower resources, the DOE was a much more loose bureaucratic organization than the Iminwi (People’s Committee) educational bureau of North Korea. Who could devise or proceed with a grand plan for higher education reform in such an agency? There was no officer who had a sense of mission or any affection for university reform, with the exception of Croft. Philip Shay, who was dispatched to the Academic Affairs Department and had supervised it, pointed out the problems of the Ministry of Educational Affairs, as follows. So-called Korean officers did not listen to the advice of American advisers. The manpower of the department was poorly organized, and the department has no “overall structure”. Without enough training or appropriate experience, the advisers were ineffective. What is worse, financial support from the military government is most insufficient.


In addition, there was a substantial qualitative difference in the way activities were carried out among the American and Korean staff at the DOE’s. The former was intent on fragmentary and stopgap work to solve present problems, and the latter were concerned about “directing overall Korean education”. Paul Auh, op. cit., 1975, p. 94

Moreover, coordination between the central and local agencies of the DOE remained poor. The division of duties between the Ministry of Educational Affairs
and internal and academic affairs division of Seoul was uncertain. This was clearly shown in the case of the dismissal of an adviser, Martin, of the Internal and Educational Affairs Division in Seoul. There was a confusion regarding appropriate policy between Martin and Underwood, who was an adviser of the Ministry of Educational Affairs, concerning the punishment of students who were present at the Labor Day Ceremony in May 1947. Martin had instructed principals of secondary schools to follow orders given from his division, but Underwood insisted that Martin was only an adviser, and not a manager. For further details on what occurred, see “Clarification of Policy, as result of incident which occurred the 1st week of May, 1947”, 12 May, 1947; “Memo on Clarification of Policy–to School Principles”, 15 May, 1947, Lee Kil-sang, op. cit., 1991, pp. 286–294.

Another issue was that officers in key departments changed frequently. At the time that the Kookdae was first suggested, Lockhard was director of the Department, but at the time of its implementation, Pittenger was head. Under such circumstances, the entire merger of the 9 professional colleges and a Japanese Imperial University, using U.S. officers, was next to impossible. The establishment of “the grand university” was a long-cherished desire of the entire academic world since the defeat of Japanese imperialism. The Jongdae was the North Korean face of this desire; and the Kookdae was its South Korean face; the latter being the brainchild of Deputy–Director of the DOE, Dr. Ah (or Cheonwon, using his Korean pen name).

The Kookdae was a “comprehensive blueprint directing and setting up the overall (path of) higher education” of Korea. However, the principal architect, Cheonwon, added his experience and perspective to the process of making it a concrete reality. He knew much about higher education in the colonial era, including its more negative practices and effects. Furthermore, he was willing to radically reform it and held very positive expectations. Cheonwon characterized the dual attitude of Koreans toward Japanese education as follows; “Koreans have been unconsciously influenced by Japan a great deal even though they display enmity toward Japan”. In the field of education, as well as other academic fields, things Japanese were regarded as better than things American. When he attempted to get a job at Bosung Junior College, even though he was an extraordinary scholar who held a doctorate, he was treated worse than those academics who had

What he was primarily concerned about in devising the Kookdaean was the elimination of the remaining legacies of colonial education. Paul Auh, op. cit., 1964, Paul Auh, 1975, Conversation with Dr. Ah, Deputy Dir. Of Education. Mar. 1947, RG332.

In 1947, he said that the greatest advantage of the Kookdaean was that it would result in the complete removal of factionalism in the professional colleges, a tradition of Japanese colonial education. He expressly stated that the National University could not accept the Japanese tradition of faculty-autonomy. He knew well that this form of self-rule of allowing professors to exercise the right to enforce personnel management decisions had originated in Tokyo Imperial University and Kyoto Imperial University. To Cheonwon, the imperial universities were regarded as bad practice models, representing the very worst things about colonial education; the principal aim of which was to cultivate a ruling class, protected by privilege. He was not willing to permit the customary practice that special groups of professors governed the colleges they had graduated from, with the “exclusive tendency of rivalry of local barons”, in the name of university autonomy. It was against the principles of democratic education he had experienced firsthand in America. His beliefs were repeated as follows, twenty years later. That is, the Kookdaean:

⋯was no more than the measures [taken] to remove all Japanese tradition and to break [the] Monroe doctrine at each school. Paul Auh, op. cit., 1964, p.421.

Accordingly, Cheonwon created a plan for adopting personnel management and financial rights much those practiced in the public educational institutions of America. However, this was not the entire reason for the establishment of the Kookdaean. After 20 years, Cheonwon made public his reasons for promoting the Kookdaean. For one, “there was strong intention to oust incompetent or leftist professors.” Teachers’ Welfare Newspaper, Sept. 28, 1987. Cheonwon thought that the main reasons for the protest against the Kookdaean by professors lay in their desire to maintain the vested rights of incompetent professors, and their worries about retirement. This opinion is repeated consistently in many relevant

The more important issue, however, was the eradication of colonial higher education. However, the self-administration of universities like that of imperial universities was contradictory and Janus faced from the beginning. The faculty-autonomy of universities, or the self-rule of professors included enjoying exclusive privileges, along with freedom of thought and study. Cheonwon tried to eliminate the tradition of self-rule, regarding it as being an example of “University Fractionalism” or part of the “Monroe Doctrine”.

It was not merely Cheonwon who wanted to do away with colonial education through the Kookdaean. The report of the legislative committee about the Kookdaean project was of the same opinion as Cheonwon, and was clearly represented by Congressman Jang, Myun, who was principal of Dongsung High School. He also thought that the idea of “not joining to SNU professors” arose simply because it was impossible to realize the autonomy of professors, and that the professors’ committee, which sought to preserve the right of personnel management was “a vestige of Japanese imperialism”. <Stenographic Records>

In the spring of 1947, a parent of a student who had watched the national strike, the so-called second Kookdaean project, made the following statement:

(The) Jongdaean is absolutely necessary in the establishment of our education system. The reason, concretely expressed, [is that] we have to root out the so-called Kyungsung Imperial University. Cho, Heon-young, op. cit., pp. 57-61, Here the integrated university refers to SNU.

He saw the cause of the strike as mainly generating from the coalition of academia and the merger of colleges by Daejawi. He believed that the strike was brought about because professors from the imperial university had failed to secure exclusive rights of personnel management. He maintained that “complete destruction” of the tradition of Kyungsung University not only meant liquidation of the vestiges of colonialism but also that it was inevitable in the construction of democracy. Like Cheonwon and Jang, Myun, the words of this parent above emphasized the evil of maintaining such privilege, rather than the more progressive issue of college autonomy.

The U.S. military officers tried to patch things up as if they were objective mediators, when opposing opinions became too strong. Their neutral attitude was

The Intelligence Department pointed out the inconsistent attitude of Namrodang (Labor Party of Southern Korea). Both the Kookdaean and Jongdaean were being advanced for the same purpose and by the same procedures and methods. It is natural to wonder why Namrodang opposed the Kookdaean even though Namrodang allowed a professor supporting the Jongdaean to go to the North. They thought the biggest advantage of the Kookdaean lay in the way that it made for the effective operation of limited resources. However, the intelligence officers thought it best to carry out a university reform plan such as the Kookdaean after Chosun had established its own government. As an alternative, if there was an insistence on putting such reform into operation earlier, it should take place with the participation and discussion of relevant professors. Most Chosun officers in the DOE were closely related to Hanmindang (Korean Democratic Party). In contrast, a great number of professors and students were not communists, but they did hold progressive opinions. The Intelligence officers pointed out that the Department should have more clearly recognized the political dynamics at play. They maintained that if the board of directors came to have the right of personnel management over professors, professors would be greatly concerned, even though they varied in political beliefs and opinions. Since it is a truism that “nobody wants one’s future to be placed on one’s enemy’s hand[s]. Professors cannot be excepted.” Ibid., p. 264

The report listed five common complaints that professors had. 1) “Self-autonomy of University” enjoyed by professors in colonial universities and colleges and loss of the “individual authority” of professors; 2) complaints about unequal treatment of “low level” junior college professors compared with “elite” professors; 3) loss of the privileged status of professors in small-sized colleges including junior colleges; 4) low wages, lack of housing, inconvenient transportation, lack of provision of food, unequal treatment among public servants of the same rank; and 5) heavy workloads due to a lack of professors. In addition, the leftist professors’ complaints included 6) uncertainty about the future based on the dismissal of leftist professors; 7) infringement of rights on freedom to do research; 8) lack of
opportunities to voice individual opinions; and 9) the existence of pro-Japanese groups and profiteers. Ibid., p. 272. Pro-Japanese refers to the head director and vice head director of the Academic Affairs Department. The head director even participated in mobilizing student soldiers, and executives of Hanmindang. The vice head director was suspected of being associated with the Hwashin Company, a representative company of pro-Japan inclinations. The newly appointed dean of the College of Commerce, was called as profiteer as he was a greatly successful enterpriser and anti-communist.

However, a more essential problem was that of “personnel issues, not finance.” Thus, it was recommended to propose a solution admitting their requests, and taking into consideration the desires of professors, not students. Looking back, the U.S. recognized exactly the reason for the suggestion of the Kookdaean, and its problems, and the causes of the opposition to it.

We can see the excellent competence of the U.S. officers from a report that shows their “ability to collect scientific information.” Bang Sun-joo, Information and material of the U.S. force area; Bang Sun-joo and others, op. cit.,

This was also evidently revealed in the survey report “Network of Commies” related to the anti-Kookdaean movement. Chokong (The Korean Communist Party) even published the “Inchon Letter”, a behavior guide which directed student movements, but also stated that it had no correlation with the Kookdaean, as it was [dated] March 1946. Minjeon was able to secure th support of the general public by defining the Kookdaean as “imperialistic“ or “anti-democratic”. That is, those who opposed the Kookdaean also included other professors in addition to leftist professors. It was disclosed that the well-known document by which Huh Heon was ordered to go on strike, and which the police captured from leftist students on Feb. 16, was not sent by a Soviet Army officer, but was in fact the invention of a rightist group. “School Strikes in Seoul, Korea: Their Political Implications”, Lee Kil-sang, op. cit., p. 276.

The fact that this falsification was even revealed clearly demonstrates that the U.S. military government analyzed this incident without prejudice; Namrodang controlled the anti-Kookdaean movement, but very carefully supported it. It is true that progressive academies including Minjeon, the Federal Union of Culture & Art Groups, the Chosun Educators’ Association, and the Professors’ Union of Junior
Colleges were organized on the instruction of Namrodang. See Appointment of Kim Il Sung University, 1947, RG242 or my thesis, 1996.

However, it is uncertain as to what extent Namrodang was involved in the movement. The positions of Namrodang and the anti-movement organization are largely the same, in terms of undermining the legitimacy of the direct governance of the U.S. military government. It remains uncertain, however, as to whether the party was involved in the movement firsthand or whether the academies spread the movement autonomously.

The U.S. military government officers agreed on the need to establish a national university, but had no concrete guidance regarding the structure, structure, functions and operation of such a university. As they were in a hurry to resolve a host of pressing questions, they were ready to listen to a ny number of conflicting opinions, in contrast to the opinion of Korean officers. According to one report, they agreed to appoint Koreans as directors and as president of SNU, at the SNU joint meeting held on Feb. 14, 1947, shortly after the strike. However, the compromise was not accepted by professors, on the grounds that it was against "self-administration." This was based on Feb. 18 issue of Jayoo Newspaper and Feb. 19 of Jungeui Newspaper.

In the long run, Military Governor Ruch suggested revising Act 102, the legal basis of the Kookdaean, on Feb. 27, 1947, and filed it with the legislative committee. More interesting was that the U.S. drew back from it, instead entrusting Koreans with the whole process of mapping out the compromise. As revealed above, the project was settled by passage of the revised bill, and the organization of a new board of directors. The revised bill showed that it was not a one-sided victory or defeat of any one group. Kyungsung University and state universities were closed, while a national university system remained. Thus, the key issue of the anti-Kookdaean movement, aimed at abolishing a national university, ultimately ended in failure. However, if the key issue lay in the autonomy of universities, the organization of a board of Korean directors from representatives of nine universities cannot be regarded as a complete failure. It should be regarded as a compromise. In addition, the professors still meet at each college, though they are given limited authority. In the case of education colleges, the college council is still directly appointed by professors, in the same manner of the system originally
pioneered by Kyungsung Educational College.

If the anti-Kookdaean movement proved not to have ended in complete failure, then it was the Kookdaean that failed. Nine universities have managed to direct their personnel management and finance operations independently for many years, since their establishment, in fact. Each college of Kyungsung University and the state universities are not "universities." In 1968, 22 years after SNU opened, they intended to build up a first class, integrated university. That is, even after integration was carried out, each college still strove to maintain superiority and leadership. Recently, this issue was brought to public notice in relation to the "direct election of college's president" system. Directly voting for the president is a practical system but not a legal system. The actualization of this system is regarded as a great achievement according to public opinion surrounding SNU. It signifies that the system of appointing a president by reinforced government as a device of control over universities has been cut. However, direct voting is not enough to guarantee the self-administration of universities. The system is a system of imperial universities, and we should not overlook that their nostalgia or affection for certain aspects of that system affected the choice of direct voting. In particular, most professors who were actively seeking to reconnect with the ideals of a true collegiate life thought that it was perfectly natural that they should be able to elect a president directly. The slogan was frequently mentioned in the autonomy movement at SNU.

In short, due to the influence of the anti-Kookdaean movement, some customary practices of autonomy like those found in the old imperial universities still remain intact to this day. The price paid has been great. SNU, unlike Kimdae, required a long time to develop into a unified university. In some respects, the process has not yet finished.

4. Division of the Universities

A number of competent and well-respected professors of SNU, graduates from imperial universities, and who were at the center of the anti-Kookdaean movement, went North and took part in establishing Kimdaes. They each held a unique position in their academic disciplines, and were known as "competent teachers" by the

The following discussion will disclose another aspect of the educational democracy movement, a slogan of the anti-Kookdaean movement, which is helpful in revealing some of the reasons as to why these professors moved to Kimdae. Furthermore, it will provide some insight into the reasons behind the ultimate division of the universities.

Let us now re-examine whether the anti-Kookdaean movement was literally a movement for “democracy of education”. The term is a rhetorical expression used in the ideological struggle between leftists and rightists. However, it has not always been easy to logically maintain this assertion. The “Not Joining SNU professors” group also knew this well. As was generally being known to the public in 1946, the U.S. was a leading democratic country, and Japan, for Koreans at least, was the most villainous, militaristic country. In this context, it was not easy to condemn “American style” colleges as being anti-democratic, and to define the maintenance of “Japanese style” colleges as promoting educational democracy. Prof. Park Keuk-che, from the Law College of Kyungsung University, endeavored to overcome these logically vexing problems in the following way.

Even in Japan, which had been a fascist, ultranationalist and militarist society before her final defeat, freedom to study, freedom of learning, freedom of students, the right to decide on the appointment and dismissal of professors had been rights long assured.... Park Keuk-che, “Settlement of Democratic Academy”, Chosun People’s Newspaper, July 17, 1946.

Prof. Han In-suk stated that the autonomy of professors that enabled them to recommend their peers and, through professors’ meetings, to appoint managers and directors of colleges derived from Japanese universities, and it can be maintained for the following reasons.

Even in Japan, an anti-democratic country, professors’ autonomy was recognized in order to protect colleges from bureaucracy. Han In-suk, “Kookdaean and Korean Education”, Our Public Opinion, Apr. 1947, pp. 18-34.

It held that self-rule was secured even in the midst of fascism and in anti-democratic countries, and that no reason existed for it not to be so in democratic countries. In terms of the non-educational aspect, however, professors’ self-administration was a unique system in Japanese imperialistic colleges, not
“Even in Japan.” There is no doubt that the model for the professors’ meetings had been copied and then was transplanted from German colleges into the Japanese colleges. However, as to the “Not Joining to SNU professors” movement, this autonomy was considered to be one of the byproducts of Japanese “nationalist education.” Faculty-autonomy of the college as an organization was not allowed even in private colleges in Japan. The self-administration of professors by professors was not the sole condition which could to guarantee academic freedom. Universities in other countries, including American universities, could guarantee academic freedom without the premise of professors’ self-administration. Professors’ self-administration, just as in imperial universities, was a premise to guarantee the privilege and authority given to said professors. It was a limited and exclusive privilege granted in order to cultivate and perpetuate the privileges of the ruling classes of Japan. Thus, it was “a vestige of Japanese imperialism.” The problem lies in conflicting opinions and thoughts on what a college should ultimately be or represent. People from imperial universities, American universities, or Russian universities varied in their opinions and perceptions of about other universities. They also presented different opinions on specific and general alternatives for the liquidation of colonial education. Professors from imperial universities who were leading the anti-Kookdaean movement to secure self-administration of colleges moved North, but they did not reiterate their assertions. The dispute on self-administration was, in the long run, a struggle to secure the right to appoint professors. The “Not Joining to SNU professors” movement endeavored to preserve that vested right, and officers of the DOE struggled to break it.

The “Not Joining to SNU professors” movement achieved superiority in the ideological struggle, by redefining the anti-Kookdaean movement as the “educational democracy” movement. The democracy they conceived meant the self-administration of professors. As Prof. Han In-suk has said, it is the key point of democracy that the deans and presidents of colleges, who are elected by professors, represent the opinion of all the professors. Op. cit.

The “Not Joining to SNU professors” movement secured extensive support for the anti-Kookdaean movement from the general public, by emphasizing the progressive side of both aspects of self-administration. The anti-movement was spread as a systematic social movement with implications beyond the professors’
rather narrow intentions. In the “educational democracy” movement, the term “education” was merely a rhetorical expression; practically, it meant a political struggle. As the U.S. intelligence organizations had indicated, Namrodang welcomed the Jongdaean in the North, and opposed the Kookdaean in the South, in quite an inconsistent manner. This policy originated as a political determination in an attempt to bring about a crisis in the orthodoxy of the USMGIK that proposed the Kookdaean. However, as they expressed such political intention as being part of “educational democracy”, not only professors and lecturers but also almost all students and faculty participated in this movement. Later, at each school, students who had no concern in this matter took part in the strike in order to achieve “educational democracy.” According to a survey of the legislative committee, this was an unprecedented political movement that instigated an overall strike and operated systematically by unified instructions delivered to every sub-organization in each school with a well-laid plan ad able to act with considerable speed and agility.

The “Not Joining to SNU professors” movement succeeded in mobilizing the masses. The general public harbored suspicions about the Kookdaean itself. It was seen to be some kind of conspiracy and believed to be the work of the Americans. National sentiment amplified the anti-Kookdaean movement. The national conflict played a role as a motive of the project more so than serving as something implanted by revisionists.

One justification for the anti-Kookdaean movement that gained sympathy with the general public lay in the realization of college autonomy. However, as indicated in another thesis on Kimdae, Kimdae did not accept the self-administration of colleges in imperial universities. The self-rule of professors who were against the Kookdaean movement meant professors’ self-rule, and its essence lay in the right to elect the president, deans and professors of the college. However, all the administrative executives, including deans of departments, were elected by the educational bureau of Iminwi in order to represent the party and the educational bureau—not “to represent the opinion of all professors.” The organization of Kimdae did not constitute a professors’ committee. The professors’ right to make determinations was very limited in the decision-making process in regard to the main issues of colleges. The college council, which retained the exact same name
as in imperial universities, was established, but it was not a supreme organ of resolution. After its establishment, all the main issues were resolved by the educational bureau of the temporary People’s Committee. There was no qualitative difference between this situation for Kimdae and the fact that the Ministry of Educational Affairs exercised decision-making rights in the preparation and implementation of the Kookdaeans.

When we compare SNU and Kimdae, we see that the former allowed more autonomy than the latter. The college council existed and exercised some rights, even though they were inherently limited. However, professors of SNU who were opposed to the Kookdaeans and went North to eagerly join the Jongdaeans, despite the fact that it did not permit the self-administration of and by professors. They did not instigate protests or encourage students to support an anti-movement that could hamstring the functions of the colleges. Here is evidence of a serious lack of consistency. How can this inconsistent behavior be explained? It is yet another aspect of educational democracy. The realization of college autonomy was the only justification for the anti-Kookdaeans movement, and it is not even a genuine reason. The real reason for the anti-Kookdaeans movement was to maintain the autonomy, power, privileges and the exclusive rights of professors. According to the higher education standards of the colonial era, only imperial universities were “the college among colleges”, beyond comparison. At the time when the prestige and reputation of Kyungsung University was still extremely strong, to get a professorship at an old imperial university was a symbol of profound honor and authority. In particular, to those who came from imperial universities, it was to be a lifelong pursuit. Therefore, such professors could not admit that such privilege should be shared with others in junior colleges by the standards of the Kookdaeans. They took to the street to oppose the Kookdaeans solely in order to preserve their professorships in reputable colleges that were different from other schools. However, they needed a plausible justification for their behavior, and they selected college autonomy or “educational democracy” as the focus for their actions. They achieved a victory in this struggle, by causing a nationwide strike. As a result, SNU remained paralyzed throughout an entire year.

The reform group that struggled to clear away all vestiges of colonial higher education grasped the true intentions hidden behind the name of college autonomy.
The group could not allow the professors to keep their colleges exclusively to themselves. In this struggle, the group labeled all the Namrodang professors who had come from imperial universities, a central force of the anti-Kookdaean movement, as leftists. To the reform group, liquidation of colonialism and expulsion of leftist professors were two mutually compatible and desirable goals. However, not all professors who remained in SNU or who went North after the anti-Kookdaean movement were leftists, and their opposition to the Kookdaean was not based on leftist ideology. The three categories of argument—the maintenance of academic cliques, promotion and hiring on ability and political beliefs—seem to be very similar, but do not come within the same sphere: Each is independent and each one cannot be assigned to another category. The reform group, however, categorized the anti-Kookdaean group as a leftist group. During the Cold War, the most powerful way to incapacitate an opposing power was to unite several movements into one, label it leftist, and condemn it. Under the direct governance of the U.S. military, pro-Japan sentiment was acceptable but pro-Communism was not. The reform group succeeded very well in over simplifying anti-Kookdaean power. Accordingly, the Kookdaean movement has long been regarded only from a single perspective, as a microcosm of the wider confrontation between right and left. It is an extremely over-simplified interpretation.

To avoid such over-simplification, the anti-Kookdaean movement should be viewed through a wider lens. Seemingly, the ideological strife was symbolic of the very real struggle to preserve the vested rights of professorship. In addition, the fundamental reason for preserving these vested rights was the self-realization of scholars. It was the same for both parties. Apart from their ideology, most of the scholars hoped to devote themselves to their newly liberated country. They were willing to make personal sacrifices in doing so. To realize their ambitions, these scholars required professorship and the security, power and influence that it provided. For them, the Kookdaean meant depriving themselves of their chances for self-realization. Namrodang seemed to have sufficient power to satisfy their desires and demands, and to alleviate their complaints. It was largely for these reasons that most scholars joined the anti-Kookdaean movement.

The DOE Affairs did not possess the practical and material means to realize the initial intent, that is, the establishment of “a grand university.” What they secured
was authority and some limited rights under the dominance of the U.S. military government. The Kookdaean came to personify extremely limited resources and capabilities. It was merely an administrative order promulgated by an Act. It was a documentary reform. There was no faculty or campus that was being prepared as a university. No plan was made to invest in facilities to help it become “the highest university in the land.” The Faculty of Science and Engineering of Kyungsung University, with the best scientific experimental facilities at the time, was devastated by the occupation of the U.S. military. For the destruction of facilities by the U.S. in the College of Engineering, Kyungsung University, see Major Lock hard Report, Form 11 Sept. 45 to 28 Feb. 46, or Interview with Lt. CMDR, A. Crofts, USNR, Foreign Affairs Section, MG, 21 January 1946, Interview with Major Lock hard, 9 March, 1946. According to Crofts, “school facilities were thoroughly devastated, and were not recoverable” , and he expressed his fear that such reckless destruction probably delayed real scientific education in Korea.

Even an imminent budget for preventing leaks in the roof during the rainy season was not secured. Harry B. Anstead, Progress Report; Seoul National University, 4 Aug., 1947, RG332. The support of a central administrative agency for SNU remained absent or weak. The 4/4 quarter budget was not delivered by the end of the year. The budget of 1947 was not settled even by April. “The budget for repairing facilities that require immediate repair” was rejected, and great damage in the summer season was caused. Electricity and waterworks were not properly supplied, and buildings for the College of Engineering could not be used. As a result, establishment of a laboratory was also delayed. Due to lack of finances and irresponsibility, SNU in the beginning could not be supported by the government.

In general, the Kookdaean was a rough-and-ready plan. The reform group, like Kimdae, did not prepare an additional budget, but it also failed in mustering nationwide support and sympathy, unlike Kimdae’s “Rice for Patriotism.” In these circumstances and this climate, professors attempted to select a college that guaranteed their self-realization, sometimes quite apart from their political beliefs. Many professors went North to devote themselves to real study. The Jongdaean had a very accurate insight into the minds of professors as far as research conditions were concerned.
In fact, the role of American officers was not as great as has been supposed. What, then, did they do, and what was the results of the actions they did undertake? In much of the past scholarship and writings on this topic, the Kookdaean was considered to have been brought about on the back of the unity in purpose of the U.S. military and Korean officers in charge. However, the idea referred to as “conspiracy” should be reviewed again. U.S. military officers were conducive to the spread of anti-American sentiment in the public in Korea due to their rough handling of businesses. Their measures, including frequent reckless destruction of facilities in the U.S. military, caused much anti-American sentiment. As a typical example, American citizens were appointed to the posts of president, dean of academic affairs, dean of students, and all other important positions at SNU. Through a series of tough administrative measures, they expected to emphasize their role beyond the normal scope of such positions. In terms of the respect and privilege granted to professors at imperial universities, the authority and dignity of the president would be great. However, [as newly appointed SNU dean,] Protestant pastor Anstead began the routine work of the day by saying, “Let’s pray together”. Such a practice was probably regarded as a form of religious imperialism, oppression or contempt for the host society. However, it was the imprudent behavior of the head director Pittenger that led to the most serious deterioration of the situation. In December 1946, when students of the liberal arts, commerce and law colleges resolved to join in the strike, he inspected the campus in full military uniform and with an exceptionally large revolver. For the behavior of Pittenger, Jang Ri-wook, op. cit., p. 236 or <Stenographic records>

He also ordered the temporary closing of the school and punishment of all students involved. He reached the height of his recklessness when he issued a unilateral announcement in a letter to the professors of SNU, in which he used very insulting remarks: There should be something like steel in your spine, but now I learn that only mud filled it. Jang Ri-wook, op. cit.

His impetuous actions caused a major upsurge of anti-American sentiment among students and professors. The actions of an irrational person like Anstead in the wrong place at the wrong time caused the situation to disintegrate.

However, a collective understanding was more important than the inappropriate behavior of individual U.S. officers. They did not support the rightists in the
beginning. When a problem arose, they tried to grasp the situation through an objective analysis and take proper action through partial and stopgap measures. However, in the end, when the situation began to get beyond them, they turned to the rightists. Thus, the reform group could categorize the anti-Kookdaean group as leftist. If an integrated university plan based on a “grand union” had existed, the U.S. officers would have helped it to become a reality. In short, the division of colleges was not merely caused by an attack of cultural imperialism on the part of the U.S. military. It stemmed from internal dissension among scholars and intellectuals. Direct governance by the U.S. military and the appearance of an irresponsible American officer sped up the division. The U.S. military did not impose their beliefs and policies unilaterally like cultural imperialists. They had no power to do so. We had not accumulated sufficient capacity to convert the intervention and interference of the U.S. military, who tried to protect the interests of their own country, into actions and policies that would ensure the overall interests of Korea. Gradually, the evident Cold War, conflicts of national interests of both sides, and a lack of coordination between the occupation forces and the U.S. military government caused the ultimate division of the two universities.

5. Conclusion

After the defeat of Japan, there was a struggle among different groups to take leadership of the reform in the process of abolishing Japanese colonial higher education. U.S. military officers in the DOE, Korean senior officers of the rightist party, professors who had graduated from imperial universities or who had not graduated from them, and pro-Japanese and anti-Japanese groups could not but each select a different political line depending on changes in the political situation. Those groups greatly contributed to the division of the higher education system by fierce contention, like elitist competing groups in Western European nations. As for the motive to form a modern state educational system as was formed from the struggle of groups in England and France, see Margaret Archer, Social Origins of Educational Systems, London: Sage, 1976 or Kim Ki-seok, “Historic and Social conditions and motives of secondary education”, Research on Education and Sociology II, Seoul; Educational Science History, 1994.
In addition, there were struggles and contention among the universities themselves. Their conflicts also played an important role in the process of dividing the two universities, SNU and Kimdae. From the beginning, there was mutual awareness, struggles, and advances and retreats, on the part of both professors and educational officers. Professors chose their universities based on the developmental potential for progress at SNU or Kimdae and even based their decisions on the political situation in the North and the South. The resultant struggle was a “zero-sum game”. When one party secured some significant share within the limited material and personnel resources, the other inevitably lost. It was in the process of recruiting professors that very fierce competition existed. Most of the professors against the Kookdaean moved to Kimdae from SNU, and vice versa. Figures critical of the Jongdaean withdrew from Kimdae and went to SNU. The Two Koreas desperately sought to create “the best university” respectively in the same period with limited resources. Such a struggle also hastened the division of the higher education system.

There was no public support or participation to achieve “the best university which would represent the rise and hopes of the nation” in organizing SNU. Unlike Kimdae, SNU had insufficient financial support from its central administrative organization. In stark contrast, Kimdae was created under a well-resourced and systematic process aimed at making it “the Highest Hall of Science.” SNU happened to secure relatively excellent human resources by relying on the traditions, customs and fame of an old imperial university. The university grew by itself, by relying on her human resources. SNU has, until the present day, been cursed by her poor facilities and has still not been able to improve her perpetually poor funding conditions, a financial problem which has existed since her birth.
Chapter 5

Transition from High Schools to Universities

1. Introduction

This chapter deals with a downward equalization phenomenon, one of the issues that emerged in the process of the formation of upper secondary education, which is the foundation of Korean higher education growth. In general, upper secondary education emerges and becomes universal in relation to higher education. Universities in charge of higher education regard the academic pursuit of excellence as more important than any other value. Higher education has focused more on the cultivation of human resources and the production of knowledge that can lead a society forward rather than fostering its citizens or socializing its members. In this respect, the question of how much academic level should graduates of upper secondary education, which is the subject of higher education, is an important issue, and there is always a movement for higher education to define secondary education. This relevance, on the contrary, also implies that the nature of higher education can be determined depending on how the upper secondary education, which is the previous stage of higher education, is formed.

In the case of Korea, secondary education expanded rapidly in quantity, and this in turn led to a dramatic development and expansion in so that higher education developed dramatically. Upper secondary education is not universal as universities take the initiative and control the levels of quality. level. High school education expanded as a result of the government’s inevitable entrance exam policy in response to the aspirations of students and their parents who wished to go to upper secondary schools and compete academically with them. What played a key role in the process was the reform of the student selection system, which is referred to as called the High School Equalization Policy. The High School Equalization Policy is a system for selecting students in general high schools. It is a system in which lotteries are assigned to each school district without the use of selective entrance examinations for each school in order to select students. As of
2007, 59% of the general high schools and 73% of the students operate are under the high school equalization policy, which is the basis of Korea’s secondary education system (Ministry of Education, Korea Educational Development Institute, 2007:177). The abolition of the school-based entrance examination resulted in the subsequent quantitative expansion of the general high schools and contributed to the universalization of the upper secondary education.

In general, rapid quantitative growth in any field raises concerns about maintaining a level of quality. level. In the case of upper secondary education, problems can be taken seriously because they are linked to the academic excellence of higher education. Since the early days of the beginning of the policy implementation of this policy, there has been constant concern that the abolition of high school entrance exams will result in a reduction in the academic levels of students’ abilities. In particular, the argument that top-ranked students’ performance would be degraded appeared was convincing. However, even though there exist are empirical studies which debunk these claims that it is no so(Sung, 1999; Kang & Sung, 2001, Sung, 2002), but worries and concerns about the decline are increasing getting worse. Some have even made a mockery of the words “downward equalization” and speak of into “downward worsening.” Behind these allegations comes the excuse for the fact that Korean universities that have grown in quantity have not made much progress in terms of their records of academic excellence. Under the system of high school equalization, there is no selection test and anyone can enter a general high school (for college entrance), so that the academic ability of high school students is lowered, and the result is that there influences are even lower levels of achievement in of university education.

This argument may be useful as a political slogan but there are many aspects that need to be verified in terms of education. The key issue is the argument that the quantitative expansion resulting from the selection system leads to a decline in the quality of education. Other issues are of little significance unless the alleged decline in education due to the abolition of the entrance examination is verified. For example, one of the most important issues is whether the decline in the academic levels quality of high school students can affect their study in higher education, but this is valid when actual quality declines occur. The key issue to be explained in the process of the formation of higher education in Korea is whether
the quality of education has decreased due to high school equalization— in other words, is there a so-called downward equalization a real phenomenon?

The general (academic) high schools in Korea are divided into two sectors. The majority of schools are located in the sector in which entrance exams are prohibited by the authority of the local school district (hereafter referred to as the prohibited sector). The remaining schools select students using an entrance exam. There also exists a complex group of separate vocational schools. Only a very limited number of schools select students through an exam. These are extremely selective in the area of the prohibited sector and accordingly are categorized as special purpose schools, since they are schools designed for students gifted in foreign languages or science. The focus of the controversy up until this point is the alleged decline of academic achievement among students in the prohibited sector. The aim of this study to elucidate effects of students studying in these sectors. These effects, if they exist, amount to prohibition policy effects. The policy regarding entrance exams was implemented in 1976, and ever since, there has existed an ongoing controversy regarding the validity of the prohibition.

Korean educational policy has been notorious for its frequent changes in direction and policy over the last 60 years. This is especially more so in the case of policies regarding admissions. Three major educational reforms have greatly influenced the formation of public education: the reform which abolished entrance exams for the lower secondary schools in 1969; the reform which prohibited entrance exams for general high schools in 1976; and the reform to set graduate quotas rather than admission quotas in 1979, which led to a sudden expansion of colleges and universities. Each of these reforms provided a gate-keeping function in one form or another. The Ministry of Education’s tightly controlled admission policies are still the subject of ongoing and frequent change. Critics have pointed out that admission policies can change from morning to evening. However, contrary to most predictions, the policy that has not changed so far over the last 30 years is the measure which prohibited high school entrance exams. When this policy was first enacted, it was termed the “Equal High School Policy” (EHS). The declared goals of this reform were to reduce the academic disparity among schools that resulted from competition for entry into the selective schools, by creating a level playing field in terms of school resources and facilities, the competence of teachers, and
students’ academic abilities. The enormous disparity among schools often resulted in fierce competition for admission to top-class schools in the Seoul area and excessive expenditure on private tuition to prepare for admission to these top schools. Due to the extreme levels of competition and excessive spending on private tuition thus created, the gap increased all the more. This vicious cycle appeared likely to continue ad-finitum. The prohibition policy aimed to break this cycle. Having presumed to have equalized schools in terms of facilities, teacher competence, and student performance, the Ministry abolished entrance exams with a view to upgrading all the high schools equally. Obviously, huge financial commitments and work were necessary in order to create equality amongst high schools. However, as history has shown, EHS eventually amounted to mere rhetoric and lip-service. What actually happened was the division of the regions into two sectors, without any effects or real change from this upgrading of resources, teacher competence, or student performance. Separate vocational schools have remained as before and are not included in either of the sectors.

Due largely to the economic crisis which hit the world economy in the late 1990s and the immediate effects it had on Korean society, educators and policymakers once again were forced to recognize the value and power of education. The financial crisis that occurred in Southeast Asia created huge problems to the Korean economy. Right before having to declare a moratorium on payments, Korea sought the help of the IMF and was able to save itself from financial collapse. Throughout the crisis, Korea came to learn a valuable lesson. It had become a middle-income country with a reliance upon human resources, not natural resources. In order to step up to an advanced level of economic development, the only option that it had was to rely on the only resources it had—human resources. This may explain why, for the first time in the history of education, the Korean government invested an unprecedented amount of money and initiated a policy in 1999 that would empower its doctoral programs to attain the same levels seen in world-class research universities. Enter the Brain Korea 21 Project. Some visible fruits are beginning to be seen. According to the ratings of world universities published annually by The Times, the rankings of Seoul National University and Korea University have advanced a great many places, to 69th and 98th place respectively (The Times Supplementary of Higher Education, 2006; Kim & Nam, in press). The number of
high school graduates planning to go on to college and university is increasing every year. Additionally, the competition to get into world-class research universities is getting more fierce by the day. The market for private tuition has grown exponentially, and families are spending more and more of their income on cram schools. For parents in low-income families, education represents hope, but at the same time, manifests itself as pain and a massive financial burden.

In the régime of the leftist government, the controversy concerning EHS broadened in its scope. From what was once a policy discussion, it degenerated into a struggle between ideologies and classes. The ruling party and left-wing groups insisted that by virtue of the prohibition, the excessive spending on private tutoring has been brought under control and social equity had been achieved. On the other hand, the opposition party and Neo-liberalists insisted that due to the prohibition, levels of competition had decreased and, accordingly, scholastic abilities have dropped. They mocked EHS policy by referring to it as the “Equal Dull-Brained Policy.” The opposition party claimed that in the long run, Korea will experience a decline in its competitive power and will go through severe delays in development just like some countries in South America. Some research findings which were prematurely released without sufficient data to back them up have further intensified this heated debate. A small number of social scientists led the debate. The Institute for Social Sciences of Seoul National University announced in 2005 that, in the last 25 years, students coming from well-to-do families, living in the more promising school districts, or being cared for by a full-time housewife mothers were more likely to enter that school than students who did not share such privileges. This was the first time that a claim for inequality being reproduced over generations was made public. A group of labor economists working in a Neo-liberalist think-tank, the Korean Development Institute (KDI), joined the debate and used an economists’ model to show the decline in academic performance over time. Although the study was a cross-sectional analysis using data from two cohorts, they maintained that math scores of students in the prohibited sector had declined over 2 years. Furthermore, they claimed that this was especially the case among top-level students. The debate heated up even more than previously. When evidence of the reproduction of inequality was presented showing the decline of scholastic achievement in the prohibited sector, the debate
enlarged into a conflict between parties and even classes. We sought to answer the core question in the conflict at hand. Our question is simply whether the prohibition policy has any propensity to arrest scholastic development among students from a particular sector. Is this really the case for the most academically able students? If the test scores in the prohibited sector became lower over time, then calling the EHS policy the “Equal Dull-Brained Policy” coincides with the data. As we will show later, we could not find any conclusive evidence that justified the label “Equal Dull-Brained Policy.”

2. Method

The main feature of our analysis seems to be similar to that of the so-called second Coleman report.6 After 20 years since his research which pointed to there being “no school effects,” Coleman and his new colleagues tested the sector effects between a majority of public schools and a small group of private or other schools in the United States. After making comparisons of sector effects, they reported that students from the private sector, mainly Catholic schools, had higher scores, and they also presented a number of explanations for their findings. In a similar way, we tried to elucidate the effects in two sectors: a majority of high schools in the prohibited sector and a small number of schools in the “non-prohibited” sector. We sought to uncover what effects each sector has on changes in test scores among students for the 3 years of high school. For this purpose, we characterized this study a Korean version of the Coleman report. We notified our mentors and colleagues in the U.S. of this fact and corresponded with them.7

The questions look similar but there is a fundamental difference between the Coleman study and our study. In our research, we could not make use of necessary and ideal data that were adequately designed to deal with the question at hand. In order to uncover the sector effects, we needed data that met the following minimum requirements. Students’ test scores before they enter high school and time series test scores showing scholastic growth over time from 10th to 12th grade were essential items of data. Just as in a study on school effects, we needed reliable measures to control for family background and students’ area of residence to avoid compounding sector effects. With these, we could determine the net sector
effect, or the prohibition policy effect. We carried out our study without these
minimum data requirements for a full-fledged analysis of the sector effects. Instead,
we used a number of scattered data sets that were available for different purposes.
We decided to use the same data that labor economists had used to claim that EHS
is in fact an “Equal Dull-Brained Policy.” These data sets were a 1% sample of
the national assessment of educational progress for 10th and 12th grades in 2001.
For test scores for the 3 years, we combined the four different data sets and
fitted it to a longitudinal analysis.8 The biggest weakness of this data set was a
lack of family background measures. Therefore, we also fitted the same analytic
model to the 2002 data, which has better measures of SES. By comparing the
results of the 2001 and 2002 data, we could examine whether a lack of background
control could lead to a sector effect due to the omitted variables. In the 2002 data,
test scores are available for just three times. Therefore, the same model could not
be applied to the two cohorts. We were careful in examining estimates coming
from unspecified effects due to the difference of key variables and truncated data.

(1) Statistic Model

Under the limited conditions of having to use data which was not ideal and not
having sufficient data and information on student backgrounds, we selected the
3-level latent variable regression hierarchical linear model, a model often referred
to as the LVR–HM3 (Seltzer, M., K. Choi, & Y. Thum, 2003; Choi & Seltzer, in
press). This model was used to identify sector effects in top-level students by
regressing students’ initial status to intellectual growth rates over time. This model
allowed us to set student test scores as a function of time and to set growth rate
as a function of the achievement level at the starting point of high school. With
this model, we can estimate the initial status (IS) and growth rate (GR) of each
student and the school mean IS and GR as well. A most interesting estimate of this
LVR–HM3 is a latent regression coefficient capturing the relationship between
students’ IS and GR in a high school within a particular sector.9 This coefficient
is often referred to as a within-school IS/GR slope (Seltzer, Choi, & Thum, 2003).

For the level-one within-student model, we used the repeated measures of a
student test scores to estimate two parameters: IS (π0ij) and GR (π1ij).
For the level-two between-student model, we introduced the student background variables, parental education measure, and learning behavior as control variables to acquire the adjusted school mean IS(β00j) and GR(β10j). Besides this, in order to estimate changes (βwj) in GR determined by student initial status (π0ij), the estimated students’ initial status (μ0ij - β00) was additionally included in the model.

For the level-three between-school model, the following were used as dependent variables: school mean IS (β00j), school mean GR (β10j), and the within-school IS/GR slope for each school (βwj). The sector index was introduced as a dummy variable, and we tried to detect differences in GR between the two sectors. The sector index has three categories. One is the prohibited sector, what is known as the EHS-schools. The others which belong to the non-prohibited sector are the non-EHS and the FL&S schools. The FL&S schools are foreign language high schools and science high schools that are designed specifically for gifted students in each field. Parents recognize them as most selective schools. Additionally, we introduced the self-esteem level of the teacher as a school characteristic variable. In the equation for estimating GR and the relationship between IS and GR, the mean IS of each school (β00j - γ00) was added as an independent variable. This was done to analyze the changes in the GR of each school according to the levels of scholastic achievements of students. (See Appendix 1.)

In summary, we can answer the core question at hand with the application of this LVR-HM3 model: Do high school students in the prohibited sector experience a decline in their intellectual growth? We found the answer in the following sequence. First, we compared the school mean GR between the three categories of two sectors. Next, we compared the student GR in accordance with the IS level of each student. Then, we investigated whether or not the GR of the students differed in accordance with the school mean IS level. For the convenience of this analysis, we assumed that schools could have two different school initial status levels: one level could be an average IS of the prohibited sector; the other could be a top-level IS like those of Foreign Language or Science schools (FL&S). In this way, we tried to confirm whether the sector effect showed itself in different ways according to the school mean IS level. If we combine all the results, we may be able to provide answers to the following specific questions: “Given the level of IS of my child, to which sector should I send my child to develop more?” Alternatively, we could
also provide an answer to a question such as this: “Can my child improve intellectually if I choose to move to a school district of the non-prohibited sector or send the child to a selective FS&S high school?” By providing such specific answers, we hope we can offer a way and a means of changing what is an ideologically heated controversy into a cool and calm discussion about the effects of educational policies and reforms on students’ intellectual excellence.

Here, we chose to show how the GR of students can be determined in different ways according to specific conditions. This was done in order to make the analysis results appear simple and clear. The analysis results of the 3-Level LVR-HLM are provided in Appendix 2. The conditions used to estimate the specific GR of a particular student are as follows.

Classification of students by their level of IS at 10th grade:
- Less able students, with one SD below the mean (below 29 points) (a)
- Average students, with mean score (about 50 points) (b)
- Able students, with one SD above the mean (above 71 points) (c)
- Most able students, with two SD above the mean (above 92 points) (d)

Classification of schools by school mean scores at 10th grade
- a school with an average achievement level, similar to the prohibited schools (A)
- a school with the highest achievement level, similar to the FL&S schools (B)

We can predict the GRs of students who have achievement levels of (a), (b), (c), (d) when they are supposed to be enrolled in a prohibited school (EHS), a non-prohibited school (non-EHS), or a FL&S school, which could have an achievement level of (A) or (B). The reason that the discussion on EHS policy has turned into such a deeply divisive conflict is due to the claims made by some social scientists that there has been a decline of mean test scores among the able or the most able students in the prohibited sector. One way that could adequately provide answers to these doubts is to compare the predicted scores of student (c) or (d) between two sectors. In addition, in order to take into consideration the influence of school mean GR, we made a distinction of school mean achievement level at 10th grade (classification of schools in to A and B). We used the WinBUGS program when applying the analysis model to the data (Spiegelhalter et al., 2003).
(2) Data

We started with a 1% national data sample taken from the National Assessment of Education Achievement, administrated by the Korea Institute of Curriculum and Education (KICE) in 2001. This is the same data set used by labor economists. As mentioned above, this is not a longitudinal data set, but a cross-sectional data set from two cohorts of 10th and 12th grade students, taken in 2001. Using the same data, we can do a cross-check on the validity of their claims. To model the time series of test scores for each student, we added to our base a set of separate test scores for each student matched by an identification number. These test scores were not from a sample but from virtually the whole population of each grade. The form and content of the tests are equated to the Scholastic Aptitude Test (Korean SAT I) administered by KICE under the strict supervision of the Ministry for all applicants to colleges and universities once a year on the same day. That is, the most critical test that largely determines the future of Korean youth. We used three sets of national test score data for each student selected in the 2001 sample. In making a time series data set for 3 years, we lost approximately 20% of the cases due to students having the same names, transfers, and the misprinting of names. The omission rate is considerable; it is however not a systematic omission but a random omission. We checked repeatedly before fitting the model to data for any problems resulting from this omission.

We could not use an equated test in compiling a set of test scores over four time points because the administration of the national test is beyond our control. Therefore, we cannot quantitatively measure the growth rate simply by looking at the difference between time points. As an alternative, we used standardized scores and computed growth rates as differences from those scores. It is undesirable to use standardized scores when performing a longitudinal analysis, but we were able to use the scores in a limited fashion to address our specific research questions. Since we used normal scores, changes in achievement levels meant changes in the relative ranking of each student among the nationwide population of the same grade. Major variables and descriptive statistics are shown in Table V -1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001 Data</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Student Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAN(Y1)</td>
<td>Korean scores at 10th</td>
<td>5607</td>
<td>55.37</td>
<td>18.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAN(Y2)</td>
<td>Korean scores at 11th</td>
<td>4905</td>
<td>54.98</td>
<td>20.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAN(Y3_6)</td>
<td>Korean scores at 12th in June</td>
<td>4786</td>
<td>56.01</td>
<td>19.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAN(Y3_9)</td>
<td>Korean scores at 12th in Sept.</td>
<td>4702</td>
<td>54.58</td>
<td>19.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENG(Y1)</td>
<td>English scores at 10th grade</td>
<td>5607</td>
<td>55.95</td>
<td>18.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENG(Y2)</td>
<td>English scores at 11th grade</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>54.87</td>
<td>20.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENG(Y3_6)</td>
<td>English scores at 12th in June</td>
<td>4782</td>
<td>56.15</td>
<td>19.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENG(Y3_9)</td>
<td>English scores at 12th in Sept.</td>
<td>4687</td>
<td>54.66</td>
<td>20.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEDU</td>
<td>Parental education level</td>
<td>4679</td>
<td>12.35</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>Scholastic attitude of student</td>
<td>4708</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EHS</td>
<td>High Schools in the non-prohibited sector</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EHS (FL&amp;S HS)</td>
<td>The Foreign Language or Science Schools</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEASE</td>
<td>Level of self-esteem of teachers and professional pride in their school</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2002 Data</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Student Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAN(Y1)</td>
<td>Korean scores at 10th grade</td>
<td>4608</td>
<td>53.23</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAN(Y2)</td>
<td>Korean scores at 11th grade</td>
<td>3666</td>
<td>54.01</td>
<td>19.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAN(Y3_6)</td>
<td>Korean scores at 12th grade</td>
<td>3575</td>
<td>54.69</td>
<td>19.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENG(Y1)</td>
<td>English scores at 10th grade</td>
<td>4608</td>
<td>40.62</td>
<td>20.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENG(Y2)</td>
<td>English scores at 11th grade</td>
<td>3665</td>
<td>54.32</td>
<td>19.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENG(Y3_6)</td>
<td>English scores at 12th grade in Jun.</td>
<td>3608</td>
<td>54.53</td>
<td>20.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>A composite of SES measures</td>
<td>4608</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>Scholastic attitude of student</td>
<td>4608</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EHS</td>
<td>High Schools in the non-prohibited sector</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EHS (FL&amp;S HS)</td>
<td>The Foreign Language or Science Schools</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESS</td>
<td>Degree of emphasize on academic achievement by schools</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Results

We will present the results with respect to the order of sequential questions raised in the policy debate. First, we looked into whether the consequences of the so-called “Equal Dull-Brained Policy” had really occurred. For this, we compared differences in school mean GR between the EHS and non-EHS sectors. We further compared school mean GR between higher and lower school mean IS in each sector. With this test, we can be certain as whether there is indeed a tendency for arresting GR among higher level IS students within the prohibited sector. This test is equivalent to a test of the effects of an entrance exam for high school on student’s intellectual matriculation. To put it differently, it is a test of the effects of test-driven policy, whether it is a cut-throat entrance exam in Korea or a test of teacher effectiveness elsewhere. Lastly, we looked for differences in school mean GR resulting from attending an average school in the prohibited sector and attending a reference group school, which include some of the most selective schools in Korea.

(1) Differences in School Mean at 12th Grade Between Sectors

Everybody is interested in achievement levels in the final year of high school. The final academic results of a student is a measure of their academic standing and is also a summary of the whole 12 years of public instruction and is moreover one of the most defining factors for transition to colleges and universities. If a student has a much higher score at 12th grade on a national level, then he or she has a much better chance to be admitted to a prestigious university. One simple way to test the validity of the claims that EHS policy arrests the intellectual growth of students in the prohibited sector is to compare the final academic results of students between sectors. Table V-2 shows differences in school mean between sectors at 12th grade in the subjects of Korean and English. Figure V-1 is a visual image of Table V-2. Students from the prohibited sector show higher scores than their counterparts, but lower scores than students from the reference group. This same pattern appears consistently across the periods of data collection in 2001 and 2002, and
across subjects such as Korean and English. The impressive higher scores among the reference group students are not surprising, since they attended, in fact, a very limited number of the most elitist and selective schools, such as Foreign Language schools or Science schools (FL&S). These are schools for gifted students in those specific fields.

However, it is not as obvious to what extent the school per se exerts an influence on the achievement level of the students. As will be shown later, even the IS at the starting point is higher than the summary scores at 12th grade. The school mean of the prohibited sector is higher from the beginning of high school. We can hardly deny the fact that the school mean scores of the non-prohibited sector are lower than those of the prohibited sector. Some schools in the non-prohibited sector, however, have higher school means than those of their counterpart schools. Consequently, it is difficult to arrive at any conclusion based only on the comparisons of the school means between sectors in the last year of high school. We made an additional comparison of average growth rates over 3 years.

<Table V-2> Difference in school mean at 12th grade between sectors in Korean and English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Location</th>
<th>LAN</th>
<th>ENG</th>
<th>LAN</th>
<th>ENG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prohibited sector (EHS)</td>
<td>51.38</td>
<td>50.84</td>
<td>52.52</td>
<td>52.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-prohibited sector (non-EHS)</td>
<td>46.35</td>
<td>45.62</td>
<td>43.40</td>
<td>43.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-prohibited sector (FL&amp;S)</td>
<td>67.82</td>
<td>72.22</td>
<td>74.37</td>
<td>79.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Figure V-1] Differences in school mean at 12th grade between sectors in the subjects of Korean and English
(2) Difference in School Mean Growth Rate Between Sectors

The comparison of growth rates between schools can be an effective means for clearly detecting the effects of the EHS policy on the scholastic achievement of students. Table V-3A shows the comparison of growth rates over a 3-year period between sectors. While the growth rates of students from the prohibited sector showed a slight increase in test scores of two subjects for the 3 years, those of their counterparts showed a decline.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School location</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LAN</td>
<td>ENG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibited sector (EHS)</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-prohibited sector (non-EHS)</td>
<td>-2.91</td>
<td>-2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-prohibited sector (FL&amp;S HS)</td>
<td>7.47</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table V-3B Changes in test scores over time between sectors, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Subject Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject Year</td>
<td>LAN</td>
<td>ENG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Y1</td>
<td>Y2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibited sector (EHS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (95%CI)</td>
<td>51.20</td>
<td>51.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(95%CI)</td>
<td>48.98</td>
<td>48.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-prohibited sector (Non-EHS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (95%CI)</td>
<td>49.26</td>
<td>48.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(95%CI)</td>
<td>45.77</td>
<td>40.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-prohibited sector (FL&amp;S HS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (95%CI)</td>
<td>60.35</td>
<td>62.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(95%CI)</td>
<td>52.96</td>
<td>58.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, for students in the reference group, there is an inconsistent pattern which we cannot explain. In Korean, the group shows a superior growth rate to
that of the EHS schools. In terms of English, on the other hand, this is not the case. According to the 2002 data, the reference group showed a steeper decline in this subject than the other non-EHS schools. In the comparison of school means, this group stood out prominently. However, when we examined school mean GR, the prominence of the group was largely reduced, and in some cases had disappeared.

<Table V-3C> Changes in test scores over time between sectors, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Subject data</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LAN</td>
<td>Y1</td>
<td>Y2</td>
<td>Y3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibited sector(EHS)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>51.74</td>
<td>52.13</td>
<td>52.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(95%CI)</td>
<td>49.38</td>
<td>49.91</td>
<td>50.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54.10</td>
<td>54.31</td>
<td>54.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-prohibited sector (Non-EHS)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>44.00</td>
<td>43.70</td>
<td>43.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(95%CI)</td>
<td>41.09</td>
<td>40.97</td>
<td>40.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46.91</td>
<td>46.40</td>
<td>46.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-prohibited sector (FL&amp;S HS)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>70.70</td>
<td>72.54</td>
<td>74.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(95%CI)</td>
<td>60.56</td>
<td>66.02</td>
<td>69.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80.90</td>
<td>78.89</td>
<td>78.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Figure V-2] School mean growth rates between sectors
(3) The Effects of Entrance Exams on Growth Patterns Over Time

We tested the core focus of this heated debate—whether a so-called “Equal Dulled-Brain” tendency has really been brought about—by comparing differences in school means at 12th grade and school mean GR for 3 years between sectors. What really matters is not just a tendency for an overall decline in test scores, but also the tendency particularly among the most able students. To test this claim, a simple comparison of GR is not sufficient. We need to compare the changes in growth rate by student IS levels in a particular high school. More specifically, we need to compare differences in GR over a 3-year period according to the levels of IS. We created the following four categories of students: below average, average, able, and most able. In our investigation, there was not much difference between the two subjects, Korean and English, so we only discuss English test scores on this point. We could not test empirically the effects on cognitive growth with our very limited sample of data. We instead analyzed the effects by using a simulation method. Using this method, we generated the estimated growth rates of students under the following two conditions: firstly, attending an average school and secondly, attending a “better” high school. By “average”, we assume that a student attended a school whose school mean is the mean of schools in the prohibited sector. The mean is in fact almost equal to the national school mean scores. By “better,” we mean the school mean of those highly selective schools referred to as the reference group.

The analysis of the different patterns of growth rates according to IS level is shown in 〈Table V-4A〉. [Figure V-3A] is a visual image of 〈Table V-4A〉.

As shown in 〈Table V-4A〉 and [Figure V-3A], the growth rates of students in the prohibited sector are higher than the others. The difference lies within the margin of error. There was, however, no tendency of declining test scores for 3 years across IS levels in that sector. Contrary to the claims made by labor economists, the top caliber students were not arrested in their cognitive development just because they were admitted to a school without first having taken a cut-throat, competitive entrance exam.

Since the selection of students differs between sectors, we also analyzed the growth rate of students who would enroll in so-called “better” schools. We
analyzed the patterns of GR among students by four different IS levels for a period of 3 years. Both [Table V-4B] and [Figure V-3B] show the tendency of growth patterns among students from the “better” schools. Overall, there seems to be an advantageous effect for enrolling in the reference group schools. However, between the high-ranking (1 SD above) and top-ranking (2 SD above) students, the differences in GR lie within the margin of error. This result carries with it significant meaning and implications. For most very able students, there is no noticeable difference in making a choice of one school over another or one sector over another sector. If anything, if students were enrolled in a school using an entrance exam, there was a slight decline in their test scores. The results indicate that the level of academic excellence of the top caliber students is not influenced by the type of the school per se, but by other factors, such as student characteristics and family background. Within the limitations imposed by our data, we cannot further determine why this is the case.

<Table V-4A> predicted changes in scores over time by IS levels in an “average” school between sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Students Initial status</th>
<th>grade</th>
<th>EHS</th>
<th>Non-EHS</th>
<th>Non-EHS(FL&amp;S HS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>student initial score</td>
<td>year</td>
<td>mean 95% CI</td>
<td>mean 95% CI</td>
<td>mean 95% CI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 1sd</td>
<td>Y1</td>
<td>29.00</td>
<td>29.00</td>
<td>29.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(=29)</td>
<td>Y2</td>
<td>30.38 (29.67 31.09)</td>
<td>29.48 (28.78 30.19)</td>
<td>38.23 (30.39 45.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y3</td>
<td>31.76 (30.34 33.18)</td>
<td>29.96 (28.56 31.39)</td>
<td>47.45 (31.77 62.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Y1</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(=50)</td>
<td>Y2</td>
<td>50.44 (49.92 50.96)</td>
<td>49.46 (48.78 50.13)</td>
<td>55.44 (50.15 60.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y3</td>
<td>50.87 (49.84 51.92)</td>
<td>48.92 (47.57 50.25)</td>
<td>60.67 (50.30 70.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 1sd</td>
<td>Y1</td>
<td>71.00</td>
<td>71.00</td>
<td>71.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(=71)</td>
<td>Y2</td>
<td>70.49 (69.75 71.27)</td>
<td>69.45 (68.29 70.58)</td>
<td>72.64 (69.35 75.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y3</td>
<td>69.98 (68.50 71.53)</td>
<td>67.89 (65.57 70.17)</td>
<td>74.29 (67.71 80.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 2sd</td>
<td>Y1</td>
<td>92.00</td>
<td>92.00</td>
<td>92.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(=92)</td>
<td>Y2</td>
<td>90.54 (89.36 91.77)</td>
<td>89.43 (87.67 91.18)</td>
<td>89.85 (86.74 92.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y3</td>
<td>89.09 (86.72 91.53)</td>
<td>86.86 (83.33 90.36)</td>
<td>87.71 (81.48 93.92)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table V-4B: Predicted Changes in Scores Over Time by IS Levels in a “Better” School Between Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Students Initial Status</th>
<th>grade</th>
<th>EHS</th>
<th>Non-EHS</th>
<th>Non-EHS (FL&amp;S-HS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initial score</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Y1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 1σ</td>
<td>Y1</td>
<td>29.00</td>
<td>29.00</td>
<td>29.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(≈29)</td>
<td>Y2</td>
<td>30.24</td>
<td>(29.36, 31.11)</td>
<td>29.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y3</td>
<td>31.48</td>
<td>(29.72, 33.22)</td>
<td>29.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Y1</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(≈50)</td>
<td>Y2</td>
<td>49.99</td>
<td>(49.32, 50.66)</td>
<td>49.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y3</td>
<td>49.98</td>
<td>(48.63, 51.32)</td>
<td>48.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 1σ</td>
<td>Y1</td>
<td>71.00</td>
<td>71.00</td>
<td>71.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(≈71)</td>
<td>Y2</td>
<td>69.74</td>
<td>(68.76, 70.75)</td>
<td>68.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y3</td>
<td>68.49</td>
<td>(66.53, 70.49)</td>
<td>66.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 2σ</td>
<td>Y1</td>
<td>92.00</td>
<td>92.00</td>
<td>92.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(≈92)</td>
<td>Y2</td>
<td>89.49</td>
<td>(87.99, 91.05)</td>
<td>88.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y3</td>
<td>86.99</td>
<td>(83.97, 90.09)</td>
<td>84.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure V-3A: Changes in scores over time by four IS levels in an “average” school between sectors](image-url)
4. Discussion

We examined the validity of the claims that EHS policy is in fact “Equal Dull-Brained Policy”, which, in turn leads to a tendency to “downward equalization” of scholastic achievement among students. The claims imply, among the reasons for decline, that there exists insufficient competition due to the prohibition policy. The key point of the claim is the necessity of returning to the “good” old days, that is, the era of the highly selective and elitist high schools. We tried to detect the existence of such a tendency. We addressed a series of sequential questions using key criteria such as differences in growth rates between sectors, differences in school mean growth rate between sectors, and the simulated patterns of growth rate by the IS level. Below, we present the summary of our findings and a number of lessons that can be drawn from them.

(1) Summary

a) The claim of “Equal Dull-Brained Policy” does not coincide with our data.
There were no sector effects and no sign of declining growth rates over time among the most able students.

b) An increase in test scores depends a lot more on other factors than on the admission policy.

If students attend a school with good facilities, highly qualified teachers and a more able student composition, there is almost no difference in the achievement levels between sectors. The goals of the EHS policy proclaimed in 1976 were not in themselves incorrect. The chief problem was that these goals were not backed up by the necessary and serious financial commitments needed to fulfill the stated intentions; resulting in them becoming mere lip service and rhetoric. The claim that bringing back the competitive entrance exam would enhance cognitive development among students does not coincide with our data. Bringing back such tests would surely lead to even more severe competition from the 10th grade onwards, or much earlier than the 10th grade, and even more household income being spent on cram schools. This would not stop or reduce the reproduction of inequality over time.

c) Cognitive development does not occur according to sector but does occur according to IS levels at 10th grade or earlier.

In the sector with no admissions test, the top-ranking students showed a tendency for their growth rate to decrease, whereas the high-ranking students showed a tendency for their growth rate to increase slightly. On the whole, scores tended to regress to near the school mean. In the sector using an admissions test, the top-ranking students showed a slight decline in their scores but the high-ranking students maintained their academic standing. By and large, the growth rate is on the decline in the test sector but not in the no-test sector. Test-driven reforms or school practices do not appear to cognitively empower students.

d) We cannot explain the reasons behind students in the reference group achieving better scores than others across subjects.

With our data, we cannot go further to probe for possible explanations. There are some phenomena which remain unclear. One of the claims that receives attention is the claim that a selective school is more advantageous to high-ranking students, and that admission without a test is more disadvantageous to top caliber students. We could not find any results that validated such claims. Rather, we found that the top-ranking students do better in a school without an admissions
test than in a highly selective school. This does not mean, however, that schools in the no-test sector are superior to those in the reference group. We are just suggesting that we could not find a decisive factor which is conducive to the impressive higher achievement of the students in FL&S schools.

e) The factors that increase test scores in Korea are mostly the factors which have been found elsewhere.

Family background matters tremendously in Korea. These results do not run counter to those of school effects studies elsewhere. In our analyses, the sector effect seems to be compounded with the other uncontrolled factors such as family background and area of residence.

(2) Reflections

The results of this analysis show that the High School Equalization Policy that led to the expansion and generalization of upper secondary education is was not significantly related to the deterioration of education quality. In this regard, it can be said that it is difficult to obtain a argue convincingly argument that the qualitative decline of the latter secondary education has made it difficult to secure the academic excellence in of the university education. A student with a high level of achievement will generally always achieve has excellent results regardless of the method of entrance examination. In addition, considering that the purpose and meaning of secondary education and higher education are different, even though the overall (average) level of students entering high school has been lowered due to high school equalization, the argument that such a decline in quality is transferred to the university is not very convincing. From the standpoint of universities, universities can re-select excellent students. On the contrary, the increase in the number of applicants to for the university may mean that the possibility of selecting a person with a high academic potential has increased. The introduction of the unsupervised lottery allocation system influenced the expansion of upper secondary and tertiary education rather than affecting students’ academic abilities. The adoption of the High School Equalization system, which can also be referred to as the called no-test lottery allocation method, resulted in the expansion of the post-secondary education and subsequent quantitative development of higher
education. In this way, the High School Equalization policy should be viewed evaluated as being an unusual event in that it has successfully resulted in carried out the quantitative proliferation without causing a deterioration in ng the quality of education.

Since high school equalization did not improve the quality of high school education, it cannot be evaluated as a ‘successful’ policy of killing two birds with one stone. In fact, in order to maintain the quality of education, other policies such as securing qualified teachers, spending a vast amount of money, and providing efficient administrative support are needed far more than entrance screening. As mentioned above, the High School Equalization Policy was inherently limited in that it was not a policy pursued due to a we;; thought out by the educational vision and enacted well thought out at the national level, but rather a policy that the government inevitably chose to cope with the educational aspirations and the fierce competition amongst of students and parents in Korea. It has only changed the way students are assigned a school, but has not been so successful in introducing and implementing follow-up policies that support or promote improvements in the quality of education.

The current debates are far too preoccupied with a single narrow but politically powerful question: bringing back the exam. Moreover, because of the political implications involved in this, other serious issues are not getting due attention from educators, policy makers, and concerned citizens. We would be better off changing the question. Topics such as decentralization of secondary education governance, extending the provision of free instruction up to at least the 12th grade, the integration of general and vocation high schools, and school choice by parents are themes that deserve an in-depth discussion. What is most essential is to change our orientation. Up until now, we have focused on how to promote competitiveness both within and outside schools. It is time for us to redirect our concerns and policy priorities away from how to introduce relatively easy and less costly test-driven reforms and practices and direct them towards reforms which make schools effective, strong, and good places for our youth to spend time in.

Following a recent trend in school effect studies in the U.S. and elsewhere, we should search for “good” schools and analyze the factors that make such a school “good.” A good school not only enables its students to excel in academic
areas but does so in character development too. We take notice of some scholars who have started to work with new ideas in school consulting and in the area of the self-strengthening of schools. Such efforts, which can be seen as a new paradigm of educational reform in the future, have brought us a new perspective that focuses on a local individual school and seeks to strengthen it from “below.” Whether it be research on school effectiveness, school consulting, or school strengthening, uncovering the characteristics of good schools is just as important as inquiring into the reasons behind world-class achievement. In short, we need to articulate a well-informed policy that can enable each local school to be strong, beautiful, and effective. This task is not something that is limited only to Korea. It is a task that should be tackled on a global scale.
Chapter 6

A Great Leap forward to Excellence in Research at Seoul National University, 1994-2006

To the Memory of Late Martin Trow (1926-2007) of Emeritus Professor of Public Policy at UC-Berkeley, especially of his seminal work on the transition of universities from elite to mass to universal education.

1. Introduction

Can a peripheral country like Korea build so-called “world-class” universities? What would it take for a non-western country to create an internationally competitive research university? In response to an increasingly globalized economy, many developing countries have been paying serious attention to building world-class universities. How to develop a research university which can compete with western flagship universities presents challenges on a number of fronts. This is especially true in the case of a country like Korea that has been peripheral for so long and has only joined the ranks of middle-income countries relatively recently. As Altbach (2003) poignantly points out, the patterns, ideas and values of a world-class university among academic institutions in the Western tradition are reflected in the criteria themselves. Applying these terms of reference to universities in non-western regions may invite skepticism or worse. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly difficult for a middle-income country to become a competitive player in the international knowledge system, because the fiscal demands of playing on the world’s stage of science and scholarship are growing exponentially.

Despite these challenges, there have been noticeable achievement in building competitive universities in many developing nations, and particularly in Asian countries. Singapore’s attempt to establish itself as the “Boston of the East” and South Korea’s “Brain Korea 21” program are cases in point (Altbach, 2000). China launched its “211 Project” in 1994 with an ambitious plan to build 100
universities by the early 21st century and the “985 Project” in 1998 with an impressive budget of 3.4 billion U.S. dollars invested in 33 key universities with the intention of developing them into world-class institutions. While Altbach (2000) maintains that these attempts have produced mixed results, it is arguably premature to draw any conclusive judgments.

There have been serious commitments undertaken and efforts made on the part of Korean universities to empower themselves to produce internationally competitive human resources. One of the most central strategies in moving toward this goal has been to empower graduate programs with a specific focus on excellence in research and to build them up to a world-class level. However, the very term “world-class” is not by any means an analytic one and therefore is not a very clear term of reference for scholarly discussions. As shown clearly in refectory remarks by an American historian (Lucas, 1994), since no attempt has been made to construct a true “global” history of higher education, in the use of this term, an unabashedly “Eurocentric” discourse prevails. According to various measures and standards, Seoul National University (SNU), a flagship university in Korea, seemingly appears to have achieved world-class status in line with western conceptions of the university. In 2005, the Times Higher Education Supplement, a British newspaper, ranked SNU as 45th among the world’s top 100 science universities and as the 93rd overall. One year later, to every body’s surprise, the overall ranking of SNU increased dramatically to 63rd, a great leap forward of 30 ranks. The only two other Korean schools within the world’s top 200 universities are Korea University (150th) and KAIST (198th). This leap by SNU is less to do with improvements in research competence but more to do with a noticeable presence of foreign students, post-doctoral fellows and faculty members at SNU. Here we clearly see The Time’s heavy reliance on internationalization in its rankings of world universities. However, with a short institutional history of 60 years, and with a mere 30 years of offering full-fledged doctoral programs, SNU’s accomplishment is extraordinary. What were the driving forces behind this university’s great leap forward?

This chapter examines the process by which SNU transformed itself into a world-class university. The analysis will focus on the internal reforms implemented at SNU over the 10 years from 1994 to 2006 and the effectiveness of these policies in building a world-class university. SNU is an important case study which bears
vital theoretical and practical implications for other Korean universities, as well as for universities in other middle-income countries.

2. Economic Restructuring and Higher Education Reform

The speed and level of economic development that Korea has achieved since the early 1970s have been well documented. By 1996, South Korea, with a per-capita national income of $10,000, had become a major competitor in the world market. By the end of the 1990s, however, the Korean economy was faced with serious economic hardship, mainly due to the foreign exchange crisis. The unemployment rate jumped from 2.6% in 1997 to 7.9% in 1998. This economic crisis uncovered the limitations of a materials-oriented manufacturing economy, and the Korean government proposed a shift to a knowledge-based economy as one of its major policy goals. The Ministry of Education formulated a series of educational reform policies to lay the foundations of a knowledge-based society. In this context, building world-class research universities that can play a central role in Korean economic development has become a national priority.

One of the major policies in this goal of establishing and supporting world-class research universities was the Brain Korea 21 Project (BK21). BK21 is a major higher education reform project that aims at cultivating the creative, high-quality human resources necessary for a knowledge-based society. To accomplish this goal, the Korean government decided to invest approximately US $1.2 billion in universities over the seven years between 1999 and 2005. The most significant difference in this project compared to previous education reform policies lies in its specific focus on graduate programs, and it is the graduate students in the selected schools who are the direct beneficiaries of this project. Research funds do not go directly to the faculty in the form of grants. Instead, three quarters of the entire BK21 budget is used to provide a supportive educational environment for graduate students in the form of stipends, financial support for overseas study, and research infrastructure.

The budget allocated to BK21 was absolutely unprecedented. However, the amount actually available for policy-related reform programs was still relatively limited.

For example, in 2004, the Ministry of Education (MOE) allocated 13% of its
budget (about US $28 billion) for higher education. This amounted to about 0.43% of Korean GDP, which in comparison to other OECD member countries is less than half of the average percentage (0.9) of GDP spent on higher education. The actual amount spent on policy-related reform programs is only 1.3 trillion Won (1.3 billion U.S. dollars), which is less than 40% of the total budget. In the same year, the MOE spent 858.2 billion Won (8.6 million U.S. dollars) on supporting research and development at universities. Of the budget allocated for research and development, 31% was given to research universities with graduate programs, 46% was given to 4-year teaching universities, and the rest was spent to support vocational colleges and schools. About 140 billion Won (140 million U.S. dollars) from the budget allocated for research and development was spent on BK21, and 123.7 billion Won (123.7 million U.S. dollars) was spent on supporting pure sciences and humanities. Besides the MOE, other government institutions provide financial support for research and development for universities. In 2003, about 2 trillion Won (2 billion U.S. dollars) was spent on research and development at universities. Of this funding, 76% came from the government, 14% was donated by private parties, and 9% was supplied by the universities themselves. The largest portion went to the field of engineering. The second and the third largest amounts of research funds were given to the fields of natural sciences and pharmacy, respectively. The most competitive university received the largest amount of financial support for research and development. The top 10 universities received 46% of research funds, and the top 20 universities received 63% of research funds. Two thirds of research funding was given to public universities.

Although the funds available for the actual reform policies were limited, BK21 has had an enormous impact on Korean universities as a whole. In particular, both its emphasis on graduate programs and graduate students and the scale of the project have provided Korean flagship universities, and especially SNU, with an unprecedented opportunity to become world-class universities despite their position on the periphery.

3. Rapid Transition to Universal Access to Higher Education

As Trow (1970, 1980) has repeatedly pointed out, higher education in
contemporary society has gone beyond the stage of elite education, has passed the stage of mass education, and has entered the stage of universal education. The experience of higher education in the United States is a case in point.

The way higher education expanded in Korea during the last several decades is unique. First of all, the speed of the transition has been very impressive. Korean higher education has accomplished in about three decades what the U.S. took half a century to achieve (Trow, 1961). By 2000, Korean high school graduates were 5% more likely to enter higher education in one form or another than their counterparts in the U.S. In the same year, Korea’s enrollment rate in 4-year colleges was 38%, and the enrollment rate in various higher education institutions overall reached 81%. This trend is continuing today. It appears not only that tertiary education has become universal, but also that even graduate education is becoming increasingly standard in Korea. Between 1995 and 2000, the number of graduate students doubled to 230,000 and has continued to increase. Additionally, and unlike the U.S. experience, the rapid transition from mass higher education to universal higher education occurred almost immediately after, or simultaneously to, the swift transition to universal secondary education. However, it is this unprecedented double transition with little time for adjustment that has brought about the so-called “examination hell” or “educational bottle-neck” for students as they advance from secondary to tertiary education.

There are several issues that the Korean higher education system has encountered due to its rapid growth and transition. Many universities have experienced rapid expansion, or rather “exploration,” without having the opportunity to make adequate adjustments to their missions, functions and structures. Instead, such universities offer similar programs and majors without any real, functional differentiation among various levels of schooling. All universities in Korea consider SNU as the “defining institution,” to use Steedman’s term (1987), and attempt to model themselves after SNU. In other words, what Riesman (1966) called a “meandering procession” on the road toward excellence, observed in the U.S., is also occurring in Korea. Most universities in Korea aspire to be like SNU, a Harvard or a “Todai” (Tokyo University) of the Korean peninsula (Cutts, 1999).

Another serious issue resulting from the rapid transition of higher education
concerns funding. The speed and level of expansion of higher education in Korea exceeded the government’s ability to support it financially, which has resulted in both parents and students having to shoulder an ever greater financial burden. It is worth noting that in the case of Korea, the main driving force behind the rapid transition of higher education came from the zeal and willingness on the part of parents to financially support their children’s higher education, rather than from the central planning efforts of the government. As a matter of fact, 83% of the national budget for higher education comes from family funds (Kim, 2005), a phenomenon unseen even in Japan or the U.S., where the private sector is far more dominant than the public sector.

Private education has always played a key role in Korean higher education. While privatization of education in Korea began long before the open-door era, the modern form of private education appeared with the arrival of Western missionaries in Korea (Lee, 2004), and continued during the Colonial Period (1910–1945). From 1948, when the independent Republic of Korea was founded, privatization was further intensified as the country experienced rapid educational expansion in the absence of the central government’s financial commitment or capacity. Currently, more than 80% of college students attend private schools. Additionally, unlike the U.S., where private universities were founded and sponsored by private donations, Korean private universities are sponsored and financially sustained mainly by student tuition.

4. Some Characteristics of Korean Universities

There are several unique characteristics of Korean universities, and these characteristics are intimately linked to the evolution and historical development of university education in Korea. In traditional Korean society, the ruling elites were the main beneficiaries of the educational system. A good number of academic circles (or what Korean scholars may call “Gates” 15) were formed with a prominent scholar of Buddhism and Confucianism as a central figure. Indigenous scholastic traditions were cultivated and maintained through academic discussions and extended exchanges of manuscripts, correspondence and letters. In contrast to Europe, a formal educational institute like “universitas,” (identified by Durkheim (1938) in his extraordinary historical sociology of the medieval University of Paris),
did not serve as the institutional basis of intellectual life and scholarly activities in Korea. During the Chosun Dynasty (1392–1910), although there was a system of formal, governmental educational institutions that could also be readily found in China (Min, 2004), Korean intellectuals participated in academic activities through informal channels of communication between mentors and their disciples. Just as Western Scholasticism blossomed in medieval universities, so did the renaissance of Korean Confucianism occur among the Gates, and not through any formal institutions led by either the central or local government. Interestingly, these traditions and practices are found even in today’s academic environment in Korea, and they serve as a powerful and effective driving force for successful academic achievement. It was against this cultural background that the Western concepts of the university were introduced and implemented, firstly by American Protestant missionaries (Lee, 2004) and later by Japanese colonizers.

During the Colonial Era (1910–1945), Imperial Japan imposed its own notions of the university, largely adopted from Germany and based on the Humboldt model (Fallon, 1980). This Japanese version of a research university was transplanted to Korea in the 1920s (Altbach, 1998), and since then and until recently was regarded as “the University.” The current system of higher education in Korea was established during the presence of U.S. military forces (1945–1948). A Columbia University graduate who worked as deputy-director at the Bureau of Education under the U.S. military government introduced an American concept of the university with a whole system of modern public education in 1946. However, graduates of the Japanese colonial universities and colleges made persistent efforts to maintain the colonial legacy of the Japanese–German idea of “the University,” which was in fact a “faculty republic” (Fallon, 1980; Musselin, 2001).

SNU was founded in this context of major power struggles between the bearers of these two conflicting ideas of the university under the same banners of “de-colonialization” and democratic reforms (Kim, 1996). In other words, SNU, in its inception and subsequent development reflects the “twisted roots” of the Western university model (Altbach, 1998) or, more specifically, internal (by faculty autonomy) and external (Board of Directors) governance. SNU integrated the Seoul Imperial University and other professional colleges with the American university system of departments as units of the school and a Carnegie unit system for
academic grading. The American model was further reinforced by the educational backgrounds of the faculty. Since most professors in Korean universities, and especially those in SNU, earned doctoral degrees from universities in the U.S., their idea of the university was the one which was learned through their own experiences at their alma maters. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the American pattern has served as a benchmark in recent self-directed efforts to restructure Korean higher education. In short, the current structures and operational environment of Korean universities, including SNU, reflect various systems and models including the traditional mentor-disciple (Gates) relationship, the German model of a research university adopted and altered by Japan, and an American system of tertiary education. Therefore, like other Asian universities, Korean universities are in indeed “hybrids” (Altbach, 1998). Furthermore, the interaction of these three conflicting models of the university may explain the enormous difficulties encountered in producing a working consensus among professors about how to reform their own universities and colleges; and this in turn infects the debate on how to develop a world-class university.

Korean universities are differentiated at two levels, namely in accordance with reputation and in accordance with areas of specialty. SNU and KAIST (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology), both public institutions, and POSTECH (Pohang University of Science and Technology), a private university, are the best-known Korean research universities. These three plus Korea University and Yonsei University (both private schools) comprise the leading flagship universities. In a recent ranking by The Times of the 200 best universities worldwide, SNU, KAIST and Korea University were included for the first time in the history of higher education. The next tier among the Korean institutions is made of 4-year comprehensive universities located in the metropolitan area of Seoul. The group after that in ranking consists of provincial public and private universities. The last group in this differentiation includes 2-year and 3-year junior colleges and vocational schools. Differentiation by area of specialization reflects both institutional prestige and the university’s marketability in the job market. The fields of medicine (including traditional Chinese medicine), law, business, pharmacy and education comprise the top tier specialties.

The hierarchy within the two levels of differentiation is determined by the level
of applicants’ academic aptitude and postgraduate employment. For example, specialty differentiation is consistent with applicants’ test scores on the college entrance examination (which is equivalent to the SAT in the U.S.). College ranking is determined by the rate at which graduates are placed in high-ranking occupations, such as prestigious civil service positions (e.g., judges, attorneys, diplomats, civil officials, and teachers), medical doctors, pharmacists, and employment in large companies (e.g., Samsung, LG, and SK). The academic background of those who are currently high-ranking government officials, judges, journalists and CEOs of large corporations reflects the ranking order of colleges in Korea.

A typical path for a successful student is to be a top-caliber student in high school, to be admitted to a high-ranking college, such as SNU, to pass a qualifying examination, and eventually to become a medical doctor, a judge, or an attorney. A similar pattern is found in Japan (Cutts, 1999). Unfortunately, this employment pattern makes for an educational experience in high school, as well as in college, that is based on rote memorization and repetition of formal knowledge rather than higher order thinking and creativity, because students focus on the college entrance examination while in high school, and on preparation for various examinations that will lead to prestigious jobs while in college. Curriculum-in-reality in high school is simply drilling and preparation aimed at obtaining high university entrance exam scores. Even children in elementary school attend private after-school academies (Juku in Japan) with the ultimate goal of entering a top-ranking college in the future. The prime clients of these private academies are high school students and those who were initially unsuccessful in entering the institution of first preference. After entering college, instead of concentrating on the college curriculum, students are concerned with the job market and begin to prepare for the qualifying examinations for their future careers. In contemporary Korea, even students majoring in engineering and natural sciences are spending 3 to 4 years during college to prepare for civil service examinations for careers in law and the public service. It appears that education in Korea, rather than reducing the level of social and economic inequality, instead perpetuates, reinforces, and even justifies inequality in the social and economic system.
5. Self-Strengthening Research Competence at SNU, 1994–2005

The current system of doctoral programs at SNU was fully implemented in 1975 as a part of upgrading the university after it moved to a new campus, now embracing all its scattered colleges, with the exception of the medical college. Obsolete was the “old form” of doctoral program, in which a degree could be earned based solely on a thesis. That was the common practice taken from the colonial Japanese university system, and thus the term “old form” was used. Replacing it was the “new form,” with prescribed graduate course work and a qualifying examination to be passed before writing a doctoral thesis, in accordance with the standards of American research universities. As mentioned above, though SNU had a historical legacy from Japanese colonial universities at its inception, its structure and operation since then have been modeled after American universities. It is important to note that the self-strengthening efforts toward building a world class university began at SNU long before the launching of BK21 in 1999. Altbach (2003) points out several important conditions that are necessary to achieve world-class university status, including excellence in research by top-quality scholars, institutional autonomy, academic freedom, adequate facilities for academic work, and long-term public funding. The main strategy to bring SNU up to the world-class level was to emphatically pursue excellence in research, the first among the five critical conditions identified by Altbach. Governmental support came at an opportune time for SNU to take full advantage of the resulting funding and other forms of assistance in the university’s endeavor to empower its doctoral programs. As a major beneficiary of this 7-year-long, large public funding effort, SNU was provided with an extraordinary opportunity and resources to pursue its long-cherished goal, chosen and supported by the faculty, to become a world-class university.

In order to promote quality research among the faculty, newly hired faculty were required to have established publication records in internationally renowned science journals and to participate in a tenure review process, which was recently deferred to the stage of promotion from associate professor to full professor. The research records of the top-ranking U.S. schools have served as a benchmark in evaluating the progress of yearly academic accomplishment and productivity at SNU since 1994. Various internal evaluations of progress have been conducted at the
university, college, departmental, and research group levels (Kim et al., 2004; Kim, 2005; Kim et al., 2005). A self-evaluation appears to be the only reasonable way to assess academic achievement and progress, for there is no “right” formula for a flagship university in the periphery to become world class (Altbach, 2003) SNU bolstered its graduate program by providing graduate students with generous stipends and research assistantships. Also, the postdoctoral program was expanded in order to support young scholars.

Global connections and cooperation are also critical for creating a world-class university. SNU has promoted global connections by regularly inviting internationally accomplished scholars in various fields for both short-term and long-term residencies. International cooperation was pursued by implementing a joint-degree program with foreign universities and other scholarly exchange programs. SNU’s outreach efforts now include academic exchange programs with about 90 universities in 27 countries around the world. There were only 100 foreign students at SNU in 1995, however, by 2005, there were more than 700. Over the last five years the number of foreign professors has doubled to 58. SNU supports graduate students for their overseas studies and their participation in international conferences. These overseas experiences are particularly important in that they give junior scholars a strong sense of self-confidence in their competitive status in the international arena. Additionally, there is considerable infrastructure support, including an electronic library with easy access to various academic databases, high-tech computer labs, and a housing facility for international scholars and students.

These series of changes and reform policies have produced impressive results. Senior officers at SNU began to pay particular attention to the number of science papers published in America and other advanced countries. It is well known among scientists that the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI) in the U.S. maintains a database on the published scientific articles in the Science Citation Index (SCI) annually. Reform-minded school officers, and government bureaucrats as well, believe that the number of published articles listed in SCI could serve as a quantitative indicator of productivity for a university. According to a tally of the number of articles by SNU faculty listed in the SCI, the world ranking of SNU was 75th in 1999, and this has increased dramatically every year since then, reaching
34th place in 2003 (Kim et al., 2004). Even though this quantitative index is a controversial one, the trend of a consistent increase in ranking gives senior officers a sense of the direction of SNU’s self-strengthening efforts. The latest ranking is far higher than their early estimation based on the current, observable trend and has indeed been a surprise to all interested observers.

The measurement of productivity levels by the number of published scientific articles provides insufficient information, however, for it only captures the gross productivity, not the real net productivity. The real productivity actually depends on the level of financial investment devoted to the school under consideration. Harvard University, the University of Tokyo, and the University of California at Los Angeles are the top three universities with regard to the number of published articles in 2004. In fact, Harvard University produces three times as many articles as SNU (9,421 vs. 3,116). However, looking at the financial resources invested in each institution produces a somewhat different ranking order. <Table VI-1> compares the productivity levels indexed by the number of papers of these top three universities with those of SNU, the one adjusted for annual budgets and research funds of each school3 (Office of Research Affairs, 2006). SNU’s budget is only about one-quarter that of Harvard University. The amount of funds spent on research at Harvard University is more than twice as high as that at SNU.

<Table VI-1> University Publications and R&D Expenditures at SNU and the Top Three World-Class Research Universities, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Harvard</th>
<th>Tokyo</th>
<th>UCLA</th>
<th>SNU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Publications(^a)(ranks)</td>
<td>9,421(1)</td>
<td>6,631(2)</td>
<td>5,232(3)</td>
<td>3,116(31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Costs(TBW)(^b)</td>
<td>2,857</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>3,651</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications per TBM(^b)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research funding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total funds(TBW)(^b)</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications per TBW(^b)</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Exchange rates; US$1=1,100 Korean won; 1¥=9 Korean won.
\(^a\)SCI-indexed articles
\(^b\)TBW = 10 billion Korean won, approximately US$10 million.
University of Tokyo data from 2003.


As shown in <Table VI-1>, considering the relative lack of financial resources available at SNU, the adjusted productivity level according to the level of investment at SNU is not very far behind that of the other top-tier universities. For 1 billion Won (about 1 million U.S. dollars) of the school operating budget, SNU and Harvard produced about 5 and 4 articles, respectively. Every 1 billion Won in development funding yielded 56 articles at SNU and 10 at Harvard, and the same amount in research funding yielded 13 and 16 articles, respectively. With the exception of productivity per dollar of research funds expended, the figures for SNU are fairly competitive. When we move from gross to adjusted productivity, we can see some potential for international competitiveness in research at SNU.

However, creating a world-class university requires qualitative rather than just quantitative advancement. To measure quality in the manner widely used by specialists is an impact factor which has potential shortcomings for understanding the research competence of a paper. Principal investigators of the BK21 groups began searching for a qualitative index to reveal the level of research competence at SNU. Kim and his colleagues (2005) produced an internal evaluation on SNU’s international competitiveness in terms of the level of research competence in the field of science and technology. The report analyzed both the quantity and quality of research articles published in SCI-indexed journals within six different fields: mathematics, physics, biological science, chemical engineering, mechanics and aerospace engineering, and pharmacy. As indicators of the quality of research papers, investigators counted the number of times each published paper was cited, based on the ISI Web of Science Database. Tallying the citations for each scholarly contributor is a time-consuming and tedious, as well as error-laden, job. Not surprisingly, the estimated margin of error is said to be about 10 percent (Kim et al., 2005). To make a specific comparison with US counterparts, two groups of US
universities were identified based on the annual rankings for selected fields reported by the U.S. News and World Report. The “top university” referred to an American university that ranked among the top three in a particular field, and “high-ranking” referred to the top 20 to 30 US universities.

The major findings of the analysis are as follows:

1) According to the measure of the quantity of articles published in the six fields, SNU achieved only 75% of the Top University category in the U.S. in 1994, but achieved 151% in 2004.

2) According to the quality index of the number times a paper was cited, during 1994–1995, SNU jumped to 35% of the Top University category and 53% of the High-Ranking Universities category. Since then, there has been a significant and steady improvement.

[Figure VI-1] Comparison of Quality Index between American Research Universities and SNU, 1994-2003. Percentages of the average of six fields, taking the top American university as 100%. From An Assessment of research competence in science and engineering (Research Bulletin), by K. W. KIM et al., 2005, Seoul: Seoul National University, Copyright 2005 by Seoul National University. Adapted with permission.
Judging by the quality of published journal articles, SNU’s graduate program in science and engineering is ranked at approximately 20th place amongst High-Ranking American Universities.

This internal review, however, provoked a number of hot debates and burning controversies, with much deep skepticism surrounding the evaluation, simply because it ranked SNU in the 20th place among American research universities. However, this soon was seen to be a reasonable estimation. An examination of SNU’s internal review data and The Time’s international comparisons of the world’s top 100 science universities yields quite consistent results for the ranking of SNU.16)

This ranking would drop quickly, as with The Times’ s overall rankings, if we took into account other criteria for ranking world-class universities, such as the ratio of professors to students, the number of foreign students, and the number of visiting or hired foreign scholars. The remarkable leap forward achieved by SNU during the last 10 years is the result of many factors. Although the American model may have served as a benchmark, it should be noted that SNU has made deliberate efforts to develop an academic model that is globally competitive and at the same time maintains culturally relevant mentor-disciple relations.

6. Conclusion

The great leap forward in terms of excellence in research shows that SNU appears to have reached the world-class level. It shows that a flagship university in the periphery has the potential to become a world-class university. There are many factors that may have led to these impressive achievements.

The first factor is the fundamental strength of the Korean secondary education system. Students who enter SNU do so after having undergone a tremendous amount of high-quality preparation. According to an international survey published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Korean students in secondary education ranked among the top three countries in terms of problem-solving and mathematical skills (OECD, 2004a, 2004b). Thus, it is not surprising that SNU, which admits only the most able students from a wider pool of students who already exhibit high level problem solving and mathematical skills, has the potential of becoming a world-class university.
The second factor is the quality of undergraduate education received by the students while at SNU. In the Chronicle of Higher Education, it was reported that SNU was second only to the University of California, Berkeley in producing more undergraduate students who later earned doctorates from American universities between 1999 and 2003 (Gravois, 2005). The undergraduate programs of SNU seem to serve as the second-best “university college,” an outstanding source of undergraduates who went on for advanced study in the United States (Jenks & Riesman, 1968, pp. 20-27).

The third factor supporting the creation of world-class universities involves the Korean intellectual tradition of a strong and committed relationship between a mentor and disciple that serves as a potent academic force for graduate programs. It is fascinating to see the Korean traditional cultural pattern playing a practical role as a crucial resource in the globalization of its modern educational institutes.

One of the reasons for Altbach’s (2000; 2003) pessimism about the possibility of a middle-income country establishing a world-class university is the issue of institutional autonomy, which is particularly critical for academic creativity and freedom. He questions whether the ambitious Korean BK21 Project would be effective, given the lack of institutional autonomy in Korea. Since central governments in many middle-income countries are attempting to build world-class universities to promote economic growth, it is a tremendous challenge for academic institutions to maintain a meaningful level of autonomy. In fact, it has been difficult for SNU to remain autonomous as a public institution, especially because it was a main recipient of public financial resources. To receive adequate funding, SNU has had to compromise its autonomy, and this is something which has made it difficult to maintain consistent policies. Given their insufficient financial resources, even private universities in Korea face this dilemma—albeit to a lesser extent.

There is another unique Korean dynamic that has affected SNU’s autonomy. In the Korean educational arena, the private sector plays a very important role. The educational zeal of parents has been the strength and driving force behind the consecutive transition to universal higher education in Korea. The highly competitive college entrance examination system has always been a major source of conflict among parents, teachers, the government, and the universities. The policy concerning the college entrance examination system has become a political
bargaining chip between the government and the private sector, which in turn has threatened the autonomy of universities. SNU, the flagship university and the dream destination of all Korean students, has paid a heavy price for its academic prestige. For SNU, all policies in general, and admissions policies in particular, have always been under close scrutiny by politicians as well as the public, resulting in some loss of institutional independence. It is not a university like SNU but, rather, the central government that has set critical limits on admissions policies. Among the "four essential freedoms" of a university, SNU lacks the freedom to determine "who may be admitted to study" (Bok, 1980). In the current political milieu of emphasizing social equity in Korea, the coming of a credential-based society and an intensifying pecking order among universities are hotly debated political issues. There have even been radical proposals—such as one in which SNU would be completely closed down to defuse and resolve this ever intensifying competition.

The achievements of SNU are indeed remarkable and should serve as a model and encouragement to other middle-income countries with similar aspirations and determinations. On the other hand, lessons can be learned by reflecting on the experiences of SNU. First, the focus of higher education reform policies should be on comprehensive and fundamental change. Although quantitative measures have been taken, they should not be the sole approach in creating a world-class academic institution.

The delicate balancing act between institutional autonomy and the role of the central government is critical for building a world-class research university in middle-income countries. While the government should provide financial and institutional support, as Altbach argues, institutional autonomy is a critical aspect of the intellectual environment that promotes academic freedom and innovation.

Lastly, scientific knowledge is not immune to political and ideological forces. A challenge that will require ongoing attention is the task of enabling a university in a middle-income country to find a niche in the global intellectual community while maintaining a commitment to the country’s unique traditional heritage without compromising the institution’s international competitive edge. Participation in the global community of world-class universities as a competitive partner requires enormous reserves of determination, tremendous effort, and a plethora of resources. Even while taking as a benchmark the models developed and refined in
the core industrial countries, middle-income countries should not abandon their own intellectual traditions. These countries need to be relevant in the global intellectual community while being mindful so as not to become victims of any emergent tendency towards intellectual neocolonialism in the 21st century.
Chapter 7

A Pyrrhic Victory?

The Korean Passage to Tertiary Education for All

1. Introduction

This paper addresses a very peculiar phenomenon of the making of tertiary education for all (TEFA) in Korea, something which has very rarely happened in the global history of education. The author has already analyzed the process of expansion of un-free secondary education in 1989. Taken together, the Korean case has shown a consecutive process of universal access to secondary and tertiary education. The Korean rate of progression to tertiary education has recently reached 81%, the highest in the world (Grubb et al., 2006, p.7). This transition from elite to universal access to tertiary education has been achieved in less than three decades, an achievement that took the U.S. almost half a century (Trow, 1961). As recently as 2000, Korean high school graduates were 5% more likely to pursue tertiary education in one form or another than their counterparts in the U.S., a leading country with universal higher education. Korea has also become one of the first countries to have achieved almost universal completion of secondary education, and this rate of growth was the highest of any of the OECD countries (OECD, 2009; Grubb et al., 2006, p. 16).17) The rapid transition to universal access to higher education in Korea occurred almost immediately after, or simultaneously with, the swift transition to universal secondary education. This phenomenon can be viewed, as I have done previously (Kim, 2007a, p. 3), as an unprecedented simultaneous transition to universal access to secondary and tertiary education. Grubb and his colleague made a telling point in their report that the idea of “tertiary education for all” is closer to reality in Korea than in any other country” (p. 16). Is this a story of victory? In short,18) I will address this question by explaining the mechanism and consequences of this simultaneous transition.

The speed and rate of expansion of higher education in Korea exceeded the
government’s willingness and ability to provide financial support for it, which has resulted in extreme privatization and the erosion of the meaning of the “public good” in tertiary education. This is a unique point worth noting in the case of Korea, namely, that the main driving force behind the rapid expansion of higher education was not a concerted central planning effort by the government, but rather the zeal and willingness to financially support their children’s studies on the part of parents. As will be shown later, over-privatization has been the primary mechanism behind this simultaneous transition since the late 1960s. Due to a heavy reliance on private funds, parents and students must pay higher prices. Among these prices, “education fever,” “examination-hell,” and “cut-throat competition” are just the most obvious non-financial costs. Some trends reflect a set of deep-rooted cultural norms conducive to this rapid double transition. Such a heavy overflow of privatization in achieving universal access places a significant financial burden on families, particularly those of disadvantaged socioeconomic status. Therefore, the more financial resources that come from the private sector, the more difficult it becomes to attain equitable access. Nevertheless, there is no sign of a narrowing in the gap which exists between regions, socioeconomic status, gender, and family background: all of which have led to the inequality of access to universities and colleges.

Privatization is also a worldwide trend in higher education. Recently, various privatization policies have been put into effect in Western societies and even in former socialist countries where a public higher education had previously been dominant. Altbach (2002) concurs in more general terms in his view that “while many look to America’s impressive private higher education sector, it is more useful to draw on the Asian experience.” Countries that allow the private sector to develop can look to Japan’s, The Philippine’s and to the Korean experiences for reflection. More than 80% of students are currently enrolled at private universities and colleges in Korea, compared to only about 20% in America. Indeed, 83% of the national budget for higher education comes from family funds (Kim, 2007a), an unparalleled phenomenon unseen in America, where the private sector is far more dominant than the public sector. Presently, in Korea, even the most selective national universities still rely on tuition and fees for more than one-third of their revenue. The distinction between public and private sector has been blurred.

The vigor and speed of the development of Korean higher education is
remarkable indeed, especially when taking into consideration the extremely limited public financial resources and infrastructural support given to it. Korea has played such an archetypal role before, such as when the Chinese government examined and analyzed Korea’s privatization efforts before launching its own. Thus, putting forward the Korean experience as an exemplary case is warranted and indeed could be beneficial to other countries, especially as it could provide fertile ground for drawing analogous implications for those other cases which approximate the Korean context more closely than the American. This paper will unearth some valuable insights, policy implications, and conditions under which universal access and equity can be attained by other countries.

2. Cultural Clashes and the Compromise between Eastern & Western Forms of Higher Education

Private education has always played an enormous role in the shaping of higher education in Korea, both in terms of quantity and quality. Privatization began long before the open-door era when a western form of private education was imposed with the arrival of Western missionaries at the turn of the 20th century (Lee, 2004). It also continued to develop as an alternative system of tertiary and adult education during the Colonial Period (1910-1945), since Japanese rulers provided only extremely limited opportunities for tertiary education. From 1948, when the independent Korean Republic was founded, privatization was further intensified as the country experienced rapid educational expansion in the absence of financial commitment on the part of the central government as well as an inability to shape or influence that expansion. In countries where private universities were founded and sponsored by huge philanthropical donations, Korean private universities are sponsored and financially sustained mainly by private citizens and organizations such as religious groups with more limited sources of funding. Even in missionary schools, students’ fees and tuition charges were the major sources of revenue. Private universities still rely upon about 70% of their revenue coming from tuition fees (Grubb et al., p. 11).

There are several unique characteristics of Korean higher education and they have evolved during the course of an equally unique historical development. In traditional Korean society, the ruling elites were the main benefactors of the
educational system. A good number of academic networks, or what Korean scholars may call “Gates,” was loosely formed with a prominent scholar of Confucianism as a central figure. The term “gate” originated from and was widely used in the Buddhist academic traditions and practices from thousands of years ago. The Buddha himself was, for example, the “gate” to the Buddhist Way for his many thousands of disciples and a greater number of faithful followers. Likewise, Confucius (551-479 B.C.) himself is also the “gate” to the Confucian Way for the cultivation of the personality to its highest form. For Korean intellectuals, a “gate” signifies the highest degree of intellectual excellence combined with the same degree of moral integrity of a prominent mentor. Entering a certain gate means positioning oneself as a lifetime disciple of that particular mentor. A Korean scholar often acknowledges himself as “a student under a certain gate” to reveal his identity and his serious commitment to an academic lineage from a particular, prominent scholar. Here “under” means referring to himself as a humble disciple. Heated debates among competing gates reinforce their own intellectual standing among scholars with and without civil service jobs. Sometimes a group evolves into a political party, especially when national security is in danger. These schools of Confucian thought constitute non-formal and less-institutionalized (NFLI) scholarly networks between mentors and disciples. These relationships have neither a formal institutional base as in European universities or an organizational base seen in medieval guilds among artisans. Min (2004) is right in his assertion that the indigenous higher learning traditions of Asia had “a long tradition going back three thousand years, encompassing both the public and private sectors (p. 56).” However, his analysis is not crystal-clear in pinpointing the fact that it was the latter, rather than the former, which was the center of academic excellence. This was quite the opposite case to that of the medieval University. In another words, it refers not to a state-run institute of tai-xue (which literally means “higher learning”), but to a private gate of Confucian disciples which was the center of excellence in higher learning. This phenomenon was also true in Korea.

In Europe, formal educational institutions such as the “Universitas” served as the institutional basis of intellectual life and scholarly activities. That was not the case in Korea. During the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910), although there was a system of formal governmental educational institutions that could also be readily
found in China (Min, 2004), intellectuals participated in academic activities through informal channels of communication between mentors and their disciples. Indigenous scholastic traditions were cultivated and maintained through academic discussions and the extended exchange of manuscripts, correspondence, and letters. They, however, had been the center of excellence in research in keeping with the Confucian way and training of the power elites of the Kingdom. If the University of Paris was where Western Scholasticism blossomed in the medieval period, then it is the gate, through which a distinctive academic lineage was formed, where the renaissance of Korean Confucianism has taken place since the early 16th century. The gates and their associated academic lineages of scholars who passed through them, were Korea’s equivalent to the medieval university, and not a formal institution set by either the central or local government. Interestingly, these traditions and practices are found even in today’s modern westernized universalities in Korea, and serve as a powerful and effective driving force for successful academic achievement (Kim, 2007a) Moreover, it was against this cultural heritage that the Western ideas of the university were introduced, clashed with, and were then implemented firstly, by American protestant missionaries (Lee, 2004), and later by Japanese colonizers.

During the Colonial Era (1910-1945), the Japanese colonizers imposed their own idea of the university which they had copied from Germany, based on Humboldt’s model (Fallon, 1963). This Japanese version of a research university was transplanted to Korea in the 1920’s (Kim, 2007a), which has for a while, been regarded as “the University,” among graduates of Japanese colonial universities and colleges. The Japanese colonial system of higher education in Chosun included one imperial university and a number of professional colleges. The pecking order between the university and other colleges was so hierarchical and rigid that the colleges were treated as second-tier institutes, as they were in Japan. This system was made and run, not for Koreans from the beginning, but primarily for the Japanese colonizers. To disguise their total dominance in higher education, only a small number of Koreans were admitted into this system. Some intellectuals became voluntarily assimilated and were employed as a kind of middle-level management for the colonial officers. American missionaries, tacitly gave legitimacy to Japanese political rule from 1910, and earned some space in return for being allowed to keep their
own schools alive, including several colleges for their cultural and moral dominance over Koreans. However, the vast number of Confucian scholars, followed by nationalist intellectuals, avoided the political and colonial dominance of the two systems and set up a variety of alternative NFLI centers of higher learning. At the periphery of colonial power, there were a good number of rudimentary private schools including indigenous family schools and Letter Halls, night schools, laborers schools, and short-term learning centers for adults. A great number of Korean students of post-secondary schools in the early 1930’s launched various literacy campaigns, which Koreans referred to as the vnarod movement, across the country during the vacation seasons. Such students’ voluntary activities for the well-being of peasants or laborers have continued up until the present day. A socialist college was established and run by a group of progressive intellectuals to produce revolutionaries for about 10 years (Nam, 2002). The colonial higher education system did not succeed in assimilating Koreans, let alone Confucian scholars, and progressive intellectuals. It’s so-call assimilation policy “played a central role in the formation of a modern Korean nationalist consciousness which was bitterly anti-Japanese.” (Tsurumi, 1984, p. 302)

The current system of higher education in Korea was established during the U.S. Military Government (1945-1948). Dr. Paul Auh, a Columbia University graduate in the 1920’s, who worked as Deputy-Director at the Bureau of Education under the Military Government, introduced an American idea of the university with a whole system of modern public education in 1946. To make a powerhouse of elite training which was an essential prerequisite for nation-building, he proposed to integrate the old imperial university and nine colleges into one comprehensive university. This was the American style of university with departments as a unit of the school and a Carnegie unit system for academic grading. However, a group of faculty members who graduated from the imperial universities and professional colleges either at home or abroad made persistent efforts to maintain the colonial legacy of the Japanese-German idea of “the University” which was in fact a “faculty republic.” (Fallon, 1963; Musselin, 2001) Since they also wanted to keep the old academic order between the university and other professional colleges, Dr. Auh’s proposal for integration was heavily contested by a combined group of anti-American nationalist and socialists.

- 124 -
This battle raged under the same banners of “de-colonialization” and “democratic” reforms for more than a year (Kim, 2007b). The real issue was indeed whether to implement internal (faculty-autonomy) or external (Board of Directors) governance into the university system. The debates and power struggles among professors ended up in a no-win situation when the Education Act was passed in 1950. The new law resulted in neither internal nor external governance but tight central bureaucratic control by the Ministry of Education over the public and private universities as well. The Ministry has exerted enormous power to impose limits on students and faculty quotas, tuition fees and salaries since then. Recently, the American model has been indirectly reinforced by the educational background of the majority of faculty. Since most professors in Korean universities earned doctoral degrees from the university in the U.S., their idea of the university is influenced by their Alma Mata. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the American pattern has served as a benchmark in recent self-conscious efforts to restructure Korean higher education (Kim, 2007a). In short, the current structures and operational environment of Korean universities reflect various systems and models. They included a traditional mentor-disciple (“gates”) relationship, a German model of a research university adopted and altered by Japan, and an American system of tertiary education.

The Korean universities and colleges are outcomes of these cultural clashes, confrontations, and adaptations between the Eastern and Western forms of higher education. More specifically, the collision of three conflicting ideas of the university may explain the enormous difficulties in producing a working consensus among professors about how to run universities and colleges of their own on a daily basis, let alone how to reform their schools. One of the biggest drawbacks of this lack of consensus was a failure to make a variety of tertiary institution as a system of higher education with a clear-cut diversification and functional differentiation among schools. Instead, the public’s demands for opportunities to access to both more and longer tertiary education courses started to drastically expand the number of institutes and students within them without a concerted overall master plan or any long-term forecasting plans.
3. From Privatization to Over-Privatization

(1) The historical origins of private higher education

It was true that as Min (2004) has stated above, both the public and private sectors played important roles in indigenous higher learning in Asia. As was the case in China, there existed in Korea a dual system of education: public education run by the Central and local government and a system of various private education institutes. It was long a common practice among historians of Korean higher education to argue that the first public college, Taehak (Great Learning), founded in 372 A.D. and its heir institute, Sungkyunkwan, established by the government in 1398, as the centers of indigenous higher education, were the Asian counterparts to the Western medieval University. However, this argument has served to obscure rather than illuminate our knowledge of one of the most distinguishing characteristics of traditional higher education. Unlike the University of Paris in the 12th Century, Sungkyunkwan was not the center of excellence of Neo-Confucian studies, but a governmental institute for lesser degree holders to reside for a certain period of time in order to prepare for their final national examination to be selected as civil officers. It was also the center of memorial ceremonies for the Great Saint Confucius and his twelve Sages. As time went by, these ceremonial functions became more important than educational functions. It was, however, at a variety of NFLI institutes that most of the training of the Korean literati was carried out, ranging from a family school to the Letter Hall, and to the private seminary known as Sowon, the most institutionalized of the private institutions, which required governmental authorization and accreditation to operate.

The origin of such private education in Asia can be traced back to the Confucius legend and his teaching practices of around 500 BC. He became a teacher at the age of 29 and his house became a site of pilgrimage and a centre of learning for his followers. According to the text Confucius Analeptics (Legge, 1892), an early form of his teaching began as follows:

The Master (Confucius) said. “From the men bringing his bundles of dried fish for my teaching, I have never refused instruction to anyone.” VII. 7

Dr. Legge, the highest authority on Chinese Classics in the English speaking
world, interpreted this phrase as follows: “However small the fee his pupils were able to afford, he never refused instruction. All that he required was an ardent desire for improvement and some degree of capacity.” (Legge, 1892, p. 61) His teaching was not carried out in any formal school or teaching institute established by the government. It was an archetype of private education for a great scholar to offer lessons at his house. This form of NFLI private higher education continued to persist as a long-standing practice in the Eastern civilizations (Lee, 1984, p. 220).

While making the teaching available to almost anyone who had the desire to learn and could pay a nominal fee for tuition, Confucius rigorously selected a small number of disciples amongst his followers. According to the original legend, there were at least 3,000 followers. He formally handpicked only 77; it was recorded thus: “The Disciples who received my instructions, and could comprehend them, were seventy-seven individuals. They were all scholars of extraordinary ability.” (p. 62). Among those selected, only twelve sages were further selected. These 12 disciples were placed, only one level below Confucius, at the Shrine of Confucius the Saint, where a ritual memorializing him had been observed. Thanks to their continuing scholastic efforts, Confucius’ s teachings survived various historical vicissitudes and ordeals and maintain their place amongst the greatest classics of higher learning in Asia, right up until the present day.

Korean Confucianism was, in fact, Chu His’ (1128-1200) Neo-Confucianism, which was revived during the Song Dynasty. The Korean literati found it most appealing, for it sought to establish an ethical base for an enlightened political world with fully fledged speculative and theoretical studies (Lee, p. 217). The Korean scholar, T’ oegye (Yi Hwang, 1501-1570), developed a full explication of i (li in Chinese) philosophy20, which accounts for what things are and how they behave. As a result of his philosophical endeavors, he was revered as a Korean Chu His, a Confucius, or sometimes as both. He presented a philosophical doctrine emphasizing moral self-cultivation as the essence of learning. He was the greatest figure in the history of philosophy in Korea and exerted a huge influence on the shaping of Japanese Confucian doctrine as well.

Under T’ oegye, a group of the brilliant Neo-Confucian literati living in the Southern area gathered, who devoted their energy to pursuits mainly at the private academies or Sowon. They remained in the South for a very long period, in order

- 127 -
to avoid being involved in the vortex of court politics. The succession of the utmost level of scholarship was made by the development of an academic lineage. Among the Southerners, Sungho (Yi Ik, 1681-1763) was the exemplar Confucius literati who was flexible enough to embrace Western Scholasticism and made a great contribution to the renaissance of Korean Confucianism in its later days. When he passed away, one of his disciples and the statesman of the time, Prime Minster Chae, wrote the following memorial words on his tombstone.

Our scholarship had always grown from an academic lineage. The Korean Confucius, T’oegye, taught his Way to Hangang who taught it in turn to Misu. As a disciple of Misu, Sungho inherited the legitimate academic lineage of T’oegye.

That academic lineage was nothing to do with Sungkyunkwan or the Four Schools established and run by the government. This lineage was made through private education. The academic lineage was transferred to the next generation of scholars. The East & West cultural collision in the early 18 century lead to the birth of various new schools of thought, ranging from voluntary conversion to Catholicism, to the birth of a movement rejecting heterodoxy, and to the rise of practical learning.

A group of early converters led by Yi Pyok (1754-1785) and Sung-hun Yi (1756-1801) started to emerge not through the works of Catholic missions abroad but rather on their own through reading, discussions and their critiques of works brought back from Churches in Beijing, such as the True Principles of Catholicism (written by a Jesuit monk called Mateo Ricci) or the First Steps in Catholic Doctrine (Lee, p. 239). All the scholastic activities and serious pursuits which sought a new way took place at the private letter hall run by Yi Pyok (or Byok). There even followed an establishment of what became to be called St. Joseph Seminary to train Korean priests in 1864. As an aftermath of the French Revolution, Jesuit priests working at Beijing Churches were expelled and replaced by priests from the Society of Foreign Missionaries of Paris. It was the latter group who gave specific instructions to the Korean church not to observe traditional rites. It was only after they faithfully followed these instructions and started to challenge the political order through the Rites Controversy that the chain of events which led to the Catholic Persecution of 1801 actually began. The Letter Hall established by Yi at a secluded place near to the Buddhist temple of Chonjin Am in the deep mountains is
regarded now as the birthplace of Korean Catholicism.\(^{21}\)

The second faction of Sungho’s disciples went on to firmly preserve the values of Neo-Confucian doctrine. The historical records indicate that this group read a vast amount of books on Scholasticism. A leading literati of this group wrote to his mentor, Sungho, letters severely criticizing the drawbacks of the European University system, especially the order of knowledge. For him, feeding technical & professional knowledge to pupils without a sound base of character building was not education at all. After this group proposed a political position rejecting heterodoxy, in fact, which meant an effective rejection of the values and thoughts of the West, including that of later westernized Japan, this faction advanced their position to vehemently oppose the opening of the doors to the West by raging a righteous war against the regime and the Japanese invaders.

The Sirak (Practical Learning) scholars led by Dasan (Chong Yag-yong, 1762–1836) put a specific focus, not on theoretical discourse, but on natural and social sciences with a pragmatic method of inquiry into the real conditions of society. He, like-minded scholars, and disciples all sought a corruption-free government, national wealth, and utilitarian land reforms. There were no records showing his having entered Sungkyunkwan, but he was remembered to be the best of the best literati who built a springboard for the modern political & social reforms in the later days. Led by him and succeeded by his academic lineage, the Sirak scholars “propelled the Yi Dynasty scholarship rapidly ahead in new directions.” (Lee, pp. 232–243)

In sum, some major characteristics of private education in the Chosun Dynasty can be specified as follows. It did not take a form of formal or institutionalized education. The use of the Letter Halls made study possible at anytime and anywhere, if there were a scholarly teacher and a group of students with a minimal level of financial resources but having both the desire and capacity for learning. The Hall was virtually open to all men with a few exceptions. Co-existing with a network of public education institutes, private education functioned as the center of excellence in research and higher learning. Family, not government, was a major actor in increasing educational opportunities. This archetype of private higher education repeatedly appeared to meet peoples’ demands for higher learning under the Japanese occupation which tried systematically to destroy indigenous private higher education.
2. The Development of Privatization over Different Time Periods

The current “modern” education of Korea started with the 1894 Education Reform. [Figure VII-1] shows the shape of school expansions at each level over one hundred years. The transition from mass to universal access to tertiary education took place only after 1980. As shown in the graph, indigenous forms of private education like Letter Halls, persisted during the colonial period. It was impossible to calculate a reliable participation rate of students attending such Letter Halls, for they took a NFLI form of education which hardly produced any statistics. However, Japanese statistics showed the number of Korean students attending indigenous schools exceeded that of colonized schools until the middle of the 1920s.

[Figure VII-1] Education expansion by the level of education, 1894-2017
Heated debates were going on among historical sociologists of colonial education to explain why the Korean supremacy collapsed at that particular time.

Quite contrary to the “official” and propaganda claims of the Japanese, the colonial education system was not a core part of its assimilation policy but rather a tool for the liquidation of Korean values, culture, and identity. As seen above in [Figure VII-1], the colonizers severely limited the opportunities for Koreans to participate in higher education. This policy of enslaving Koreans led to a distorted development of secondary education which functioned as a preparatory program for universities and colleges. Since the late 1920s and early 1930s, primary education seemingly started to expand, not because of the provision of free and compulsory education for all Koreans by the Japanese, but because of its enforcing privatization at the level of primary education. The privatization of elementary education was a rare and unusual policy in a nation-state building process. From the beginning, the Japanese colonizers shifted their responsibility of the financing of education to Korean parents so that the principle of financial responsibility on the part of the so-called “beneficiaries” was made and maintained during the whole period of occupation. As long as we are using the term “beneficiaries,” it should be pointed out that there was no public education per se since Japanese colonial education could not be part of the “common good.” In his brilliant historical sociology of the elementary school expansion in the 1930’s, Prof. Sung-Cheol Oh (2004) made the point that Korean parents and their children, strongly resisting Japanese policy to implement rudimentary vocational education to the Ordinary School (i.e., elementary schools) in order to produce docile peasants, instead chose to pay the costs of non-vocation general education by themselves and encourage their children to prepare for the entrance examination to the next level of education. Their financial commitment led to school expansion and an early form of examination-hell in the 1930s.

In spite of a series of education reforms aimed at de-colonization immediately after liberation, the colonial principle of shifting financial responsibility to the so-called beneficiaries that resulted in the privatization of elementary education was kept and further extended to secondary and higher education. As shown in [Figure VII-2], as early as 1952, the number of students attending private universities and colleges exceeded that of the national and public universities. This tendency never
ceased, but rather continued to develop, and led to an extreme dependence on private education.

[Figure VII-2] Number of higher education students by control of school before massification, 1952-1965

Source: KEDI and MOE (each year), Education Statistics Yearbook

Privatization accelerated school expansion and led to the simultaneous transition to universal access. Its speed was so rapid and swift that no other country can be compared to the Korean case. The following [Figure VII-3] is a composite graphic of Trow’s numbers and ours on the transition to universal access. Korean statistics were superimposed onto American ones to compare some contrasting differences between America’s “parallel transition” (Trow, 1961) and Korea’s “simultaneous transition.” (Kim, 2007a).
[Figure VII-3] A composite graphic of Trow’s numbers and Korea’s on the transition to universal access

As a result of the simultaneous transition since the 1980s, the educational attainment level of Korea reached the top level among OECD countries. [Figure VII-4] shows an international comparison of the attainment rate.
The top level of tertiary education attainment was possible for the recent expansion of the two-year private college. As shown in [Figure VII-5], the majority of tertiary students are attending private universities and vocational colleges.
While all higher educational institutions in Korea rely on private funds, the vocational colleges have the highest degree of reliance on the private sector. This pattern differs sharply from the American model where large research universities and liberal arts Ivy League schools show a higher level of reliance upon the private sector than community colleges which are mostly state-funded public institutions. This dominance of private vocational training implied that the financial burden from the lower SES parents was expanding and entrenching itself at the same time so that the idea of higher education as a form of “public good” appears to have been seriously eroded.

This erosion is not new but is, in fact, a very old phenomenon. It started to appear as early as 1950 when the supremacy of private over public education occurred. In the early 1950s, UNESCO and UNKRA jointly sent for an Education Planning Mission to study the situation of Korean education and made recommendations needed for a rebuilding of the education system from the total ruins of the Korean War. The Mission made a report underscoring the fact that a “striking feature of the financing of education in Korea is that secondary and higher education is financed to the extent of at least 75% by voluntary contribution from parents.” (UNESCO, 1952, p.103) It continued to report that “Even the unsatisfactory program of education today is maintained, not as a charge upon the whole people through public taxation, but largely through the voluntary support of these families who have at present members to be enrolled in a school or college.” (p. 127) Based on these facts and realities, the Mission offered a very specific recommendation about educational financing as follows (UNESCO, 1953, p. 103):

The full cost of primary education and at least 50% of the costs of public secondary and higher education should be supplied as soon as possible from tax sources.

The Korean government never took UNESCO’s recommendation for higher education seriously, has failed to do so even up until the present day. For a very long time, it never set up a funding policy for basic education from tax revenues until the 1990s, let alone such a policy for higher education. For education experts from abroad or at home, the core problem was in the shifting from private funds to public taxation as a basis for the financial support of public education, including tertiary education. [Figure VII-6] show that dependency on private funding was getting worse over time at home and has turned out to be the worst among the OECD member countries.
Korea spent the least amount of public funds on higher education, and has allowed privatization to prevail in the terrain of public education and especially in tertiary education. The loss of the meaning of education as for the “public good” boosted the spending of private funds. The ever-growing increase in the size of private funds that were invested in the education market by parents, in turn further broke down the meaning of the “public good.” This vicious cycle of privatization was the mechanism of the simultaneous transition. An interesting question remains: what are the costs that all stock holders should pay for this pattern of privatization?

4. The role of higher education on economic growth

Both the expansion of education and the growth of the economy are unique events in the history of Korea. For the last six decades, Korea has achieved unparalleled economic growth. Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world in 1948. Now, it has grown into a global economic player with a solid industrial base. During the same period of time, as shown before, Korean education reached the point of being able to provide tertiary education for all (TEFA). An intriguing
question is the relationship between the expansion of education and economic expansion. Is the relationship it causal, functionalistic or are they simply two concurrent happenings? If the causal relationship holds, first was the case, we can see saw the law of the market at work in Korea. Alternatively, we can see or we found some evidences of human capital theory. If this is not the case, then we must. If not, a search a different for an alternative explanation. is in order. MaGinn and his colleagues (1982) are the first group of scholars who started to study this relationship. They tested the laws of market theory as well as the Webern theory of status competition against the Korean case.

The moving forces that have triggered sudden economic expansion has not been convincingly identified by historians of economics. It is rather complex that extant theoretical and analytical works are could rarely able to supply any convincing accounts on economic miracles. After the above mentioned work, there followed renewed studies on the relationship. (Kim, 2018, Chung, 2012; Amsden 2011) They all analyzed the impacts of education and skills development on economic growth.

Condensed growth is one thing, but phases of economic growth composed of several distinctively different patterns of industrialization within it is another matter. For example, labor-intensive industrialization differs from capital-intensive industrialization. one. The She termed the Korean case was termed as a form of as the “late industrialization,” for the purpose of international comparison with earlier Western cases, such as the like British and American ones.

In the 3 decades for 1960-1990, the Korean economy has recorded an average annual growth rate of 9%, with 11% per annum in the peak years of 1962–1973. These rates are unprecedented in the history of the world economy. Professor Cho (2009, p. 194)) has coined the Korean case as “condensed growth” in the sense that it has achieved these miracle in a shorter period of time than those Western countries and Japan before the WW II. The rates have been a lot higher than later-day, so-called advanced countries (Britain, America, France, German and Japan). For the period 1970–2010, Korea also underwent a made sustained economic boom at a very rapid pace with its GDP at current and constant prices, rising 423-fold and 17-fold, respectively, and the annual growth rate registering approximately 7.3%. In their study, Accounting for Economic Growth in Korea: (Kim, D. S. et all., 2012) some Korean economists attributed the remarkable growth
experienced between for 1970–2010 to the increase in production factor inputs and to the improvement of production technology. It is natural that international economists and policy makers have started to pay a keen attention to the Korean miracle since 2000, when the now begun to widely used the term the knowledge–economy came into use on the backs of from the international organizations like the World Bank and OECD. This slogan can be summarized as argues that it is “not money, but knowledge” which drives that matter in the economic growth of the LDC as shown below.

In–house economists of the World Bank have made the below figure by using the standard Solow’s (2001) standard method of accounting for economic growth. Their goal is to more clearly delineate represents the relative contribution of two types of statically estimated factors: tangible factors such as the accumulation of physical capital and additional years of schooling in the labor force, and other factors linked to the use of knowledge, such as the quality of education, the strength of institutions, the ease of communicating and disseminating technical information, and management and organizational skills.

[Figure VII-7] Comparison of per capital of GDP (constant US dollars) between Korea and Ghana
Source: Salmi (2003).

They compare the 1958 per capital of GDP (constant US dollars) between Korea and Ghana (later they add more LDCs). The message derived from such comparisons is crystal clear; the huge economic gap over times between Korea and other countries is based on the use of knowledge.

To every expert’s surprise, the total trade volume of Korea has further reached to one trillion USD, firstly in 2011, and this rate remained relatively constant for lasted three more years. Years later, in 2017 and 2018, it happens again in 2017 and 2018. Korea’s world’s ranking of exports rises up to the 6th place. With reference to this index, it could be argued that we could say Korea has become an is one of the economic dynamo powers of the world. As is well known, it has one from the state of colonial exploitation (which lasted for 35 years), endured and almost total destruction during the Korean War of from the 6.25 War for 1950-53, and has been physically and ideologically divided up until the present day.

When we switch from a macro-economic index (GDP) to a student’s life journey moving from school to work, it is not so easy to use hold the charts, graphs and statistics of international economists to account for the changes mentioned above World Banks accounts. In this rapid and impressive transformation, the formal education system as a whole has played a peculiar role. Korea formal schooling in Korea reached at the stage of tertiary education for all, or TEFA. In this passage, the gaps in the mismatch between schools and work has proven to be far too wide to bridge in the years since liberation in since 1945.

When we stick to looking at some of the macroeconomic indices like GDP, education as a whole, and higher education in particular specific, seem to play very pivotal roles. When we switch to a micro index like an individual with a BA degree transitioning to move to work, or the employment rates for graduates, the rosypicture of the role of education and economic advancement starts to appear more shaky and imagination started to shaken. The [Figure VII-8] below demonstrates a perennial mismatch between education and the world of work. The relationship between educational expansion (the sum of students at each level) and economic growth (the annual volume of trade) do not match for the years between 1957 to 2017.
The first expansion of universities and colleges occurred between 1950 and 1953. The number of students pursuing higher education increased dramatically, partly as a way for young men to postpone or avoid their compulsory military service. The student’s academic interests and/or the job aspirations of students did not seem to play any significant role. The intrinsic value of higher learning (e.g., knowledge for the sake of knowledge) hardly mattered in a sudden rush to enter higher education colleges. Ever since the war, there had begun to be a surplus of university graduates created by the education system. Education expanded much more rapidly than the economy prior 1960 could have. To such an extent that educated unemployment amongst university graduates was regarded as a serious problem. By 1960, 9,000 of 15,000 college graduates were unable to find employment. A surplus of university graduates led to no employment and, if such graduates were able to be employed, it was at the price of a mismatch between the degrees they held and the requirements of the workplace. It occurred at two levels: by students entering tertiary education but admitting to studying at the wrong department or majors which were unsuitable.
for them, and by graduating but working in different fields from their own majors. By 1960, 9,000 out of 15,000 college graduates were unable to find employment. An international research team discovered that the higher education was producing 19 times more agricultural technicians than were needed. According to Underwood, “over 50% of the college students were in the wrong department, and ten years’ after graduation, over 70% were working in different fields” (MaGinn, p. 220).

Education expanded much more rapidly than could the economy absorb that expansion prior to 1960, to such an extent that educated unemployment amongst graduates was regarded as a serious problem. The lack of employment opportunities for college graduates contributed to political unrest and this eventually culminated in the 4.19 student revolt in 1960. Education made a relatively small productive contribution to the growth of Korean GNP, especially after 1969. Oversupply continued in the early 1970; a 1974 UNESCO reported that only 60% of graduates in engineering and related sciences were able to find employment.

The [Figure VII-8] (above) shows the fact that growth in education first occurred first and this was followed by the economic boom. All the previous studies (Kim, 2019; Amsden, 1989; Chung, 2002) have confirmed this fact. Education in Korea did not expand not in response to technological improvement in the economy which in turn requires higher levels of ability among workers. The data suggested that education made a relatively small productive contribution to the growth of Korean GNP, especially after 1966. “Evidence is not consistent with a conclusion that education generated growth through some transformation of individuals from traditional to modern men. Education in Korea does not appear to have expanded as responses to technological improvements in the economic requiring higher levels of ability among workers. A look at the contents of what is taught in the classroom suggests that formal schooling has largely served the purposes of political socialization, not technical preparation for industrialization. The major differences seem to be that Korea seemed to place a heavy stress on moral education and discipline (MaGinn, p. 228). The socialization of the population into the basic attitudes of compliance, not skill acquisition was undertaken done by the military government and its successors.

It is hard to see how the relationship between education and industrialization of Korea can be said to have obeyed a kind of Say’s law. The quality of education
in Korea was sometime strained and education itself appears as passive rather than an active agent in the industrialization process. Educated unemployment was massive until the government introduced its subsides in the 1960’ s (p. 217).

Education expanded not in response to technological improvement in the economy requiring higher levels of ability among workers. The major differences seem to be that Korea seemed to place a heavy stress on moral education and discipline (MaGinn, p. 228; A, 2014, p. 219) It is hard to fit this characteristic into the HRD explanation of education’s contribution to economic development. Prof. Chung underscored the fact that “experience of compulsory military service for all males” is conducive to the high production rates of laborers. It’s the pool of already available talent that made possible the economic take off of Korea during the period of heavy-industry economic growth rise. Given that both human capital and status competition theories do not fit and explain this miracle, the best alternative perspective could be correspondence theory (Kim, 2019), a set of thesis that maintains that capitalist schooling is a strong system or state apparatus designed to, of producing docile workers. According to this thesis, the contents of schooling, such as like the formal curriculum, which that might bring forth about some abilities or competencies of students, do not really matter. In contrast, it would appear that, but the forms of school experiences that lead to school disciple matter greatly in connecting schools to the market.

5. Some Consequences of over-privatization

The speed of expansion of Korean higher education can only be described as explosive; and has been particularly rapid since the 1980s, as illustrated in [Figure VII-1]. One of the consequences of the simultaneous transition was that there was very little time to build up an efficient university system with adequate functional differentiation between public and private institutions, between metropolitan and provincial universities, between 4-year universities and junior colleges, and between research-oriented and teaching-oriented institutions. This process was reflected also in the secondary educational system, which also failed to develop a reasonable differentiation between college preparatory schools and vocational schools. No efforts were made to make secondary education comprehensive. Instead, vocational
high schools separated from academic schools and were allowed to provide a college-bound track for their students, who in turn eventually went on to receive some type of tertiary education.

Therefore, different universities and colleges in Korea did not develop their own unique missions and functions. All universities aspired to be major flagship universities. It is perhaps understandable that a newly established school chooses to model itself after a top ranking university as its defining institute. Many universities in the U.S. have attempted to model themselves on Harvard University. However, in Korea, all universities (public, private, metropolitan as well as provincial universities) model themselves upon Seoul National University. As a result, there has been very little differentiation of functions and purposes amongst various institutions. One example of the negative consequences of such a process is that several private universities have offered doctoral programs without adequate academic and institutional preparation and support.

The absence of a well-coordinated higher educational system has also critically affected the Korean economy and impacted upon the labor market. The higher educational institutions were not able to adequately meet the specific and strategic human resources needs of Korea’s rapidly growing knowledge-intensive industries. There was a serious mismatch between the ‘end products’ of higher education and the real needs of the labor market (Grubb et al., 2006, pp. 20-29). Some large corporations have responded to this by establishing their own educational training facilities where they are able to retrain their college graduate employees.

The 60 year-long history of Korean higher education can be summed up as lowest costs education. In 2006, the Ministry of Education allocated 6.4 percent of its budget to higher education. This amount is about 0.7 percent of the Korean gross domestic product (GDP), which in comparison to other OECD member countries is less than half of the average allocation (1.3%) of GDP spent on higher education. Despite the government’s inability and unwillingness to provide adequate resources, the Korean higher education system has expanded rapidly, largely due to extreme privatization.

What has been compromised in this record-breaking growth of higher education in Korea is the value of the “public good” in education. The Korean government has transferred its responsibility and commitments to educate the general public
onto the private sector, more specifically, to the parents and students themselves. This pattern is particularly noticeable in the tertiary education system. As shown in [Figure VII-6], only a little more of 10% of the Korean higher educational budget was provided by public funds. [Figure VII-7] shows that the Korean case is one of the worst among OECD countries. The degree of financial responsibility on the part of parents and students far exceeds the case of Japan and the US, which are known to have the most well developed private educational systems. This pattern of over-privatization is currently intensifying in Korea.

6. Lessons from the Korean Model

Korea has transformed itself into the world’s 11th largest economy, virtually from the total ruins of the civil war, over the last five decades or so. In this rapid and impressive transformation, the higher education system as a whole has played an essential role. The salient characteristics of this system can be summarized in the following three statements: The quantity is impressive, privatization is incredible, and the quality is diverse. We may draw some lessons from this Korean model.

(1) Functional differentiation among universities and colleges

The most critical issue that the Korean model demonstrates is the strong need for rebuilding a coherent system of tertiary education including lifelong learning that provides higher educational opportunities in more diverse forms and needs than currently is the case. In their recommendations, Grubb and his colleagues defined the system as “a structure that links individual colleges, universities, and other tertiary institutions, rather than simply a group of unrelated institutions.” (p. 63) The California State University System is an example of a coherent higher educational system that provides an equal educational opportunity to a student population remarkable for its tremendous diversity in terms of both educational needs and personal backgrounds. As Douglass (2000) points out in his compelling analysis, the Master Plan of the California System, this success is a result of long dialogue and hard-won compromises between the various stakeholders who hold
conflicting views and interests. Like the land grant universities of other states, the California System has successfully established a higher educational institution system with reasonable functional differentiation among colleges and universities that successfully meets diverse and unique educational needs. Thus, the California System has been able to not only meet the expanding demands of higher education but also build several world-class research universities. The California University System has played an essential role in helping the Californian economy become the world’s tenth largest economy. This is a truly remarkable achievement in itself.

The difficulty in establishing a higher educational system with efficient functional differentiation stems from the fact that the Korean government relied too heavily upon the private sector to meet the expanding demands for higher educational opportunities. It is as if the market’s invisible hand guides the simultaneous massification process of secondary and tertiary education. It is extremely difficult to establish a coherent and well-balanced educational system when about 80% of higher educational needs are met by private institutions and private funds. The comprehensive master plan has to be prepared in advance and used to guide the process of expansion so that the educational system is able to remain neutral to the private sector’s interests.

The Korean experience suggests the following lessons. First, the higher educational system has to clearly differentiate between research universities, teaching universities, and vocational colleges. Each individual college and university should develop their own unique system and structure for finance, curriculum, faculty recruitment, and student admission policy according to their missions and functions. The different levels and types of institutions should be interlinked and articulated with each other, so that, for example, a vocational college graduate who wishes to transfer to a 4-year university for a doctoral degree should be given such an opportunity. Faculty should be able to transfer between different types of schools, depending on their abilities and interests. However, teaching universities should maintain their commitment to the mission of teaching and instruction by carrying out teaching-related research, education and vocational-training.

Second, there has to be a governance system for universities and colleges of similar types and functions. Universities and colleges should be given complete freedom, particularly in the areas of faculty recruitment, curriculum development,
classroom instruction, and student admission policy. An autonomous committee of post-secondary education on a central government level should manage the governance system. Such a committee should be responsible for higher education as well as life-long education provision for adults and the elderly. In doing so, the committee will be better able to foster and expand the idea of the ‘public good’ in education. The central or regional government should be responsible for providing and securing finance, while the individual institutions should be able to manage funds according to their own unique needs and institutional environments.

(2) The renewal of the idea of the “public good” in higher education

The most challenging issue for public education in Korea is to restore the public aspect of public education. After several decades of the central government being largely unwilling and unable to provide the necessary resources for public education, policy makers, politicians, and even scholars have lost their critical perspective regarding the authentic and real meaning of the “public good” in education. It is the central government’s responsibility and commitment to the public to fund and provide adequate public education.

The idea of the “public good” in higher education can be promoted and reinforced by the national government providing the necessary resources for all. Ironically the only unchanging policy in Korean public education during the last 60 years has been the principle of exporting financial responsibility from government to the so-called beneficiaries which mean students and parents. The parents have been forced to share the financial burden with the national government. According to this principle, the public’s fundamental right to be educated becomes reduced to a form of economic behavior, and major educational decisions are made on the basis of profit motives. The element of the public good in education has been replaced by the market principle. An individual’s right to be educated has turned into profit-seeking commercial behavior. This change undermines the legitimacy of the public good in Korean higher education. This trend of privatization was initially introduced during the Japanese colonial era in order to suppress or limit the public’s educational opportunities. Under the American military administration during the second-half of the 1950s, privatization was an inevitable and temporary
strategy used to cope with the rapidly expanding aspiration for higher education. Unfortunately, what it was supposed to be a temporary measure has turned into a permanent one. Privatization reaches definite limits when the issues are moving from quantity to quality, especially to the quality of teaching and research. Building a world-class university, for example, requires a tremendous amount of funding and resources, which cannot solely be driven from the zeal of Korean parents for their children’s education.

(3) The making of an internationally competitive research university

The explosive expansion of schooling led by privatization has resulted in a great disparity in the quality of higher education. There co-exists a mixture of simple custodial institutes, diploma-mills, vocational colleges, comprehensive universities, and top-level research universities. As Kim (2007a) shows, a self-conscious and self-strengthening program of a particular university can result in the creation of a leading-edge research university in a peripheral country like Korea. Some of the Korean flagship universities are examples of such cases. The graduate programs of SNU, KAIST & Korea University have recently become very competitive by global standards. The Times ranked SNU to be 27th among the world’s top 50 universities for engineering & IT in 2009. The overall ranking of SNU has jumped from 93rd in 2005 to 47th in the 2009 survey. This impressive ascendance in world rankings can be termed as “a great leap forward.” (Kim, 2007a)

There are many factors that may explain this impressive achievement at the top-level universities in Korea. First of these factors is the fundamental strength of the secondary educational system. Students enter flagship universities only after top quality preparation. According to an international comparison published by the OECD, Korean students in the secondary education level ranked within the top 3 countries in problem-solving skills and mathematical abilities. Thus, it is not surprising that SNU, which admits only the brightest students, has the potential of becoming a world-class university. The second factor is the quality of undergraduate programs received by the students while at SNU. According to the “Survey of Earned Doctorates” conducted by NORC in 2008 at the University of Chicago, it surprisingly turns out that SNU, with 3,420 recipients, is second only to
UC-Berkeley, with 4,398 recipients, in the number of undergraduates who earned doctoral degrees in the United States between 1997 and 2006 (NORC, 2008). The undergraduate programs of SNU have seemed to serve as a second-best “University College,” which is a preparatory course for graduate programs in American research universities since the 1960s (Jenkins & Riesman, 1963). Thirdly, the Korean intellectual tradition of a strong and committed relationship between a mentor and his disciples becomes a productive and potent academic force for modern graduate programs. It is fascinating to see a unique and indigenous academic tradition and practice playing a useful role as a crucial resource for empowering the international competitiveness of research universities in the era of the knowledge-economy.
Chapter 8

Reflections on the Making of and Prospects for the Remaking of Korean Universities

Tertiary education in Korea, as a whole, has been undergoing a severe crisis for which there seems, at present, no feasible solution. This crisis seemingly originated from two principle causes, one of which stems from an ideal and the other from a harsher reality. There have been conflicting conceptions of the idea of a university among stake holders since the political controversy over the SNU Plan in 1946: from professors, administrators, government officials, and others. In addition to this confusion, there has always existed a cadre of incompetent and politically inclined bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education. The reasons behind and the processes at work in the current crisis are the principle concerns of this book. To these ends, I explore the peculiarities of Korean higher education; an education system that has been made, unmade and re-made over the last seven decades. This is done to reveal some of the underlying factors that has caused Korean tertiary education to fall into such deep disarray. My purpose is not to write an institutional history. As demonstrated in Chapter One, it is instead, a piece of historical sociology of higher education inspired by the exemplary work of Durkheim. In his work (1936), he analyzed the making of French classical education over a thousand years.

There seem to be two aspects to the above mentioned peculiarities. One is something manifest, and the other is something more latent or hidden. The academic relationship between prominent mentor and loyal students belongs to a long standing notable tradition, whereas university governance has been either confusing or absent. In Chapter Two, I showed that neither internal (faculty republic) nor external (lay board) governance has managed to prevail since 1948, but the legal shackles of tight control of every aspect of the schools by the education ministry does. This is the most notable peculiarities of university governance in Korea. The absence of university governance was the critical factor leading to the total failure of the higher education system.

In the previous Chapters, we saw the confusions and misunderstandings concerning
the vital policy issues of the university. In this final Chapter, I shall sum up the three components that have been conducive to creating and prolonging this crisis: unstable governance, the lack of the system, over-privatization in finance, and the small contribution of tertiary education to Korea’s economic miracle.

The Korean universities and colleges are the outcomes of the cultural clash, confrontation, and adaptation between the Eastern and the Western forms of higher education. The current structures and operational environment of Korean universities reflect various systems and models. They included a traditional mentor-disciple (Gates) relationship, as shown in Chapter One. The solid bond between an eminent professor and the ablest of his or her students seemed to recapitulate the time-honored conventional connection between a mentor and disciples from the Chosun dynasty. Onto to this was grafted both the German model of a research university adopted, altered and imposed by Japan during her 35 years of imperial occupation, and later, an American system of tertiary education imposed during the American Military Government during 1945-1948, as shown in Chapter Three. The collision of these three conflicting ideas of the university may explain the enormous difficulties in producing a working consensus among professors within a school about how to select deans and presidents, let alone how to reform their long-term school policies. Eventually, it leads to unstable, incoherent, and confusing governance.

1. Governance

Unambiguously, both stable governance and the forceful leadership of university presidents were the two pillars which helped build the great American research universities (Thelin, 2004). These institutions later became customarily known as “World-class Research Universities.” Some countries tried to introduce the American style of external governance but failed, while others kept and maintained their time-honored domestic varieties. Korea belongs to the first group while Japan belongs to the second. Boyer, Altbach & Whitelaw (1994, p. 15) reported the survey results that university governance has been “one of the most confusing and most tension-ridden issues in higher education.” They showed that “more than half among the fourteen participant countries responded that the relationship between
faculty and administration are “fair” or “poor.” Korea was the least content case, with 84% of discontents. Japan was the only example to say they were “influential” in helping to shape key academic policies at the school level. The Japanese case was related to its stable governance of internal control by the faculty, as established in Kyoto University from the 1920s. Some reasons behind the higher levels of dissatisfaction amongst Korean faculty resulted from the very particular type of governance: strict and harsh ministerial control with unbearable levels of political interference.

Since the failure of replacing internal with external governance, as embedded in the 1946 SNU Plan, the issue of governance has been unresolved and accordingly has long been “the most confusing and most tension-ridden issue.” As seen in Chapter Two, it was not the SNU Plan (external governance) but faculty members’ political protests against the Plan that failed in the 1948 disputes. Escaping from the harsh ministerial control became a common goal of all faculty members, whose bandwagon was the so-called “democratization” of universities. The real burning issue is how to select the President of the public universities. For the majority of faculty, the meaning of democratization is simply reinstating popular votes. This is the case at not only large universities but even in relatively small education colleges with less than 40 faculty members. In large regional public universities, there were two independent votes, one for college deans and the other for the university president. There have been continuous tensions and disputes between parochial deans and presidents. School politics have virtually ruined the ethos of the university.

The Medieval guilds of students (or universitas) in northern Italy were the historical origins of external governance. It was in part derived from Dutch, Scottish and Irish sources and the idea of the lay board was then transferred via these traditions when the American colonies were settled. The Founding Fathers of private universities “detested the sloth and autonomy of Oxford scholars, accept the Scottish practice relying on an external board, rather than faculty control.” (Thelin, 2004, pp. 11-12) The legacy of the colonial American colleges is that of an “external board combined with a strong college president” (p. 12). Removed was the idea of the colleges as a form of a self-perpetuating guild for the benefit of the faculty. All the American land-grant public universities followed this innovation.
Thus, established was an American pattern of external governance in which “the president is the school’s CEO” who tended to “function as an authority onto himself and answerable only to a non-resident board of trustees, not faculty” (Lucas, 1994, pp. 302-303). Neither Korean scholars nor senior government officials have held such a vision or practice in university governance.

The choice of a selection method of the president is hardly something to do with university autonomy and freedom, and does not necessarily lead to democracy in and outside a school. It is only in Korea where the issue of choosing a pattern of governance became entangled with the idea of university autonomy, specifically, freedom from the shackles of ministerial control. This confusion resulted from the failure of de-colonization and separation from the Japanese legacy of higher education, best shown in Tokyo and other imperial universities (Cutts, 1999). These conflicting ideas of the university have resulted in misunderstandings and disputes surrounding university governance. The Japanese example and legacy still support the practice of internal management or the faculty republic in Korea. This idea has kept the practice of popular vote as a component of the selection of university presidents. Harvard University President Derek Bok (1980), in his reaffirming of the 1957 Supreme Courts’ rule against the intrusion of government politics, asserted that there are “four essential freedoms” of a university: “the freedom to determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it should be taught, and who may be admitted to study” (Lucas, 1994; Thelin, 2004, pp. 343-344).

The solid legal protection of the primary activities of higher education from the intrusion of government is indeed the case in America and elsewhere, but not in Korea. In addition to Bok’s four freedoms, Korea arguably needs to add two more; the freedom to run a school without political intrusion and the freedom to determine student quotas and their tuition fees in private schools. It is not surprising that the Blue House sends the Vice-Minister of Education to a private university to investigate a janitors’ strike orchestrated by the notoriously militant Minjunochong (labor union). The Ministry of Education has fixed and then frozen student tuition fees for more than a decade. However, tuition and fees have been the most significant sources of income in private schools. It is not the rise of world-class universities, but the survival of private schools under this dictatorship of ministerial control that might be called the Korean miracle of tertiary education.
2. Division of labor among institutions

In 1989, the OECD urged member countries to adopt the 1960 California Master Plan for Higher Education as the best case for keeping the principles of social equality of opportunity in post-secondary education, while preserving the separate missions of the three types of public institutions.” (Douglass, 2000, 311-312) It is Kerr, the Chancellor of California, who, in scaling up Wilhelm von Humboldt’s idea of the research university in terms of the freedoms to teach and to know, which has seen remarkably advances in building both institutions as well as ideas. The Plan combines excellence with access and equality of opportunity in the service of the state, society, and economy through “the device of a managed division of labor between institutions, with missions, both comprehensive within their frames and distinct from each other“ (Marginson, 2004, p. 12). This model was born from what was, in fact, a bargain between the University of California and a state university, which wanted to become a second fully fledged university. Later, community colleges were established within commuting distance of almost every citizen in town. The consensus among the three sectors consolidated the Californian tripartite system. (Douglass, 2000) The underlying consensus is that there shouldn’t be a higher education system “where every component was intent on being another Harvard or Berkeley or Stanford.” (Marginson, 2004, p. 18) In his efforts to create this system, Kerr, the founding father, was helped by the state constitution of 1879. It gave legal status to the University and the board of regents, removing both from direct political interference. This 1879 measure was set long before the 1957 Supreme Court Case reaffirmed by President Bok. The UC campuses were, moreover, not owned by the state government or the people of California, but by the regents. Instead of an overarching governing board, there was a low-key coordinating council to ensure cooperation between the sectors. A division of labor co-existed with a delegation of authority and power.

The maintenance of a rigid division of labor between research universities, the state colleges, and two-year community colleges was the route to the successful implementation of the Plan as well as to the overall expansion of social access. The elite, research-intensive University of California recruited from the top 12.5 percent of the school graduate cohort. Thus, UC secured its position of excellence
by guaranteeing the quality of its incoming students and concentrating the public investment in research. The middle sector, the state colleges, recruited from the top 33.3 percent of school graduates. The two-year community colleges provided an open door to all comers, undertaking to provide universal literacy as well as equal opportunities. These schools were the cornerstone of California’s transition from mass to universal access to tertiary education. CSU’s and CCs were located more on the mass than the elite side of the system because their potential for research and doctoral training was truncated. This firm downward segmentation of opportunity—with highly selective doctoral universities and the barriers to academic drift in both the two-year and the other four-year institutions—were to be leavened by guaranteeing individual (students and faculty) upward transfers between the sectors. “This system embodied the idea of higher education as more than a collection of individual institutions; rather, these were interdependent institutions operating within the framework of common public structures and with a commitment to a single set of ideas within structured limits. The system was a major departure from the idea of the university as a stand-alone firm that was influential than in the private sector.” (Marginson, 2004, p. 20)

Compared to the Californian case of a division of labor, one of the most significant drawbacks of the universities in Korea was a fatal failure to create a variety of tertiary institution as a system with a clear-cut diversification and functional differentiation among schools. As shown in Chapter Six, Korea seemed to reach the stage of tertiary education for all (in short, TEFA). This came about not as a result of any Master Plan nor any access policies. TEFA happened to everybody’s surprise. The people’s uncoordinated demands for more opportunities to access tertiary education, and to carry that access as far as was desired, started a process of drastic expansion in the number of institutions and the number of students within them without a concerted overall plan or long-term forecasts. During the rapid double transition shown in Chapter Four and Six, many universities have experienced exploration, without having the opportunity to make adequate adjustments to their missions, functions, and structures. Instead, such universities offer similar programs and majors without any real, functional differentiation among various levels of schooling. All universities in Korea consider SNU as the “defining institution,” to use Steedman’s term (1987), and attempt to model themselves after
SNU. The California Plan firmly prohibited such a move and created the tripartite system with its separate governance. Most universities in Korea aspire to be like SNU, whilst Japanese universities aspire to be a “Todai” (Cutts, 1999). What has occurred is what Riesman (1966) termed a “meandering procession” on the road toward excellence as observed in the U.S.

The absence of a well-coordinated higher education system has also critically affected the Korean economy and impacted upon the labor market. The higher educational institutions were not able to adequately meet the specific and strategic human resources needs of Korea’s rapidly growing knowledge-intensive industries. The KEDI report also indicated fascinating facts in that “the overall employment rate for all graduates of tertiary education in 2004 (August 2003, February 2004 graduates) was 66.8%, with 77.2% of all two-year college graduates and 56.4% of university graduates seeking employment. This data shows that four-year BA degree holders find it more difficult to secure a job than Associate BA degree holders. The mismatch between the human resources produced by tertiary education and the demands of industries is, in fact, a perennial one. OECD experts have found a severe mismatch in Korea between the end products of higher education and the real needs of the labor market (Grubb et al., pp. 20-29). Some large corporations have responded to this by establishing their own training facilities where they can retrain their college graduate employees. In their country report, OECD experts examine several distinct types of mismatches in Korea. The pervasive problems of over-education, rather than a shortage of skilled workers is one of them.

3. Over-privatization

Privatization is a worldwide trend in higher education. Recently, various privatization policies have been put into effect in Western societies and even in former socialist countries where the higher education system has been public in nature. Altbach (2002) concurs in more general terms in his orientation that “while many look to America’s impressive private higher education sector, it is more useful to draw on the Asian experience.” Countries that allow the private sector to develop can look to Japanese, Philippine’s and Korea’s experiences for reflection. More than 80% of students are currently at private universities and
colleges in Korea, compared to only about 20% in America. As shown in Chapter Six, 83% of the national budget for higher education comes from family funds, a unique phenomenon unseen in America, where the private sectors are far more dominant than the public sectors. Presently, in Korea, even the most selective national universities still rely on tuition fees for more than one-third of their revenue. The distinction between public and private sector has thus become very blurred.

The current “modern” higher education system of Korea started from the “Gap-o” 1894/95 Education Reform. However, the Confucian (551–479 B.C.) cultural tradition and practice of teaching around 500 BC was the historical and cultural origins of private higher learning in Korea. An archetype form of privatization emerged, following Confucius Analeptics (VII. 7); by bringing “bundles of dried fish” as nominal tuition to the teacher. The Confucian model also formed the basis for the very old form of non-formal and less-institutionalized (NFLI) private learning for intellectuals. This academic tradition and lineage composed of the very Asian form of private lessons, none of which can be found in the West. As shown in Chapter One, the University of Paris arose from a strong institutional base and organization which originated from the Medieval guilds.

It was true that both the public and private sectors have played their own essential roles in indigenous higher learning in Asia (Min, 2004). As in China, there existed in Korea a dual system of education: public education run by the central and local government, and a network of various sites for private lessons. It has been a longstanding, common practice among historians of Korean higher education to argue that the first public colleges were Taehak (Great Learning, 太學), founded in 372 A.D., and its succeeding institution, Sungkyunkwan, (成均館), established by the government in 1398. These were the centers of training of the Korean literati or scholar-bureaucrats and were the Asian counterparts to the Western medieval “universitas.” However, this argument has served to obscure rather than illuminate our knowledge of one of the most distinguishing characteristics of traditional higher learning and teaching sites of Korea. Unlike the University of Paris in the 12th Century, Sungkyunkwan was not the center of excellence of Neo-Confucian studies, but a national institute for lesser degree holders to reside for a certain period to study and pass their final national examination to become
qualified civil officers. It was, however, at a variety of NFLI institutes that most of the learning and teaching of the Korean literati was carried out, ranging from a family school to Letter Hall, and to the private seminaries known as Sowon (書院), the most institutionalized of the private schools, operating with governmental authorization.

Indigenousness scholastic traditions were cultivated and maintained through academic discussions and an extended exchange of manuscripts, correspondence, and letters. They, however, have been the center of excellence in research in keeping with the Confucian way and training of the power elites of the Kingdom. If it is the University Paris where Western Scholasticism blossomed in the medieval period, then it is the Gate (to the Way), through which a distinctive academic lineage was made, where the renaissance of Korean Confucianism has taken place since the early 16th century. It was these Gates and the academic lineage of scholars which passed through them, not any formal institutions created by either the central or local government, which were comparable to Medieval Universities. Interestingly, these traditions and practices are found even in today’s modern westernized universalities in Korea. As I stated rather boldly in Chapter Seven, a strong bond of mentor-disciple relations at Seoul National University serves as one of the powerful and effective driving forces for successful academic achievement.

The transition from elite to universal access to tertiary education was attained in less than three decades, an achievement that took the U.S. almost half a century (Trow, 1961). This rapid transition to universal access to higher education in Korea occurred almost immediately after, or simultaneously with, the swift change to universal secondary education. This phenomenon can be termed as “the unprecedented simultaneous transition to universal access to both secondary and tertiary education. The vigor and speed of TEFA is especially remarkable when we take into consideration the minimal public financial resources available at the time. Korea has been used as an archetype and model before, such as when the Chinese government scrutinized Korea’s privatization efforts before launching its own in the 1990’s. Following this notable success, however, TEFA spawned a process of over-privatization which has since regressed into disaster. Over-privatization started to appear as early as 1950 when the supremacy of private over public education occurred. This trend of privatization changed during the Japanese colonial era to
suppress or limit the public’s educational opportunities, with virtually no higher education being made available. The American military administration between 1945-1948 maintained this status quo as an inevitable temporary strategy used to cope with the rapidly expanding aspiration for higher education amongst the public in the context of very limited public financial resources.

The UNESCO Mission Report drafted in the 1950s underscored that “a striking feature of the financing of education in Korea is that secondary and higher education is financed to the extent of at least 75% by voluntary contribution from parents. (1952, p.103) Based on those facts and realities, the authors offered a particular recommendation regarding education financing as follows:

The full cost of primary education and at least 50% of the costs of public secondary and higher education should be supplied as soon as possible from tax sources (UNESCO, 1953, p. 103)

The Korean government has rarely taken external experts’ recommendations regarding higher education very seriously, as shown in Chapter Three. For an inexcusably long time, it failed to set up any firm policy of funding primary education from tax until the 1990s. For education experts from abroad or home, a key problem consisted of shifting from private funds to public taxation as a basis for the financial support of public education, including tertiary education. Whilst both Japan and Korea were the two countries that have spent the least amount of public funds on higher education; Korea’s dependence has been much more severe than Japan’s. The loss of the meaning of education as a public good has fueled private expenditure on education. The ever-growing increase in the amount and proportion of private funds that were invested in the education market by parents, has in turn further broken down the meaning of a common good. This vicious cycle of over-privatization was the mechanism of the simultaneous transition to universal access to secondary and tertiary education.

While all higher education institutions in Korea rely on private funds, the vocational colleges have the highest degree of reliance on the private sector. This pattern differs sharply from the Californian Master Plan. In America, community colleges are mostly state-funded public institutions with virtually free education. The dominance of private vocational training meant that the financial burden from lower SES parents would continue to increase to the point so that the idea of
higher education as a form of public good seemed to be severely eroded. Moreover, tertiary education has often served to reproduce the level of social and economic inequality outside the education system itself.

The time has come to take steps to solve the grave crisis of Korean higher education before it is too late. Now is the right time to seriously consider the OECD’s 1989 suggestions. It is also the time to make use of the lessons from the 1960 California Plan which has produced a stable and robust system of higher education for excellence in teaching and research, social equality of educational opportunities, and economic prosperity for the State of California. It is, therefore, the time to remake the system of Korean higher education. Piecemeal reforms or added-on policies will not suffice. Nothing short of an overall reconstruction of the system is urgently required, with a particular focus on new governance and a new division of labor among public universities, and similar coordination amongst private institutions. The very key of reconstruction is to have a substantial and irreversible legal base that protects schools from political interference and harsh ministerial control. In the Californian case, the State Constitution of 1879, as well as the 1950 Supreme Courts Case, protected university freedom from national political intrusion. The so-called “democratization” of universities is also insufficient a response to this crisis, for it more often than not puts a specific focus on the direct popular votes for the presidential election. The minimum measure is to remove the shackles of tight administrative control and liberate universities to become self-autonomous entities. As shown in Chapter Seven, some flagship universities could undertake such a self-transformation, changing from peripheral to world-class research universities, utilizing their own, home-grown, self-strengthening competence and will. In this remarkable transformation, it will not be the research funds given by the education ministry, but a living tradition of mentor-disciple relationships that will make all the difference.
1) Official English Name: Equalization of High School Policy. Referred to as EHS for the convenience of the reader.
2) Times Higher Education Supplement, 2005 & 2006. World university rankings
http://www.thes.co.uk/statistics/international_comparisons/
3) Kim, Kwang Uk et al. (2004)
4) Kim, Tae Jong et al. (2004)
5) They applied difference in difference method.
6) Coleman, J. S. et al. (1982)
7) The scholars that we corresponded with were three angels that go by the names Mike (Marshall) Smith (Education Director, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation), Michael Olneck (UW-Madison, EPS & Sociology), and Michael Seltzer (UCLA).
8) The formation of the composite data set was made possible by Dr. Ryu, Han Gu, a participant in the research done by Kim, Ki Seok et al. (2005).
10) A certain parent may have a child who ranked in the top 5% during his middle school years. If he resides in a prohibited school district, the parent may ask whether the school of a prohibited sector or the FL&S high school is more advantageous to the child. In order to answer this question, we need to compare the IS of the student to the average IS of the two schools and then deduce the GR of the students. Then we can compare the results and provide an answer to the above question.
12) We looked at the complete data and original data afterwards and found there were no major differences.
13) Goldschmidt, P., K. Choi, & F. Martinez (2004). The rank-order correlation for each school calculated by using the standard score and the average score was shown to be over .95.
14) Funding for this work was provided by the SNU Development Funds. This is a substantial revision of my previous paper on Korean flagship universities that was presented at the Boston College in 2004. The flagship university project was funded by Ford Foundation. I thank to Professor S. H. Nam who helped for refining the presentation paper. Special thanks should go to Director Altbach and his staffs for their comments and editorial works.
15) The term “gate” originated from and was widely used in the Buddhist academic traditions and practices from thousands of years ago. The Buddha himself is, for example, the gate to the Buddhist way for his many thousands of disciples and greater number of faithful followers. Likewise, Confucius himself is also the gate to the
Confucian way for his legendary 3,000 disciples from all over China. For Buddha and Confucius, a gate signifies the highest degree of intellectual excellence combined with the same degree of moral integrity of a prominent mentor. Entering a certain gate means positioning oneself as a lifetime disciple of the mentor. Korean scholars often call someone “a student working under a certain gate” to classify a serious and committed disciple of a particular prominent scholar. Here “under” means making the student a humble disciple. Heated debates among competing gates reinforce their own intellectual standings among scholars with and without civil service jobs. Sometimes a group evolves into a political party, especially when national security is in danger. These circles constitute loosely connected mentor-disciple relations but have neither an institutional base as in European universities nor an organizational base as in medieval guilds among artisans. These relationships, however, have been the center of excellence in research in keeping with the Confucian way and teaching of the power elites during the Kingdom of Chosun.

16) According to The Times, SNU with a score of 38.3 is located between Johns Hopkins University with 39 and UC-San Diego with 36.7. If we only count American research universities, leaving out European, Japanese and Chinese institutions, among the 100 universities, Johns Hopkins University is 16th and UC-San Diego is 17th. If these rankings are valid, we can hardly reject SNU’s self-evaluation of its standing among its benchmark counterparts in America. For data on Harvard, see the school’s 2004 Analysis of Financial Results. For data on the University of Tokyo, see the school’s statement of 2003 (http://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/fin/01/06_01j.html); its total research funds included a research subsidiary from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, in addition to external funds from private groups, enterprises, and other sources. For data on UCLA, see the Campus Facts in Brief 2004-2005 (http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/annualreport/2005/).

17) Table A.1.2, p. 37

18) This paper is a revision of my paper presented at Hurst Seminar on Higher Education and Equality of Opportunity, Ben Gurion University and published on APER, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009. My former graduate assistant and colleague Professor Hwan-Bo Park did much of the data revision work. Funding of this research was in part provided by NRF of Korea (Outstanding Scholars Program) and Academic Leadership Institute for Competency-based Education (BK21) of SNU.

19) As a Russian term, Vnarod literally means “to the people.”

20) The other contrasting but inseparable component of Confucius philosophy is ki (Ch’i in Chinese) which emphasizes the energizing component. See “The Culture of the Neo-Confucian Literati,” (Lee, 1984, pp. 217-220), for the detailed discussion of Korean Confucian tradition.

21) For historical records on the birth place of Korean Catholic Church and Yi Byok’s pioneering activities and advanced scholarship, please refer to the following website at http://www.chonjinam.or.kr/english/
Primary sources
Captured Korean Documents, RG242, National Archives
American Military Government in Korea, RG332, National Archives


Brender, A. (2004). Asia’s new high-tech tiger: South Korea’s ambitious, and expensive, effort to bolster university research is paying off, Chronicle of Higher Education, 5(46), A34.


Official California Legislative Information (http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/const.html).


Cutts, R. L. (1997). An empire of schools: Japan’s universities and the molding of a
national power elite, NY: M.E. Sharpe.


Seoul National University, Educational Research Institute.


Ilchogak.


Official California Legislative Information (http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/const.html).


Sources of the Papers

Chapter 2
Original publication
This article was reprint with the same title in Han, & Javis (2016, eds). East and West in Comparative Education: Searching for New Perspectives. NY. NY. : Rutledge.

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5
Linking high schools to universities: Partisan debates on the policy to ban entrance exam to high schools.
This is a revision and translation of the following paper:

Chapter 6
It was a revision and synthesis of the following two papers.


Chapter 7


This is a revision and synthesis of the following two papers
